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ANCIENT LAND LAW: MESOPOTAMIA, EGYPT, ISRAEL
This Article provides an overview of the land regimes that the
peoples of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel created by law and custom
between 3000 B.C. and 500 B.C. One purpose of the endeavor is nar-
rowly pedagogic. In the United States, students who enroll in courses
on property law traditionally have found the history of land law
treated in highly stylized fashion. The leading casebooks begin their
historical accounts with the Norman Conquest of 1066, sketch the
English land regime under high feudalism, and then chronicle the de-
velopments over the ensuing centuries, particularly the weakening of
the crown and the rise of a landowner's powers of alienation.' Be-
cause English legal history is more directly relevant to an Anglo-
American lawyer than any other remote history, some emphasis on
these events is entirely appropriate. The shortcoming of this peda-
gogic tradition, however, is that the English struggles are presented as
if they are without parallel. This is highly misleading. This Article
demonstrates that the peoples of the ancient Near East grappled with
comparable issues some 3,000 years before the English Normans did.
A look at land regimes in the earliest periods of human history
can illuminate debate over the extent to which human institutions can
be expected to vary from time to time and place to place. On this
crucial question there are four general schools of opinion: rational-
actor optimists, rational-actor pessimists, stage theorists, and cultural
pluralists.
Some scholars who embrace a rational-actor model of human be-
havior are willing to leap from attributing universal characteristics to
individuals to predicting significant regularities in social institutions.
2
These rational-actor optimists forecast, with some caveats, that
changes in economic conditions will prompt residents of a society to
alter their property institutions so as to minimize the sum of: (1)
1. See, e.g., A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 185-
218 (3d ed. 1984); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 193-324 (3d ed. 1993);
JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RuLEs, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 502-23 (1993).
2. Levmore, for example, has theorized: (1) that societies tend to develop efficient legal
rules to prevent opportunistic behavior; and (2) when the efficient approach is plain, that these
rules tend to converge. Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith
Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987) [hereinafter Levmore, Variety and Uniformity]; Saul
Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort
Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986) [hereinafter Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law]. For the-
oretical and empirical doubts about this convergence theory, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Water Law
in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal Convergence, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1989).
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transaction costs; and (2) the costs of coordination failures. 3 For ex-
ample, one of the authors has hypothesized: that "a close-knit group
virtually always entitles its members to own, as private property, lands
used for dwellings, crops, and other intensive activities"; 4 that mem-
bers of a close-knit group can be expected to opt for communal
(group) ownership of lands only in circumstances where those ar-
rangements exploit significant efficiencies of scale or spread signifi-
cant risks that would otherwise be concentrated; and that a society
invariably surrounds its private and communal parcels with a network
of public open-access lands.5 Did the civilizations of the ancient Near
East generate the marble cakes of land arrangements that this theory
predicts?
Scholars who are rational-actor pessimists stress that defects in
social-choice processes commonly prevent a society from developing
adaptive institutions. A society is likely to go off track, various of
these commentators might say, by starting down a path not easily re-
versed,6 or failing to prevent special interests from capturing undue
political power. 7 To illustrate, ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and
Israel all had "palace" and "temple" organizations. Rational-actor
pessimists might predict that these organizations, or others, would
sometimes have succeeded in establishing inefficient land institutions
that served the narrow interests of their constituencies.8
Stage theorists aspire to identify sequences in institutional
change. With earlier roots in the Scottish Enlightenment, stage theory
was ascendent in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when Henry
Maine, Lewis Henry Morgan, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and other lead-
ing intellectuals became engrossed with ancient civilizations. These
3. In the context of land institutions, this viewpoint is exemplified by Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (property rights evolve
adaptively in response to changes in supply and demand conditions); Robert C. Ellickson, Prop-
erty in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993) [hereinafter Property in Land] (members of close-knit
groups tend to generate rules that enhance the welfare of group members); and, for the ancient
world specifically, MORRIS SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES OF THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST
(1985) [hereinafter SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES].
4. Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1332.
5. Id. at 1331-32, 1341-44, 1381-87.
6. See, e.g., Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL ECON. 912 (1994).
Also, see the folk theorem in game theory, which asserts that even an uncooperative equilibrium
can be stable as long as each player could do even worse.
7. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991);
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION,
AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).




scholars sought to discern the transitions from, say, hunter-gatherer
band, to rude agricultural village, to walled city.9 Marx in particular
aspired to induce a theory of historical progression based on underly-
ing property relations and "ruling classes." 10 Much of the Marxian
literature envisages a transition in late prehistory from a primitive tri-
bal communism, in which class exploitation was absent, to emerging
forms of private property that did entail exploitation. Marx's devo-
tees, such as Engels and Lenin, tended to simplify his themes.'1 Their
most reductionist work envisioned a succession of stages: in the
past-savagery, solidary clans, slavery, serfdom, and capitalism; 12 in
the future-socialism and ultimately pure communism. 13 During the
twentieth century, this linear script captured the imagination of many
intellectuals and revolutionaries. Marxian ideas have particularly
colored the work of the Soviet school of scholars of the ancient Near
East. Does evidence from the ancient world support this or any other
stage-theory of history?
Cultural pluralists, who now dominate work in history, anthropol-
ogy, and sociology, stress differences among societies and epochs and
the dangers of generalizing across them.14 This perspective is also well
represented within the legal academy. For example, scholars associ-
ated with the Critical Legal Studies movement have tended to empha-
size the mutability and contingency of human institutions.15 For them,
9. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: IN CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY His-
TORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (Oxford University Press 1946) (1861);
LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY (Henry Holt & Co. 1877); KARL MARX, PRE-CAPI-
TALIST ECONOMIC FORMATIONS (Jack Cohen trans. & E.J. Hobsbawm ed., 1965) [hereinafter
MARX, ECONOMIC FORMATIONS] (mostly excerpts from GUNDRISSE (1857-58)); MAX WEBER,
THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVIUZATIONS 69-77 (R.I. Frank trans., NLB 1976)
(1909).
10. Writing before many of the significant archeological finds in Mesopotamia and Egypt,
Marx saw history as a succession of stages based on modes of production, starting from a variety
of "primary" bases: the Asiatic, the ancient, the Germanic, and the Slavonic. See E.J. Hob-
sbawm, Introduction to MARX, ECONOMIC FORMATIONS, supra note 9, at 27-38.
11. FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE
STATE: IN LIGHT OF THE RESEARCHES OF LEWIS H. MORGAN (Int'l Publishers 1972) (1884); on
Lenin's views, See KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
TOTAL POWER 389-400 (1957).
12. See ENGELS. supra note 11, at 19, 160. For a critical assessment, see FREDERIC L.
PRYOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DISTRIBUTION IN PRIMI-
TIVE AND PEASANT ECONOMIES 222-24 (1977).
13. See Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875) in KARL MARX: SELECTED
WRITINGS 564-65, 568-69 (David McLellan ed., 1977).
14. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973),
typifies this perspective.
15. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THE-
ORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histo-
ries, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
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ideology, language, class structure, and other interrelated cultural fac-
tors strongly influence institutions, including land regimes. A look
back to earliest recorded human history can shed light on the plausi-
bility of this perspective.
Our objective in this Article is not to reveal new findings about
the ancient Near East-a task for which the senior author in particu-
lar is unqualified. Instead, our first aspiration is to publicize to a wide
academic audience a trove of material about land institutions at the
dawn of history. To scholars interested in institutional development,
we offer the ultimate in time-series data.16 Aspiring to stimulate re-
search, we pursue breadth, not depth. As a result, our discussion skit-
ters across cultures and millennia.
Our second aim is to analyze this material from a law-and-eco-
nomics perspective. This approach involves a set of methodological
assumptions that should be made explicit. First, it assumes that 5,000
years is too brief a span for significant genetic evolution, and there-
fore that "human nature," such as it is, was no different in ancient
times than it is in current times. Second, law-and-economics employs
the previously mentioned rational-actor model of human behavior. 17
This model anticipates that an individual will estimate the expected
utility of alternative actions, and then choose the action that promises
to maximize his personal expected utility, which may, of course, re-
flect a concern for others' welfare. 18 Despite its many limitations, 19
we regard this model as a fruitful prism in all social contexts, and
think it has been too seldom used by scholars of ancient institutions.20
Some historians regard the standard economic paradigm as an in-
appropriate heuristic for analysis of ancient economies. They believe,
apparently, that people were too differently motivated then, or that
markets could not, or did not, function in those environments. 21 We
16. Rather than commencing our analysis with a johnny-come-lately civilization such as an-
cient Rome, we have chosen to peer back twice as far.
17. A third, and presumably uncontroversial, assumption is that people in ancient societies
faced scarcities of resources and possessed limited technical and scientific knowledge.
18. See sources cited in Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Ra-
tional Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 Cmn.-KE, L. REV. 23, 23 n.2
(1989).
19. See, e.g., id. at 23-26, 35-55.
20. Levmore and Miller have been pioneers in the application of tools of law-and-econom-
ics to ancient law. See Levmore, Variety and Uniformity, supra note 2; Levmore, Rethinking
Comparative Law, supra note 2; Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis, 22 J. LEGAL STuD. 15
(1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, Ritual and Regulation: A Legal-Economic Interpretation of Selected
Biblical Texts, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1993).
21. See, e.g., KARL Pot.Nyi, THE LIVELIHOOD OF MAN 6-7 (Harry W. Pearson ed., 1977)
[hereinafter PotAtyi, LiVELIHOOD] (prices in noncommercial transactions do not fluctuate with
1995]
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dissent from this view, and strive to demonstrate that law-and-eco-
nomics can illuminate the institutions emerging at the outset of
civilization. 22
I. Ti ANCIENT NEAR EAST
Taken together, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel provide a rich
lode of material on ancient land institutions.23 Despite their relative
proximity, these three civilizations (two Goliaths and one David) dif-
fered sharply in numerous respects, including religion, language, and
writing system. All three embraced a variety of practices that offend
modern sensibilities-slavery, polygamy, and (with the qualified ex-
ception of Israel) polytheism. Nevertheless, Mesopotamia and Egypt
rightly are regarded as cradles of civilization. 24 By 3000 B.C., before
any other society, the peoples of these lands had separately developed
systems of writing, were capable of living in cities, and were beginning
to engineer earthworks and other massive construction projects that
for millennia would awe travelers from abroad. Ancient Israel, situ-
ated roughly equidistant between Mesopotamia and Egypt, took root
in the highlands of Canaan during the late second millennium,25
nearly two thousand years afterward. The Israelites, however, ulti-
mately had more direct influence on Western culture.
A. Mesopotamia
Mesopotamia, literally "the land between the rivers," lies be-
tween the Tigris and Euphrates, largely in present-day Iraq.
Babylonia, the southern portion of the area, offers the richest concen-
supply and demand until time of the French physiocrats); M.I. FINLEY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
IN ANCIENT GREECE 71-73 (Brent D. Shaw & Richard P. Saler eds., 1982) (land was not a
commodity in ancient Athens and ancient Rome); Johannes Renger, On Economic Structures in
Ancient Mesopotamia, 63 ORIENTAtUA 157, 166-68 (1994) [hereinafter Renger, Economic Struc-
tures] (criticizing Morris Silver's work and commending various scholars for being skeptical
about "the appropriateness of applying modem economic concepts to ancient economies"); see
also infra Part IX.
22. There has been an analogous debate in the field of developmental economics. Adher-
ents of the "moral economy" school have been reluctant or unwilling to view peasants as rational
economic maximizers. Their critics have no such qualms. For an introduction to this debate, see
Jose Edgardo L. Campos & Hilton L. Root, Markets, Norms, and Peasant Rebellions: A Rational
Choice Approach with Implications for Rural Development, 7 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 93 (1995).
23. We take some reassurance from the fact that Max Weber started his remarkable study
of ancient times with an examination of the same three civilizations. See WEBER, supra note 9,
at 81-366.
24. One scholar of the ancient Near East defines the four essentials of civilization as: agri-
culture, cities, "advanced social organization," and writing. A. BERNARD KNAPP, THE HISTORY
AND CULTURE OF ANCIENT WESTERN ASIA AND EoYPT 14 (1988).
25. All references to specific millennia in this Article should be understood as B.C.
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tration of sources for our inquiry. Deceptively inauspicious, it is a
semi-arid and exceptionally flat alluvial plain,26 with virtually no rain
during the eight-month dry season and a mean daily high temperature
reaching 122 degrees Fahrenheit in August.2 7
Babylonia's climate and topography destined it to become a quin-
tessential "hydraulic society," to invoke Karl Wittfogel's influential
phrase.28 By no later than 4000 B.C., the natives of the region had
recognized that, by controlling the Euphrates to provide irrigation,
they could transform this inhospitable desert floodplain into fertile
cropland. In its natural state, the Euphrates crossed the alluvium in
shifting and meandering braids, dropping sediment that built up natu-
ral levees higher than the land surface.29 Especially at flood stage in
spring, the water level in the river was higher than the riparian land.30
The natives' challenge was to devise a system of gravity-flow irrigation
for the late fall and winter, critical periods in the annual crop cycle.31
Over many centuries, the inhabitants of southern Mesopotamia per-
fected the necessary earthworks. 32 These included: outlets cut in the
sides of the natural river levees to feed canals; excavated canals (per-
haps opportunistically congruent with abandoned meander chan-
nels);33 regulators (weirs) employed to keep canal waters above
26. Where the Euphrates enters the alluvium some 700 kilometers upstream from its mouth
at the Persian Gulf, its low-water elevation is barely 50 meters above sea level. ROBERT McC.
ADAMS, HEARTLAND OF CITIES: SURVEYS OF ANCIENT SETFLEMENT AND LAND USE ON T1HE
CENTRAL FLOODPLAIN OF THE EUPHRATES 1 (1981). As much as 500 kilometers upstream from
the mouth, the elevation of the general landscape is under 20 meters. J.N. POSTGATE, EARLY
MESOPOTAMIA: SOCIETY AND ECONOMY AT THE DAWN OF HISTORY 6 (1992) [hereinafter POST-
GATE, MESOPOTAMIA].
27. SETON LLOYD, TmE ARCHEOLOGY OF MESOPOTAMIA 17 (1978); McC. ADAMS, supra
note 26, at 12.
28. WrrrFOGEL, supra note 11, at 3, 166 (identifying pharaonic Egypt and city-states of
ancient southern Mesopotamia as "compact" hydraulic societies). Wittfogel's subtitle ("A Com-
parative Study of Total Power") indicates a tendency to exaggerate the degree of economic and
political centralization present in a hydraulic society. In his most cautious passages, he merely
asserts that a hydraulic society is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for emergence of
despotism. Id. at 12. In any event, ancient Mesopotamia was not nearly so statist as Wittfogel
implies. See McC. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 243-44.
POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 173, criticizes Wittfogel's theory on the ground
that village, not palace, authorities were mainly in charge of irrigation. But as Postgate himself
notes, id. at 179, villages surely were not large enough political units to manage construction of
30-mile dikes, id. at 182-83, or large branching canals installed parallel to the main channel, id. at
174.
29. See POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 174-76.
30. As are the waters of the Mississippi River at New Orleans.
31. McC. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 3-6.
32. Archeologists have found evidence of advances in irrigation technology before and dur-
ing the Ubaid period (c. fifth millennium), when the Mesopotamian alluvium was first being
settled. Id. at 54.
33. Id. at 245-46.
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adjoining land surfaces; and localized canal outlets to allow for con-
trolled inundation of fields. 3
4
To build these earthworks, the Mesopotamians of the alluvium
had to develop not only technologies but also social institutions that
would enable them to mobilize large teams of men and animals. In
this setting, investments in the social capital of civilization promised un-
usually high returns. In addition, because southern Mesopotamia was
relatively invulnerable to invasion during its early burst of agricultural
development, the Mesopotamians could expect good success in
preventing aliens from seizing what they produced. To the west, the
Syrian desert (home of pesky Amorite nomads) initially provided
something of a buffer; the rugged Zagros Mountains (home of clan-
nish but fragmented tribes) lay to the east; to the south was the
marshy delta at the top of the Persian Gulf; and, finally, to the north
of the irrigable plain was a protective stretch of territory too inhospi-
table to sustain much settlement.35 Responding to their conducive
natural conditions, during the fourth millennium the residents of Su-
mer (the southern portion of Babylonia) led human civilization into
the Bronze Age. 36 Their extraordinary innovations included axled
vehicles, bronze tools, mathematics, the world's first practical system
of writing, and (by inference) methods of managing large
organizations. 37
As the third millennium progressed, several dozen rivalrous
walled city-states, surrounded by hinterlands of villages and farms,
evolved in both Sumer and Akkad (northern Babylonia). 38 Powerful
states arose during the Old Akkadian (c.2350-2200 B.C.) and Ur III
34. See POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 173-80.
35. Id. at 14.
36. See WILLIAM H. McNEILL, THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF TIE HUMAN COM-
MUNrIY 29-33 (1963) (conditions in lower Mesopotamia were conducive to emergence of larger
social units after c.4000 B.c.); see also Johannes M. Renger, Institutional, Communal, and Indi-
vidual Ownership or Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia from the End of the
Fourth to the End of the First Millennium B.c., 71 Cmn.-KEr L. REV. 269, 272 (1995) [hereinafter
Renger, Arable Land] (regional political entities arose in late fourth millennium concurrently
with provision of regional irrigation facilities); WrTFOGEL, supra note 11, at 22-51 (how hydrau-
lic agriculture fosters cultural and organizational advances).
37. The first evidence of cultivated crops and domesticated animals dates from c.8000 B.c.
and comes from sites in the Fertile Crescent (including northern Mesopotamia) that are much
less hydraulic than southern Mesopotamia. See DANIEL ZOHARY & MARIA HOP, DOMESTICA-
nON OF PLANTS IN THE OLD WORLD 13,207 (1988). Cities also were evolving in northern Meso-
potamia during the sixth millennium, before the settlement of the alluvium. KNAPP, supra note
24, at 23-26. Our theory of the rise of civilization cannot account for the innovations at those
times and places. It does offer, however, a hypothesis for why the seeds of civilization that had
been sprinkled about the Fertile Crescent blossomed first in Sumer.
38. SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucruREs, supra note 3, at 163, conjectures that the urban popu-
lation of the ancient Near East was about 10%-20% of total population.
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(c.2100-2000 B.C.) periods under charismatic rulers, only to collapse
again under the weight of foreign invasion, internal revolt, and the
region's relentless centrifugal forces. A highpoint of the subsequent
Old Babylonian period (c.2000-1600 B.C.) was the kingship of Ham-
murabi of Babylon (beginning c.1792 B.C.). In the sixteenth century
B.c., however, all of Mesopotamia entered into something of a dark
age after successive foreign invasions. The region's influence later re-
vived, especially c.950-500 B.C., the era of the great Assyrian and Neo-
Babylonian empires. In all, Mesopotamia enjoyed more than a 3000-
year run as the site of one of the world's leading civilizations.
Mesopotamian societies developed sophisticated legal institu-
tions, and more is gradually being learned about how they func-
tioned.3 9 A village's council (elders and "mayor") may have served as
a court of first resort. Many cities eventually housed temple- or pal-
ace-affiliated courts, whose judges were capable of dealing with com-
plex disputes.40 The law codes, a primary source of legal information,
mainly date from the period 2100-1700 B.C. Fragments of these codes
have been found written in cuneiform on stone pillars (stelae). Four
of the oldest and most complete of the known codes, all issued under
the name of a ruler of an ascendant city-state, are the Laws of Ur-
Namma 41 (c.2100 B.C.); the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar 42 (c.1930 B.C.); the
Laws of Eshnunna 43 (c.1770 B.C.); and the renowned Code of Ham-
murabi 4 (c.1750 B.C.). 4 5
Although published by rulers of distinct regimes in different cen-
turies, these codes share numerous themes and provisions. These sim-
ilarities suggest enduring commonalities in the customary law of
39. Indeed, these legal institutions left a considerable "clay trail." Modem scholars have
published editions of hundreds of tablets recording legal transactions, such as sales, estate divi-
sions, even court decisions, and thousands more remain unpublished.
40. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 275-77.
41. See MARTHA T. ROaH, Laws of Ur-Namma, in LAW COLLEcIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA
AND ASIA MINOR 13, 15-22 (Piotr Michalowski ed., 1995) [hereinafter Laws of Ur-Namma].
Roth's translations of the cuneiform law codes are the most recent and reliable. We rely on
them in virtually all instances.
42. See MARTHA T. ROTH, Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, in ROTH, supra note 41, at 23, 24-35 [here-
inafter Laws of Lipit-Ishtar].
43. See MARTHA T. ROTH, Laws of Eshnunna, in ROTH, supra note 41, at 57, 59-70 [herein-
after Laws of Eshnunna].
44. See MARTHA T. ROTH, Laws of Hammurabi, in ROTH, supra note 41, at 71, 76-142
[hereinafter Code of Hammurabi].
45. Also relevant are a Sumerian legal exercise tablet, c.1800 a.c., and a compendium of
contractual clauses in Sumerian, c.1700 B.c. For recent translations of these texts, see, respec-
tively, MARTHA T. ROTH, A Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet, in ROTH, supra note 41, at 42,43-45
[hereinafter Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet]; MARTHA T. ROTH, Sumerian Laws Handbook of
Forms, in RoTH, supra note 41, at 46, 47-54 [hereinafter Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms].
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Babylonia 46 (and also, perhaps, a compiler's tendency to start from an
existing text).47 Whether Old Babylonian judges actually heeded
these code provisions is a matter of vigorous debate.48 No one dis-
putes, however, that the code provisions are a valuable source on the
customs and institutions of the era.
B. Egypt
Ancient Egypt also was a hydraulic society centered on a desert
floodplain.49 Apart from regions such as the Fayyam just south of the
Nile delta, however, its arable lands were in a fixed valley basin, not a
flat alluvial expanse. The Nile inundated its valley each summer and
then receded, leaving moist fertile soils prime for planting with barley
(the staple grain of the ancients), flax, or emmer (a hard-to-thresh
wheat). The Nile's floods are more reliable and predictable than that
of any other major river. Its relative regularity enabled the Egyptians
to operate a largely decentralized irrigation system less complex than
the Babylonians'.5
0
In ancient Egypt, as in southern Mesopotamia, the expected re-
turns from investing in the social capital of civilization were unusually
high. To prevent a Hobbesian land-rush in late summer on fields in
the moist flood basins, the ancient Egyptians had to devise systems for
surveying and recording land titles. This circumstance undoubtedly
helped spur the development of mathematics and writing. In addition,
46. Commonalities in the cuneiform codes and documents justify the use of phrases such as
"Old Babylonian law," or even, "Mesopotamian legal tradition." See Martha Roth, Scholastic
Tradition and Mesopotamian Law: A Study of FLP 1287, A Prism in the Collection of the Free
Library of Philadelphia 1 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania);
A. LEO OPPENHEIM, LETr"ERS FROM MESOPOTAMIA 16 (1967). This cuneiform jurisprudence
influenced legal developments elsewhere in the ancient Near East, e.g., the "Hittite Laws" that
governed what is now Anatolia. This collection of laws, the earliest copies of which date to 1650-
1500 B.c., are translated in MARTHA T. ROTH, Hittite Laws, in ROTH, supra note 41, at 213, 217-
40 [hereinafter Hittite Laws].
47. See REUVEN YARON, TIH LAWS OF EsHNUNNA 11-12,96 (2d rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter,
YARON, ESHNUNNA].
48. Compare POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 291 (codes probably influenced
judges), with Raymond Westbrook, Cuneiform Law Codes and the Origins of Legislation, 79
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AssYRiOLOGIE UND VORDERASIATISCHE ARCHAOLOGIE 201-02 (1989) [here-
inafter Westbrook, Cuneiform Law Codes] (powerful argument that, while monarch's edicts
were (strictly retrospective) legislation, the law codes were only compilations of precedent and
custom, and did not in themselves bind the courts).
49. For a detailed description of the cultural ecology of Egypt in the Predynastic (c.5200-
3050 B.c.) and Dynastic periods, see KARL W. BUTZER, EARLY HYDRAULIC CIVILIZATION IN
EGYPT: A STUDY IN CULTURAL ECOLOGY (1976). It is conventionally thought that Egyptian
civilization burst forth somewhat after Sumerian civilization did. See McNEILL, supra note 36, at
64-69.
50. BUTZER, supra note 49, at 41-51.
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Egyptian farmers were strongly motivated to coordinate with one an-
other to develop irrigation systems to enable them to grow a second
crop of vegetables and fodder.51
The Egyptians' investments in civilization were even less risky
than the Mesopotamians'. Protected by deserts to the east and west,
cataracts of the Nile to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the
north, the Egyptians could anticipate the success they would have in
keeping foreigners from capturing riches they produced. 52 Ancient
Egypt had a far more unified and stable political structure than did
Mesopotamia, perhaps because there were fewer potential invaders
nearby and because the Nile was more suited than the Euphrates for
large ships. In any event, Menes, the first pharaoh, succeeded in unit-
ing the Upper and Lower Kingdoms of the Nile valley in around 3200
B.C. He was succeeded by thirty dynasties of pharaohs, whose reigns
lasted until 341 B.C. Although periodically riven with internal chaos,
with one exception Egypt was free of foreign invaders until the late
second millennium. 53 The civilization along the Nile prospered partic-
ularly during the Old (2695-2160 B.C.), Middle (1991-1785 B.c.), and
New (1540-1070 B.C.) Kingdoms.
54
The ancient Egyptians' showy accomplishments overtly symbol-
ized their organizational prowess. By the end of the Old Kingdom,
they had sailing vessels 170 feet long 55 and pyramids far taller than
any ziggurrat temple the Babylonians would ever erect. Although the
Egyptians' painting, sculpture, and architecture were long unmatched,
their hieroglyphic method of writing was less compact than Mesopota-
mian cuneiform (wedge-shaped markings on clay or stone). In addi-
tion, because papyri are far less durable than cuneiform's primary
media, comparatively few ancient Egyptian documents have survived.
As a result, while troves of Mesopotamian documents await transla-
tion, the structure of Egyptian land institutions must be inferred from
a small number of texts written centuries apart. The most important
of these are the farmer Hekanakht's letters (2002 B.C.), records of the
lawsuit of Mose (c.1250 B.C.), and the cadastral survey contained in
51. Id. at 50. Summer fodder crops also served to restore soil fertility.
52. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 31-32.
53. The exception was the roughly hundred-year domination of the Nile Delta by Palestin-
ian kings (known as the Hyksos) during the seventeenth century a.c. See BARRY J. KEMP, AN-
CIENT EGYPT: ANATOMY OF A CIVILIZATION 25-26 (1989) [hereinafter KEMP, ANCIENT EGYPT].
Beginning in the twelfth century B.C., many invaders, especially ones from the sea, made Egypt
their target. See KNAPP, supra note 24, at 182, 212-15, 239.
54. The dates of various Egyptian periods are drawn from KEMP, ANCIENT EGYPT, supra
note 53, at 14.
55. SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 66
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the Wilbour Papyrus (1142 B.C.). 5 6 Historians can derive some solace,
however, from the exceptionally conservative and static character of
Egyptian civilization; what is discovered about Egypt's early legal sys-
tem almost invariably accords with the better documented portrait of
its institutions in later eras.57
C. Israel
The civilization of ancient Israel arose relatively inconspicuously,
in the early Iron Age.58 The Israelites appear to have settled in the
hill country of Canaan during the thirteenth century B.C., following
their exodus out of enslavement in Egypt.59 Giving up their previ-
ously pastoral ways, they turned to cultivating wheat, barley, grapes,
and olives, and raising sheep, goats, and other livestock.60 Agriculture
was less centralized than in the hydraulic societies of Mesopotamia
and Egypt. Israel has a Mediterranean climate, and essentially no rain
from mid-May until September.61 In Canaan the basic tools of water
management were the household cistern and the hillside terrace.
62
Urbanization accelerated in Israel after David established his monar-
chy in 1000 B.C. The population of Jerusalem, King David's capital,
grew from about 2,000 in c.1000 B.C., to about 25,000 in c.701 B.C. 63
Alien emperors, such as Sargon 11 of Assyria and Nebuchadrezzar of
56. Legal texts, such as official records of lawsuits or contractual agreements, from the Old
and Middle Kingdoms are especially rare, and there are almost no traces of law codes or other
legal promulgations prior to the third century B.C. P.W. Pestman, The Law of Succession in
Ancient Egypt, in ESSAYS ON ORIENTAL LAWS OF SUCCESSION 58, 58-59, 65 (J. Brugman et al.
eds., 1969). Nevertheless, documents of legal practice, often handed down in redacted form as
funerary inscriptions, remain the best sources on Egyptian land law. See Aristide Thdoridorid~s,
The Concept of Law in Ancient Egypt, in THE LEGACY OF EGYPT 291, 292 (J.R. Harris ed., 2d
ed. 1971).
57. Where they arise, moreover, variances typically involve formailities, not doctrine.
Pestman, supra note 56, at 59; see also T.G.H. JAMES, PHARAOH'S PEOPLE: SCENES FROM Ln
IN IMPERIAL EGYPT 46-48 (1984).
58. A wide-ranging source is MORRIS SILVER, PROPHETS AND MARKETS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ANCIENT ISRAEL (1983) [hereinafter SILVER, PROPHETS]. Silver, the most promi-
nent economic historian of the ancient Near East, focuses especially on the period 800-600 B.C.
59. See KNAPP, supra note 24, at 181,247-48; NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE 85, n.12.40
(Bruce M. Metzger & Roland E. Murphy eds., new rev. std. ver. 1991) [hereinafter OXFORD
BIBLE]. Both sources speculate that this exodus occurred in the reign of Rameses I (1290-1224
B.C.). But cf. NORMAN K. GOTTWALD, THE TRIBES OF YAHWEH: A SOCIOLOGY OF THE RELI-
GION OF LIBERATED ISRAEL 1250-1050 B.C.E., at 32-44, 495 (1979) (Yahwistic Israel forms in
Canaan in 1325-1250 B.C., before Moses).
60. See generally ODED BOROWSKI, AGRICULTURE IN IRON AGE ISRAEL 87-139 (1987).
61. DAVID C. HOPKINS, THE HIGHLANDS OF CANAAN: AGRICULTURAL LIFE IN THE EARLY
IRON AGE 80 (1985).
62. See id. at 151-52, 173-87 (on water systems in use c.1250-1050 B.C.); SILVER, PROPHETS,
supra note 58, at 22-23 (describing minor Israelite irrigation works in eighth and seventh centu-
ries B.C.).
63. See SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 4, 13-15.
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Babylonia, bullied Israel, particularly during 721-587 B.C.64 The Israe-
lites' perennial concerns about security influenced their institutional
arrangements.
The Hebrew Bible (or Old Testament) is the primary textual
source on ancient Israelite society. Its first five books, the Torah (or
Pentateuch), include several law codes, seemingly highly redundant,
that contain numerous provisions on land.65 The Torah is thought to
have been written in patches and fragments over many centuries. Its
first portions date from no earlier than 1200-1100 B.C., and are recor-
dations of oral accounts of events of the prior several centuries. 66
Deuteronomy, the last of the five books, probably dates from the sev-
enth or sixth century B.C. 6 7 In 587 B.C., Babylonian invaders removed
many Israelite priests to Babylon after sacking Jerusalem, and kept
them there for the next fifty years. In anticipation of their eventual
return to Canaan, the exiled priests interstitially inserted fresh mate-
rial into the Torah and added glosses to older texts. This priestly ma-
terial (the "P source") reflects the influence of egalitarian prophets-
Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others-who angled dur-
ing 800-587 B.C. to reform the wickedness of their prospering and ur-
banizing society. 68 The land law of the Hebrew Bible thus reflects
over 500 years of development and reveals a variety of normative per-
spectives. Some of the Biblical land rules-particularly those created
during the Babylonian captivity-appear not to have had any practical
significance. 69 Many provisions, however, unquestionably reveal cus-
tomary practices that priests involved in the administration of the Is-
raelite judicial system would have honored. 70
64. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 251-52.
65. These are the Covenant Code (Exod. 20:22-23:33); the Holiness Code (Lev. 17-26); and
the Deuteronomic Code (Deut.).
66. Westbrook tentatively dates the Covenant Code, the earliest of the three, to the tenth
century B.C. Westbrook, Cuneiform Law Codes, supra note 48, at 219. Because the Hebrew
script evolved only after 1000 B.c., any earlier versions had to have been written in other
languages.
67. See id. at 219 (seventh century B.c.); Eryl W. Davies, Land: Its Rights and Privileges, in
THE WORLD OF ANCIENT ISRAEL 349, 356 (R.E. Clements ed., 1989) (Deuteronomy was "essen-
tially composed" after 587 B.C., during the Babylonian exile.).
68. See KNAPP, supra note 24, at 253; SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 123-263.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 142, 459-69.
70. Deut. 17:8-13 implies priestly involvement in judicial matters. It is widely accepted that
the Covenant Code, at least, prescribed juridically recognized norms. Cf. RAYMOND WEST-
BROOK, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL AND CUNEIFORM LAW 134-35 (1988) ("[U]nlike the cuneiform
texts, [biblical law apart from the Covenant Code] contains the voice of dissent as much, if not
more, than that of the establishment."). Westbrook regards Israelite law as part of a larger legal
tradition of the ancient Near East. Id. at 1-8.
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Another window on ancient Israel is the archival material un-
earthed in the port of Ugarit, a site in what is presently northern Syria.
Ugarit's rich store of administrative and political documents, some in
Akkadian and some in Ugaritic, has been dated to the fourteenth and
thirteenth centuries B.C. 71 Some texts provide information about land
transactions, and the institutions depicted commonly parallel those
described in the Hebrew Bible.
II. PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND
To an unblinking reader of formalist ancient texts, the pharaoh
owned all land in ancient Egypt,72 and Yahweh, all in Israel.73 Contra-
rily, for more than a century, some commentators have asserted that
ancient man knew only communal property.74 Evidence of actual so-
cial practices in ancient settings belies both of these reductionist per-
spectives. This Part demonstrates that in all historical periods some
lands in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel were held as private
property.7
5
Private property connotes both a type of owner and a core set of
entitlements. The discussion in this Part assumes that a private owner
is either an individual, a nuclear household, or a household extended
to include sons' wives and children.76 A private landowner's basic en-
titlements are the right to exclude trespassers, the privilege of decid-
ing how the land is to be used, and the power at death to pass
ownership interests in the land to successors.77 The civilizations of the
71. See M. Heltzer, Royal Economy in Ancient Ugarit, in 2 STATE AND TEMPLE ECONOMY
IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 459, 459 (Edward Lipinski ed., 1979) [hereinafter Heltzer, Royal
Economy]; William Johnstone, Old Testament Technical Expressions in Property Holding, 6
UGARITICA 309, 310 (1969).
72. As a matter of theological formality, throughout ancient times the pharaoh was the
titular landowner by virtue of his divinity. See HERMAN KEES, ANCIENT EGYPT: A CULTURAL
TOPOGRAPHY 61-74 (F.D. Morrow trans., 1961).
73. Lev. 25:23 ("the land is mine; with me you are but aliens and tenants").
74. See, e.g., I.M. Diakonoff, The Structure of Near Eastern Society Before the Middle of the
2nd Millennium B.C., 3 OIKUMENE 7,42-43 (1982). See generally PAOLO GROSSI, AN ALTERNA-
iVE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1981) (stressing the nineteenth-century
debate between Henry Sumner Maine, who espoused the collective-property thesis, and critic
Fustel de Coulanges).
75. Chattels appear to have been "privately/individually owned" as far back as the Mesopo-
tamian record reveals. IGNACE J. GELB ET AL., EARLIEST LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE NEAR
EAST: ANCIENT KUDURRUS 17 (1991) [hereinafter GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS].
76. The next Part considers land ownership by larger social units (such as clans and tribes)
and also bureaucratic organizations (such as temples and palaces).
77. For the heritability of land in the ancient Near East, see infra Part IV.A.
Some observers are unwilling to call a bundle of entitlements private property unless the
entitled party has power to transfer by sale. See, e.g., William A. Ward, Some Aspects of Private
Land Ownership and Inheritance in Ancient Egypt, ca. 2500-1000 B.C., in LAND TENURE AND
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ancient Near East conferred entitlements along these lines, but-like
other societies that honor private property-also hedged the entitle-
ments in certain respects.
A. Evidence of Private Land Ownership
Law-and-economics theory suggests that a society is almost cer-
tain to devolve to private households responsibility for dwelling main-
tenance and hard-to-monitor agricultural operations.78 In the three
ancient civilizations, small family units indeed tended to dominate
these land activities.
1. Houses and Gardens
All commentators agree that, from the earliest periods of ancient
Near Eastern history, free family households-even the poorest of
them-typically owned 79 their own houses and garden plots. 80
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 63, 64 (Tarif Khalidi ed., 1984); cf. Renger,
Arable Land, supra note 36, at 286-89, 295-96 (construing absence of field sales as evidence of
absence of private property in fields). In ordinary language, however, the core denotation of
private property is the owner's right to exclude. Restrictions on the power to alienate land by
sale or gift not only were common in ancient times (see infra Part VI.D.) but also are today (e.g.,
cooperative apartments, commercial leases, beneficial interests in trusts). As these modem ex-
amples illustrate, one can appropriately characterize the ownership of an asset as private even
though the owner lacks an unfettered power to sell.
78. See Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1322-32. Commercial and industrial buildings
seem to have been rare in the ancient Near East. While archeologists have found some evidence
of shops, most trade seems to have taken place along embankments, just inside city gates, and in
other open areas. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 78-79; SILVER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 118-21. On warehouses, see SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at
35-38.
79. Some commentators might prefer possessed (or held) to owned, on the basis that owned
falsely implies that an ancient household's entitlements were entirely secure. See infra text ac-
companying notes 127-34 & 311-19 (on expropriations and landowner duties). But possessed is
surely too weak a term. In the ordinary language, one does not hesitate to assert that someone
owns a house even though, for example, the state could take the house by eminent domain, the
municipality could compel the owner to pay property taxes, and a bank could sell the house if
the owner were to fall in arrears on mortgage payments. If the members of an ancient house-
hold could reasonably expect that authoritative decisionmakers would help them remain indefi-
nitely on a land parcel as long as they performed the duties required of ordinary members of
their society, they are appropriately labeled as owners of that parcel.
80. Even Saggs, a staunch advocate of the temple-ownership model, admits this was the
case in Mesopotamia. H.W.F. SAGGS, THE GREATNESS THAT WAS BABYLON 163-64 (1962)
[hereinafter SAOGS, BABYLON]; see also ADAM FALKENSTEIN, THE SUMERIAN TEMPLE CITY 14
(Maria deJ. Ellis trans., 1974) (1954); POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 94-96 (on
ownership by extended and nuclear families). For Egypt, see Joseph Gilbert Dominic Manning,
1 The Conveyance of Real Property in Upper Egypt During the Ptolemaic Period: A Study of
the Hauswaldt Papyri and Other Related Demotic Instruments of Transfer 25 (1992) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) ("Garden and house plots ... were arguably
always in private control."). The earliest direct evidence from Egypt relates to a legal dispute
during the early 4th Dynasty (c.2600 B.c.) following the consensual sale of a small house in
Khufu. See Thforidorids, supra note 56, at 292-93. For Israel, see BOROWSKI, supra note 60, at
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Although some stone and wood was in use, the basic domestic build-
ing material was mud brick, at times reinforced with straw.81 On
farmsteads and in rural villages, where most of the population resided,
an extended household might dwell in a cluster of one-story buildings.
A wealthy family, rural or urban, might have a two-story house with
an unroofed central court.82 Even within the crowded areas of walled
cities, private homeownership appears to have been the norm.83
A text from Ugarit suggests the intensity of interest in security in
one's housing:
Ammistamru .... king of Ugarit... gave the house of Anndr... to
bdmlk... and to his sons for ever. Nobody shall take it away from
them. This house is in the hands of bdmlk... and in the hands of
his sons for ever, and there is no corvee from it.
84
The prevalence of home ownership in Israel seems reflected in the
opening words of the Tenth Commandment: "You shall not covet
your neighbor's house.
'85
2. Croplands, Orchards, and Vineyards
Of the three civilizations, Israel seems to have had the most
privatized system of agriculture. 86 The Hebrew Bible is rife with inci-
dents and rules involving farmers' fields, vineyards, and orchards.8
7
25-26 (the Samaria Ostraca, an extra-biblical source, confirms private ownership of land in
Israel). Cf. MARX, ECONOMIC FORMATIONS, supra note 9, at 90 ("[D]wellings... appear to be
always in the possession of individuals.").
81. On house materials and designs, see POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 88-91
(Mesopotamia); HOPKINS, supra note 61, at 143-48 (Israel); SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at
83-86 (Israel).
82. See LLOYD, supra note 27, at 162-63; SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 4, 84-86
(archeological evidence of multiroom and multifloor houses in Israel by c.1050 B.C.). For evi-
dence of mass production of houses, see id. at 19.
83. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 96-97 (on heritability of urban residen-
tial property). In New Kingdom Egypt, at the impacted "model" workmen's village of Deir el-
Medina, there is also evidence that houses tended to pass from father to son. JAMES, supra note
57, at 230-31; see also id. at 174-75, 216 (letter to agent ordering purchase of urban land as house-
plot and giving instructions for building of house).
84. Heltzer, Royal Economy, supra note 71, at 479 (punctuation simplified). An interpreter
of this passage should want to know more about what had happened to Anndr.
85. Exod. 20:17. This interpretation is not utterly plain, however, because in some Biblical
contexts house refers not to a dwelling but to a family line or patrimonial inheritance. See RAY-
MOND WESTBROOK, PROPERTY AND THE FAMILY IN BIBLICAL LAW 12-14 (1991) [hereinafter
WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW].
86. On the dominance of households in Israelite agriculture, see BORowsKI, supra note 60,
at 22-26; HOPKINS, supra note 61, at 252-54. When settling a new territory, Israelite households
divided the land into portions of equal value, and then chose plots by lot. MOSHE WEINFELD,
THE PROMISE OF THE LAND 35-36 (1993). In light of the Hebrew tradition of household farming,
the kibbutz movement of modem Israel had to be founded on a secular socialist ideology, not
ancient religious tenets. See Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1347-48.
87. Deut. 5:21 adds field to the Tenth Commandment's list of a neighbor's things that one
should not covet.
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Israelite practice was hardly exceptional for its region. Legal texts
from Ugarit, the seaport in northern Syria, attest to the existence of
privately owned estates in 1400-1200 B.C.88
In the hydraulic civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, owner-
ship of agricultural lands was more varied.8 9 Most scholars currently
agree that during all historic periods some croplands in both regions
were in the hands of private owners who owed no special services to
the crown.
There has been much debate over the extent of private land ten-
ure in southern Mesopotamia during the third millennium, the earliest
historic period. An outdated view holds that Sumerian culture then
recognized only institutional or communal ownership of arable land,
and that Semitic immigrants imported the alien institution of private
landownership, bringing it first to Akkad toward the end of the mil-
lennium.9° The most recent scholarship on Mesopotamia, however,
indicates that private property in fields co-existed with palace and
temple property throughout the third millennium.91 While Diakonoff
and other members of the Soviet school have argued that almost all
land was held communally prior to the rise of the temple in the mid-
and late third millennium,92 some of the earliest recorded land sales
are by individuals, not groups.93 Even during the Ur III period in
Sumer, when palace power was at a peak, investigators have found
records of sales of private houses and orchards, field leases, and royal
grants of fields to individuals. 94
88. M. Heltzer, Mortgage of Land Property and Freeing from It in Ugarit, 19 J. ECON. &
Soc. HIST. ORIENT 89, 92-93 (1976) [hereinafter Heltzer, Mortgage] (instance of unconditional
royal grant of land); VIcrOR H. MATrHEWS & DON C. BENJAMIN, SOCIAL WORLD OF ANCIENT
ISRAEL 1250-587 B.C.E. at 202 (1993).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 173-257.
90. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 82-84, 86-87, 96; SAGGS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 46, 164.
91. Benjamin Foster, A New Look at the Sumerian Temple State, 24 J. ECON. & Soc. HIST.
ORmNT 225, 225-30 (1981) [hereinafter Foster, New Look]; see also POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA,
supra note 26, at 183-84; SILVER, ECONOMIC STRuCTUREs, supra note 3, at 57.
92. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
93. Ignace J. Geib, On the Alleged Temple and State Economies in Ancient Mesopotamia, 6
STUDI IN ONORE DI EDOUARDO VOLTERRA 137-54 (1969); Foster, New Look, supra note 91, at
239-40 (review of mid-third millennium administrative records from an archive at Telloh reveals
652 instances of individually held land parcels, mostly 4-12 acres in area, with a large majority of
the landholders identified as skilled craftsmen, professionals, and other untitled people not asso-
ciated with the temple).
94. Ignace J. Gelb, Household and Family in Early Mesopotamia, in 1 STATE AND TEMPLE
ECONOMY IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 1, 69-70 (Edward Lipinski ed., 1979) [hereinafter Gelb,
Household and Family]; see also Piotr Steinkeller, The Renting of Fields in Early Mesopotamia
and the Development of the Concept of 'Interest' in Sumerian, 24 J. ECON. & Soc. HIST. ORIENT
113 (1981) [hereinafter Steinkeller, Renting of Fields] (on leasing of fields during Ur III period).
The Ur III dynasty apparently did attempt to bar sales of private fields (see infra notes 219 &
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In any case, there is universal agreement that outright private
ownership of agricultural lands was widespread in northern Babylonia
by the start of the second millennium (the Old Babylonian period). 95
By that time and place, at least, there appear to have been brisk mar-
kets for agricultural workers and other farm inputs.96 A provision of
the Code of Hammurabi deals explicitly with breach of a promise to
faithfully supervise crop-growing operations:
If a man hires another man to care for his field, that is, he entrusts
to him the stored grain, hands over to him care of the cattle, and
contracts with him for the cultivation of the field-if that man steals
the seed or fodder and it is then discovered in his possession, they
shall cut off his hand. 97
Evidence on land tenure is thinnest for Egypt. Perhaps because
the coordination of post-inundation land recoveries may have been
particularly crucial along the Nile, land ownership appears to have
been more centralized there than in southern Mesopotamia and
Israel.98 A number of parties, private and institutional, sometimes re-
tained concurrent claims on the same land.99 Even so, the emerging
scholarly consensus holds that private owners controlled some agricul-
323), but market inalienability does not negate the existence of private land ownership. See
supra note 77.
95. See Johannes Renger, Interaction of Temple, Palace, and "Private Enterprise" in the Old
Babylonian Economy, in 1 STATE AND TEMPLE ECONOMY IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 249,
250-51 (Edward Lipinski ed., 1979). Renger doubts that private field ownership was common in
the South, where the palace and temple retained many sustenance and rental fields. Id.
96. Paragraphs 257-58, 261, & 268-273 of the Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, specified
the wages private farmers were to pay to cultivators, shepherds, and wagoners, and the rentals
farmers were to pay to hire draft animals. A prior Mesopotamian Code had analogous provi-
sions. See Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 3, 7-8, 10. Prices in ancient codes tended to be
below market. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 194-95. This pattern suggests
that the authors of these provisions were seeking to gain the favor of purchasers involved in
these transactions. Whether these sorts of price controls--common in the ancient Near East-
had any practical effect is uncertain. See YARON, ESHNUNNA, supra note 47, at 224-25: see also
infra text accompanying notes 482-87; infra note 440 (on usury laws).
97. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, j 253.
98. Manning, supra note 80, at 24 (citing summary by KEES. supra note 72). From the start
of the historical era in the third millennium, however, Egypt's social and administrative system
rested on the interactions of families and individuals with civil institutions, temples, and the
state. Tribal and gentilic organizations, if present at all, played no discernible role. See Th6-
oridorid~s, supra note 56, at 292.
99. Private individuals, officials, and temple foundations, for instance, could each hold si-
multaneous interests in a parcel of land recorded on an official survey such as the Wilbour Papy-
rus. The king maintained a superordinate interest in all lands: theologically, through his divine
status, and practically, by virtue of his continuing levies of land taxes. See David O'Connor, New
Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period, 1552-644 B.C., in ANCIENT Eovr: A SOCIAL HISTORY
183, 226-28 (B.G. Trigger et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter ANCIENT EOYPr]; see also KEES, supra
note 72.
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tural lands throughout ancient Egyptian history. 100 In the Early Dy-
nastic period of Egypt (3050-2695 B.c.), some royal officials controlled
landed estates that had been transferred to them (perhaps by phara-
onic grant, perhaps through inheritance), and villagers honored tradi-
tional private land holdings.1 1 There is some evidence of private land
ownership in the Old and Middle Kingdoms,10 2 and much for the New
Kingdom. 0 3 Perhaps to diversify risks of variations in the Nile's inun-
dation, many private landholders held not a single discrete farm, but a
collection of scattered plots, some owned outright, and others rented
from a temple or other landholder.' °4 The Wilbour Papyrus, the rich-
est source on ancient Egyptian land tenure, identifies smallholders by
54 different professions, some of the most frequent of which were:
priest, stablemaster, soldier, herdsman, and scribe.10 5 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, 11% of the identified smallholders were women.
0 6
B. A Landowner's Right to Exclude Trespassers
The foundational norm of private property in land is an owner's
broad (but not unlimited) right to control entry.10 7 On this legal issue
there is much textual evidence from Mesopotamia and Israel, the two
civilizations for which law codes have been found.
100. Manning, supra note 80, at 21-22. One scholar confidently states that it is "well known
that private individuals could own farm land at all periods of ancient Egyptian history." Klaus
Baer, The Low Price of Land in Ancient Egypt, 1 J. AM. RES. CENTER IN EGYPT 25 (1962)
[hereinafter Baer, Low Price]; see also Ward, supra note 77, at 64, 67-68, 72 (while the royal
family, temple, and highest aristocrats owned most of Egypt's agricultural land during 2500-1000
B.C., persons from all social classes could and did own it as private property).
101. B.G. Trigger, The Rise of Egyptian Civilization, in ANCIENT EGYPT, supra note 99, at 1,
57-58. Moreover, the Palermo Stone demonstrates that, at least from the 2nd Dynasty onwards
(c.2900 B.C.), the state conducted a biennial census "of gold and fields," a procedure that implies
transactions in a private economic sector. Thdoridorid~s, supra note 56, at 292.
102. Barry J. Kemp, Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom, and Second Intermediate Period c.
2686-1552 BC, in ANCIENT EGYPT, supra note 99, at 71, 81-82 [hereinafter Kemp, Old Kingdom].
But cf. GEORGE R. HUGHES, SAITE DEMOTIC LAND LEASES 1-2 (1952) (doubting if there were
many small-holders prior to the New Kingdom).
103. See SALLY L.D. KATARY, LAND TENURE IN THE RAMESSIDE PERIOD 23, 211-12 (1989);
Manning, supra note 80, at 21.
104. Alan B. Lloyd, The Late Period, 664-323 BC, in ANCIENT EGYPT, supra note 99, at 279,
310.
105. KATARY, supra note 103, at 299-301. There has been debate over how to characterize
the financial obligations listed in the Wilbour Papyrus. Compare Baer, Low Price, supra note
100, at 32, 41 (P. Wilbour probably is a central agency's accounting of the rents due temples)
with KATARY, supra note 103, at 11, 211-12 (because P. Wilbour smallholders had inheritable
rights and owed only small quantities of grain, they should be regarded as freeholders regardless
of whether sums listed in the P. Wilbour are "rents" or "taxes").
106. KATARY, supra note 103, at 16, 307; cf infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text (roles
of women in the ancient Near East).




Sumerian and Akkadian boundary inscriptions commonly in-
cluded general "curses" against boundary crossers. The Akkadian
verb meaning "to cross," like the English "trespass," sometimes con-
notes immorality.'08 All four major Mesopotamian codes include pro-
visions that condemn trespassing. To violate certain of these
provisions, a trespasser had to have not only entered the land without
permission, but also either to have committed an additional wrongful
act or harbored an improper motive. For example, several codes im-
pose stiff monetary penalties for felling a tree on another's land' 09 or
entering an orchard with an intent to steal." 0 A provision in the Laws
of Eshnunna, however, makes a trespasser strictly liable for being in
cropland, even in the absence of aggravating circumstances:
A man who is seized in the field of a commoner' among the
sheaves at midday shall weigh and deliver 10 shekels silver; he who
is seized at night among the sheaves shall die, he will not live."
2
This provision, by distinguishing cropland from, say, pasture, signals
the importance of protecting investments in cultivation.
The chief livestock in ancient Mesopotamia were sheep and
goats, with cattle and pigs next in importance. Animals commonly
were placed in the care of shepherds, who specialized in locating fod-
der and pasture within the semiarid environment. The Code of Ham-
murabi includes two provisions on a fieldowner's remedies for
trespass by sheep; these triple the sheep-herder's liability once the
crop has progressed beyond the stage of green shoots." 3 The Israe-
lites' Covenant Code requires a party to make restitution for having
108. See "etaqu," 4 THE ASSYRIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE OF THE UNI-
VERSITY OF CHICAGO 388-89 (Ignace Gelb et al. eds., 1958).
109. Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, supra note 42, 1 10; Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 59; see
also Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 104.
110. Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, supra note 42, 9 ("If a man enters the orchard of another man
and is seized there for thievery, he shall weigh and deliver 10 shekels of silver."); see also Hittite
Laws, supra note 46, 1 101, 103 (prescribing sanctions against those who steal crops).
111. On the meaning of this word in the original, see YARON, ESHNUNNA, supra note 47, at
51, 132-46 (eventually deciding to translate it as "subject").
112. Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 12. Like many provisions in the cuneiform codes,
this one does not explicitly identify to whom the monetary sum is to be "delivered." The code
provisions that do specify a recipient, however, invariably name the victim of the offense, not
crown or village authorities. See, e.g., Laws of Eshnunna; supra note 43, 11 23, 36, 53; Code of
Hammurabi, supra note 44, 9 24, 42, 53.
113. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 11 57-58. For commentary, see 1 THE BABYLO-
NIAN LAWS 154-57 (G.R. Driver & John C. Miles eds., 1952) [hereinafter Driver & Miles]; see
also Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 107 (setting formulas for damages to be paid by stockman who
let sheep ruin another's vineyard).
[Vol. 71:321
ANCIENT LAND LAW: MESOPOTAMIA, EGYPT, ISRAEL
intentionally (and perhaps even negligently) caused livestock to
trespass.114
The ancient codes are especially unforgiving of an unconsented
entry into a dwelling. Applying distinctions reflected in the English
common law three millennia later, the Laws of Eshnunna call for the
death of a trespasser who is discovered in a commoner's house at
night. 1 5 The Code of Hammurabi prescribes capital punishment for a
trespasser who has broken into a house. 116 Exodus 22:2-3, only
slightly more forgiving, privileges a house owner to kill a burglar
caught breaking in at night, but not "after sunrise," when the owner's
successful use of lethal force would be deemed excessive enough to
justify the burglar's kinfolk avenging the burglar's death.
Private property in land presupposes sanctions against encroach-
ments and interferences with valid boundary monuments. The earliest
of the known codes, the Laws of Ur-Namma, provides that a farmer
who violates the "rights" of another by growing a crop on his field
forfeits all expenses. 17 A number of cuneiform codes from northern
Mesopotamia deal explicitly with encroachments. 118 Under the Mid-
dle Assyrian Laws, a bad-faith encroacher has to forfeit his improve-
ments to the land's owner, but one who improves another's land while
its owner looks on without objection is entitled to keep the improved
land if he compensates the owner with equivalent land.119 In Egypt, a
similar concern with physical boundaries is manifested in the charter
114. Exod. 22:5: "When someone causes a field to be grazed over, or lets livestock loose to
graze in someone else's field, restitution shall be made from the best in the other's field or
vineyard."
115. Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 13 (trespasser in house at night shall die (perhaps
privileging self-help homicide by house-owner); trespasser in broad daylight shall pay 10 shekels
of silver). For discussion, see YARON, EsHNUNN'A, supra note 47, at 259-60 & n.11.
116. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 21 ("If a man breaks into a house, they shall kill
him and hang (?) him in front of that very breach."); cf. Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 93 (pecuni-
ary sanctions to be imposed on trespasser caught attempting to enter house).
117. Laws of Ur-Namma, supra note 41, 27. Tablet B, 13 of an Assyrian code originating
in the fourteenth century B.C. calls for a bad-faith squatter on a field to forfeit his crops and
other improvements to the land's owner. For a recent translation of this code, see Martha T.
Roth, Middle Assyrian Laws, in Ro-, supra note 41, at 153, 155-94 [hereinafter Middle Assyr-
ian Laws].
118. See Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 168 ("He who violated the boundary, shall give one
sheep, 10 loaves, and one jug of... beer and reconsecrate the field."); Middle Assyrian Laws,
supra note 117, Tablet B, 11 8-9 (large-scale encroachments by one neighbor upon another's
lands subjects guilty party to forfeiture of three times the land in question, corporal punishment,
and penal servitude; small-scale encroachments subject guilty party to lesser corporal punish-
ment and money fine).
119. Compare Middle Assyrian Laws, supra note 117, Tablet B, 112 with id. Tablet B, T 13-
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of a temple foundation at Abydos (c.1300 B.C.). 12 0 The Hebrew Bible
includes numerous condemnations of those who tamper with bound-
ary markers, for example, Proverbs 23:10: "Do not remove an ancient
landmark or encroach on the fields of orphans.' 121
In exceptional circumstances, Anglo-American common law priv-
ileges a passerby to enter the private land of another without consent.
For instance, a parent can invoke private necessity to enter to retrieve
a wandering toddler. In a similar vein, and without any known Meso-
potamian precedent, the Torah of the Israelites authorizes impover-
ished persons to enter upon private agricultural lands to obtain small
quantities of food.122 Leviticus 19:9-10 provides an example:
When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the
very edges of your field, or gather the gleanings of your harvest.
You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather fallen grapes of
your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the alien.' 23
The exact terms of this archaic social-insurance program vary from
passage to passage in the Hebrew Bible. While the Leviticus Holiness
Code confers entry rights upon "the poor and the alien," portions of
the Deuteronomic Code define the beneficiaries as "the alien, the or-
phan, and the widow," somewhat more definite categories of per-
sons. 124 All Torah provisions limit the amount that can be taken, but
vary in how the ceiling is set. An entrant seeking grain is variously
restricted to: the leavings after the harvest; the crop growing at the
edge of the field; or what the entrant could gather without use of a
sickle.
25
120. This is monumentally preserved on the so-called Nauri Decree of Sethos I. The Decree
includes a by-law that ordains that any high official, overseer of the estate's fields, herdsman of
plowing cattle, or factor who tampers with the boundaries of the land belonging to the temple
shall have his ears cut off and be reduced to a field laborer of the temple. See JAMES, supra note
57, at 80-82.
121. See also Deut. 19:14, 27:17; Hosea 5:10; Prov. 22:28 (all condemning those who "move"
or "remove" boundary markers). SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 74, interprets these provi-
sions as injunctions against land consolidations, a construction plausible only if the verb were to
be translated as "remove." One might expect a passage intended to prevent land assembly to
read, "You must not acquire your neighbor's field," not, as in Deut. 19:14, "You must not move
your neighbor's boundary marker ...."
122. These Torah provisions had enduring influence. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *212-13 (citing Israelite codes as a basis for the rights of the English poor to glean).
123. See also Lev. 23:22 (similar, but lacks references to vineyards).
124. Deut. 24:19-21. These categorical limitations must be reconciled with the broader lan-
guage in Deut. 23:24-25, which in isolation could be construed as creating universal privileges to
enter private farmland to obtain a meal.
125. Compare Lev. 19:9-10, reproduced earlier in this paragraph, with Deut. 23:25 (ban on
use of sickle). An entrant into a vineyard might be limited to: the leavings after harvest; fallen
grapes; or (Deut. 23:24): "If you go into your neighbor's vineyard, you may eat your fill of
grapes, as many as you wish, but you shall not put any in a container."
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The extent to which this system of social insurance was honored
in ancient Israel is impossible to know. Perhaps instructive on this
front is the story of Ruth, who was both an alien (Moabite) and a
widow. Before going upon Boaz's barley and wheat fields to glean for
food, Ruth asked him "please"-perhaps an indication of her lack of
privilege, but, alternatively, perhaps just a courtesy or an overture to
the man she would later marry.'
26
C. A Landowner's Protection from Expropriation
Confiscation is a far larger insult to the right to exclude than is
trespass. In the ancient Near East, an alien invading force might sud-
denly seize lands.127 A conviction for treason could result in forfeiture
of property to the palace. 128 Potentially most worrisome of all was the
risk of an unprincipled and land-hungry monarch. 129 As Samuel put
it, a king might be tempted to "take the best of your fields and vine-
yards and olive orchards and give them to his courtiers.' 130 Neverthe-
less, royal officials may have been somewhat constrained by norms
against "takings," especially without compensation.' 31 Two anecdotes
strongly suggest the existence of norms along these lines.
Postgate reproduces a translation of a letter from Hammurabi to
his governor at Larsa, complaining of misconduct by someone who
appears to have been a lower-level royal bureaucrat:
126. See Ruth 2. In addition, gleaners typically delayed coming onto a field until after the
sheaves of harvested stalks had been gathered and taken away. Ruth's request, "to glean and
gather among the sheaves behind the reapers," may have been uncommonly assertive. BOROW-
SKI, supra note 60, at 61.
127. See, e.g., Jer. 39:10, 52:16 (reporting that Babylonian invaders had expropriated fields in
Judah and redistributed them to the poor).
128. Kings in the ancient Near East appear to have routinely confiscated the lands of trai-
tors. Zafrira Ben-Barak, Meribaal and the System of Land Grants in Ancient Israel, 62 BIBLICA
73, 84-86 (1981).
129. See Benjamin R. Foster, Early Mesopotamian Land Sales, 114 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC'Y
440, 444 (1994) [hereinafter Foster, Land Sales] (referring to expropriations of land by Naram-
Sim in Lagash during Sargonic Period); POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 41 (confis-
cations by Sargon of Akkad in Sumer); Jac. J. Janssen, The Role of the Temple in the Egyptian
Economy During the New Kingdom, 2 STATE AND TEMPLE ECONOMY IN THE ANCIENT NEAR
EAST 505, 509 (Edward Lipinski ed., 1979) (pharaohs sometimes took temple property).
Kings also are reported occasionally to have "withdrawn" land previously granted. See, e.g.,
HUGHES, supra note 102, at 1 (pharaoh's withdrawals from nobles and soldiers); Heltzer, Mort-
gage, supra note 88, at 89, 93 (withdrawals in Ugarit). These sources do not make clear to what
extent these withdrawals dashed landowners' expectations.
130. 1 Sam. 8:14.
131. It is notable that even the most aggressive monarchs sometimes chose to buy, not con-
fiscate, land. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 41 (Sargon I's land purchases on
northern plain in the third millennium, perhaps from buyers he had put under duress); I.M.
Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 17 (evidence that even Sargon II of Assyria rendered compensation
when he took land).
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May Adad [the God of Rain and Storms] keep you alive! About
the field of Ahum-waqar: As you know, he has been enjoying the
use of the field for 40 years, and now he is going on one campaign in
the king's corps, but Sin-imguranni has now taken the field away
from him and given it to a servant of his. Look into the matter and
don't allow him to suffer an injustice.132
One of the Hebrew Bible's memorable cautionary tales involves
King Ahab's forcible acquisition of his neighbor Naboth's vineyard. 133
"Because it is near my house," Ahab desired to have the vineyard and
convert it to a vegetable garden. Ahab began by offering Naboth
compensation, either cash or in kind. These Naboth refused, saying
"The Lord forbid that I should give you my ancestral inheritance."' 34
Jezebel, Ahab's wife, and presumably a staunch proponent of the gar-
den project, then successfully conspired to have two scoundrels falsely
accuse Naboth of blasphemy, and stone him to death. Although this
homicide cleared Ahab's path to possessing the vineyard, the biblical
text stresses that the Lord was greatly angered by what Ahab and Jez-
ebel had done.
D. A Landowner's Privileges to Control Land Uses
Honoring a hallmark of private property in land, the three an-
cient civilizations appear to have permitted owners broad discretion
over the use of their parcels. 135 Nonetheless, the sources include some
provocative examples of land-use controls that functioned to secure
economies of scale and prevent activities with spillover effects harmful
to neighbors.
1. Crop Selection and Fallowing
Even in Egypt, the most centralized of the three societies, the
fragmentary evidence suggests that small-holders typically could de-
cide what crops to plant and when.136 Virtually the only textual
132. POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 187.
133. 1 Kings 21:1-19.
134. 1 Kings 21:3. Although norms against alienation of ancestral lands undoubtedly helped
motivate Naboth's refusal (see infra text accompanying notes 381-402), it may also have been
significant that Ahab's taking was for "private," not "public" use. For a modem perspective on
this issue, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61 (1986).
135. Freedom of land use includes freedom to subdivide. Perhaps most common were in-
kind divisions of land among sons after a father had died. See infra text accompanying notes
268-69. The Mesag archive from Sargonic Sumer portrays a land division on a grander scale. See
Susan J. Bridges, The Mesag Archive: A Study of Sargonic Society and Economy 148-49 (1981)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University); infra text accompanying notes 253-57.
136. See Ward, supra note 77, at 76 n.24 (quoting this expansive language from Papyrus Turin
2021: "Pharaoh has said: Each should do as he wishes with his property.").
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sources on Egyptian agriculture prior to the New Kingdom are two
letters that a prosperous farmer, Hekanakht, wrote to his sons in 2002
B.C., a few weeks prior to the onset of the planting season. Hekanakht
appears to have been able to make farming decisions without the ap-
proval of any higher authority:
Now as for all the affairs of my estate and all the affairs of my farm
in . . . wi,-I had planted them with flax-don't let anybody go
down onto it (to rent it).... And you shall sow the farm with
northern barley. Don't sow emmer there. But if it turns out to be a
high inundation [of the Nile], you shall sow it with emmer.137
The degree of a farmer's autonomy in ancient Israel is difficult to
divine. Biblical vignettes, such as the "Song of the Vineyard" (a de-
piction of a farmer's efforts to grow new vines), make no references to
restraints on land users. 138 The Torah codes, on the other hand, in-
clude a number of injunctions aimed at controlling farmers' practices,
for example: to avoid sowing with two kinds of seed;139 to leave the
crops at the edges of fields for the poor and alien;14° and to fallow the
land every seventh year.' 41 Many of these may have been priestly ex-
hortations that went largely unrealized. Several passages in the He-
brew Bible, for example, imply that Israelite farmers commonly failed
to adhere to the fallow year.142
Postgate speculates that, in the heavily irrigated territories of
southern Mesopotamia, villagers may have made communal decisions
about when to fallow fields.143 Ur III texts suggest that a field typi-
cally was a long thin strip whose most elevated end abutted an irriga-
tion canal. A narrow strip would have been an efficient shape for a
field because plow oxen were extremely difficult to turn and because
irrigation water could be relatively easily distributed once it had been
introduced at a strip's higher terminus. By fallowing adjacent strips in
the same year, villagers could open the whole area as a commons for
137. Klaus Baer, An Eleventh Dynasty Farmer's Letters to His Family, 83 J. AM. ORIENTAL
Soc'y 1, 6 (1963) [hereinafter Baer, Eleventh Dynasty].
138. Isa. 5:1-7; see also Gen. 26:12 (in Canaan among the Philistines, Isaac sowed and reaped
a hundredfold). See generally SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 19-23 (on agricultural
practices).
139. Lev. 19:19.
140. Lev. 19:9 (quoted in supra text accompanying note 123).
141. Exod. 23:10-11; Lev. 25:2-7.
142. Lev. 26:34-35 ("the rest [the land] did not have on your sabbaths when you were living
on it"); 2 Chr. 36:21 ("until the land had made up for its sabbaths"). Hopkins speculates about
how the Israelites might have honored the fallow year, and notes that, for proper soil conserva-
tion, they probably actually fallowed as often as every other year. See HOPKINS, supra note 61, at
192-202.
143. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 188-90.
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grazing, thus achieving efficiencies of scale in fencing and herding
(and perhaps also irrigation management). 1'"
2. Building Projects
There is no evidence of legal constraints on a rural landowner's
construction of dwellings and farm structures. Urban structures were
another matter. Most houses in ancient cities were crammed closely
together and separated by walls, which provided support and defense
against trespassers. An inadequate wall could pose serious risks to
neighbors or passersby. Ancient legal systems dealt with these issues
not by requiring building permits, but by imposing after-the-fact sanc-
tions, especially on someone who had been warned that his premises
were subpar. A provision in the Laws of Eshnunna, probably written
in response to a notorious incident, calls for a severe response:
If a wall is buckling and the ward authorities so notify the owner of
the wall, but he does not reinforce his wall and the wall collapses
and thus causes the death of a member of the awilu-class-it is a
capital case, it is decided by a royal decree. 145
The Laws of Lipit-Ishtar specify a civil remedy for a dispute likely to
arise only in an urban context:
If a man-adjacent to whose house another man has neglected his
fallow [bare?] land-(if this) house-holder declares to the owner of
the fallow land: "Your fallow land has been neglected; someone
could break into my house. Fortify your property!" and it is con-
firmed that this formal warning was given, the owner of the fallow
land shall restore to the owner of the house any of his property that
is lost.1 4 6
Although the law of executory contracts was in its infancy at the be-
ginning of the second millennium, 147 there is some evidence that
neighbors might occasionally coordinate by express agreement. 148
Design and construction defects in buildings pose risks to occu-
pants as well as neighbors. In an early manifestation of products-lia-
bility law, the Code of Hammurabi calls for the death of a builder of a
144. This paragraph is an elaboration of POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 159,
188-90. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 91 58 hints at communal shepherding. Historians
may find it fruitful to compare Mesopotamian practices with those employed in medieval open-
field villages. On the latter system, see CARL J. DAHLMAN, Ti OPEN-FIELD SYSTEM AND BE-
YOND (1980).
145. Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 58.
146. Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, supra note 42, 11. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, gap e, is
similar, and also addresses the situation where a neighbor's failure to maintain a wall has led to
the wall being scaled by thieves.
147. See YARON, ESHNUNNA, supra note 47, at 223-24.
148. See, e.g., Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms, supra note 45, at iii, 18-38 (agreement
involving common wall).
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house that collapsed and killed the owner who had hired the
builder.' 49 The Deuteronomic Code cautions the builder of a new
house to install a parapet to prevent anyone from falling off the
roof.150 In general, however, the Hebrew Bible's many descriptions of
building projects make no mention of land use controls.'
51
3. Other Activities that Might Generate Harmful Spillovers
There appear to be no ancient precedents for a nuisance action to
obtain relief from fumes, dust, noise, and odors. Several codes do
deal, however, with invading floods and fires, two of the most trau-
matic of land-use spillovers. Paragraphs 53-56 of the Code of Ham-
murabi address liability when irrigation waters spill out and
accidentally flood neighbors' lands. Foreshadowing the controversy
that surrounded Rylands v. Fletcher,152 a famous torts case 3500 years
later, the Code seems to waffle on whether liability is to be strict or
instead turn on negligence:
55: If a man opens his branch of the canal for irrigation and negli-
gently allows the water to carry away his neighbor's field, he shall
measure and deliver grain in accordance with his neighbor's yield.
56: If a man opens (an irrigation gate and releases) waters and
thereby he allows the water to carry away whatever work has been
done in his neighbor's field, he shall measure and deliver 3,000 silas
of grain per 18 ikus (of field).'
53
149. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 229; see also id. 9 230 (if the son of the owner is
killed by the collapse, the son of the builder is to be put to death).
150. Deut. 22:8 (without a parapet, "you might have bloodguilt on your house, if anyone
should fall from it").
151. See, e.g., Gen. 33:17 (Jacob's building of a house and cattle booths in Succoth); Gen.
33:20 (Jacob's construction of an altar); 1 Kings 6-9 (Solomon's numerous building projects); 1
Kings 12:25, 31 (Jeroboam's construction projects).
There is some evidence of efforts at town planning in the ancient Near East. See, e.g.,
SAGGS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 180-81 (Neo-Assyrian efforts to make towns militarily defen-
sible). Nothing appears to have come, however, from the hopelessly utopian schemes that the
prophet Ezekiel hatched while in exile in Babylon in c.593-563 B.c. Ezekiel drew up resettle-
ment plans for the original tribes of Israel, which no longer existed. See Ezek. 45:1-9, 47:13-
48:35, politely described at OXFoRD BIBLE, supra note 59, at 1119 n.45.1-9, as "completely ideal-
istic." On Ezekiel, see JEFFREY A. FAGER, LAND TENURE AND THE BIBLICAL JUBILEE 64-81
(1993).
152. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
153. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44. On these provisions, see 1 Driver & Miles, supra
note 113, at 464-66 (doubting if true negligence principle was operative); Westbrook, Cuneiform
Law Codes, supra note 48, at 206-11 (focusing on measures of compensation). Paragraph 31 of
the Laws of Ur-Namma, supra note 41, a code some 400 years older than Hammurabi's, implies
a strict-liability approach: "If a man floods(?) another man's field, he shall measure and deliver
720 silas of grain per 100 saps of field." See also Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms, supra note
45, at iv, 35-41 (calling for a man to make restitution to his neighbor when he has diverted water
into a field the neighbor had harrowed).
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The Hittite Laws contain the earliest-known code provisions on the
liability of a landowner who starts a fire that spreads to consume a
neighbor's orchards and fields; they impose liability without regard to
negligence.
154
III. KINSHIP GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS AS LANDOWNERS
. In practice, contrary to the texts that assert overarching deistic
claims, 155 none of the three civilizations allocated all lands to a single
owner, or even to a single type of owner. The land tenure patterns
that emerged were attuned to the high risks that were present. People
in a subsistence society live in fear of crop failures, illness, and attack
by pillagers. 156 Because ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel all
were semiarid, the denizens had to be especially anxious about
drought. The Euphrates and even the Nile could be fickle, in one year
inadequate for irrigation,157 in the next, overample enough to wash
away crops and earthworks. For their part, Israelite villagers, who had
to adapt to riverless highlands and rainless summers, strove to spread
risks by diversifying crops and planting in varying ecologic niches.
158
A. The Theory of the Sizing of Landowning Entities
The economic theories of the firm and household can illuminate
how members of ancient societies accommodated relevant considera-
tions when deciding on mixes of landowning institutions. 159 To sim-
plify, a society prospers by having enterprises whose sizes serve to
minimize the sum of (1) transaction costs160 and (2) deadweight losses
arising out of coordination failures. A deadweight loss can arise in the
land-tenure context when, for example, efficiencies of scale in produc-
154. Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 105-06. For doubts about whether ancient legal systems
actually excused non-negligent parties from liability for accidents, see DAVID DAUBE, ROMAN
LAW 157-63 (1969).
155. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
156. On the role of risk in shaping institutions, see JAMES C. ScoTr, THE MORAL ECONOMY
OF TE PEASANT 4-7 (1976) ("safety-first" principle tends to prevail in peasant societies); Rich-
ard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, With Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1,
10-19 (1980) (on insurance mechanisms in preliterate societies).
157. See McC. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 3-7, 12-13 (on variability of river flows and rainfall
in Babylonia); Baer, Eleventh Dynasty, supra note 137, at 5 n.33 (Egyptian farmer Hekanakht's
worries that the Nile would be too low to permit irrigation of his fields).
158. Splendidly described in HOPINS, supra note 61, at 213-61.
159. On the theory of the firm, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, T-E ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM (1985). On the theory of the household, see GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY (1981), and sources cited in Martin Browning et al., Income and Outcomes: A Struc-
tural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1067 (1994).
160. These are the costs of bargaining, obtaining infomation, and otherwise carrying out
transactions. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
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tion are not exploited or risks that could have been spread among
individuals are instead concentrated. 161 There are two basic methods
of preventing these sorts of deadweight losses. One is to create and
manage organizations large enough to capture the advantages of
size.162 The other is to utilize family households or other close-knit
units that can most cheaply monitor against shirking and grabbing by
members, and to depend on these small units to coordinate with one
another by contract and norm to exploit scale-efficiencies and risk-
spreading opportunities. 163 Both approaches involve transaction
costs: large firms give rise to (exponentially?) increasing costs of in-
ternal governance; on the other hand, a proliferation of small units
entails greater exclusion and contracting costs. Economic theory gen-
erally predicts that the leaders of a landowning entity will attempt to
adjust its size to minimize the sum of the transaction costs and dead-
weight losses that its members incur.' 64
1. The Mixed Influence of the Rise of Civilization
The rise of civilization-of literacy, metallurgy, urbanization, and
so on-tends to create countervailing pressures on the optimal sizing
of landowning groups.
When a society first develops writing and mathematics, it is likely
to achieve technological advances that create net economies of scale
in military, legal, and water-control operations, among others. More
concretely, in the earliest periods of ancient Mesopotamian and Egyp-
tian history, innovations in engineering and organizational governance
created new regional scale-economies in the management of the wa-
ters of the Euphrates and Nile, and also, at the village level, localized
scale-economies in irrigation, fallowing, and plowing. All else equal,
these new production possibilities would have tended to increase the
scale of agricultural operations in these societies. 65
But the rise of civilization also introduces new opportunities for
contracting and risk management, and these tend to reduce the scale
of landowning entities. Civilization helps to free people from clan-
nishness by enabling them to circulate in social networks larger than
insular villages. As trustful relationships with outsiders multiply,
161. We assume that most ancients were risk-averse.
162. Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1332-44.
163. Id. at 1327-32.
164. Id. at 1325-26 & 1332-34.




trade and other cooperative interactions expand. "Civil society" ma-
tures, transaction costs of contracting fall, and people have less need
to use membership in a close-knit village or hierarchical institution as
a method of coordinating economic production.
Civilization brings other advantages. During the earliest historic
periods, people tend to live in extended families on ancestral farm-
steads in (rather reliably) close-knit villages. This age-old system
helps spread risks, but locks participants into rigid economic and so-
cial roles and concentrates much of their wealth in a highly undiversi-
fled asset, the farmstead.166 Civilization affords people new and
better ways to spread risks, for instance, by engaging in market trans-
actions, diversifying investments, and creating broad-based charitable
institutions. 167
2. Two Illustrative Cases: Southern Babylonia and Israel
Because the rise of civilization commonly has countervailing in-
fluences, its net effect on the size of landowning units depends on con-
text. In at least two of the locales under examination, the presence of
risk, scale-efficiencies, and coordination alternatives appears to have
had the effects anticipated.
Conditions conducive to the emergence of large-scale landowning
entities prevailed in the alluvial plain of Babylonia. The aridity and
extreme flatness of this region gave rise to unusually great scale-econ-
omies in water management. A major canal, for example, was beyond
the capability of a single village.168 Risks in southern Babylonia were
unusually high, however, because water flows in the Euphrates were
erratic. A flood could even displace a strand of the river into a far-
distant channel.169 Excessive irrigation also could contaminate soil
with salts brought up by capillary action.' 70 As anticipated, the palace
and temple-two bureaucracies well adapted to exploiting scale effi-
166. See Campos & Root, supra note 22, at 97-100; see also Robert H. Bates & Amy F.
Curry, Community versus Market. A Note on Corporate Villages, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 457
(1992).
167. Stone speculates that, aside from a sharecrop arrangement, an agricultural tenant could
obtain insurance by asking for aid from his tribe or working at a second job. Elizabeth C. Stone,
Economic Crisis and Social Upheaval in Old Babylonian Nippur, in MOUNTAINS AND Low-
LANDS: ESSAYS IN THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GREATER MESOPOTAMIA 267, 283 (Louis D. Levine
& T. Cuyler Young, Jr. eds., 1977). There appear to be no signs of overt insurance markets in
any of the three ancient civilizations.
168. See supra note 28.
169. See McC. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 8, 155-70; Stone, supra note 167, at 285 (shift in
Euphrates' channels may have caused the abandonment of Nippur in 1721 a.c.).
170. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 28-30; McC. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 4-5.
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ciencies and spreading risks-during most periods owned far more
land in the southern part of Babylonia than they did in the north.171
In ancient Israel, by contrast, family farmsteads always domi-
nated the landscape. Lacking rivers to feed irrigation canals, the Is-
raelites had little use for entities capable of large engineering projects.
The Israelites also seem to have been unusually successful in develop-
ing systems for spreading risks to entities larger than the extended
household. Indicative are the biblical provisions that entitle the poor
to glean in others' fields, and the Israelite clan's traditional obligation
to help a member in need.172 Large landowning institutions, which
held few advantages in Israel, were relatively absent there.
3. The Universality of Diverse Landowning Entities
Until recent decades, scholars of the ancient Near East, particu-
larly of Mesopotamia, have been prone to imagine a stage of history in
which a single type of entity controlled all land.173 The Soviet school,
influenced by Marx's views,174 contended that extended patriarchal
households dominated agriculture in Mesopotamia until the middle of
the third millennium.175 Anton Deimel envisioned temples control-
171. See GELa ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 24-26. There was also a gen-
eral (if punctuated) trend in Babylonia toward smaller landowning entities. See infra note 184
and accompanying text. Over time, the maturation of trade networks and legal institutions
would have lessened the comparative advantages of hierarchical landownership. In particular, as
time passed, palace elites may have become better skilled at financing canal systems through
taxes and user fees, enabling them to dispense with having to own lands riparian to canal sys-
tems. See also infra note 292.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26; infra text accompanying note 201.
173. Maine helped start the woeful tradition of simplistic characterization of ancient institu-
tions with exaggerations like this one: "But Ancient Law, it must again be repeated, knows next
to nothing of Individuals. It is concerned not with Individuals, but with Families, not with single
human beings, but with groups." MAINE, supra note 9, at 250. Maine's investigation went back
no further than the Homeric poems and the Twelve Tables of Rome. Had Maine known, say, of
the Code of Hammurabi, which was discovered after he wrote, he might have been more cau-
tious. The Code contains many provisions dealing with the rights, for example, of brother
against brother (see, e.g., 165-166); father against son (see, e.g., 168-69); and sister against
brother (see, e.g, 1% 178-184). See Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44.
174. Marx was convinced that the first permanent human settlements involved only commu-
nal property. See MARX, ECONOMIC FORMATIONS, supra note 9, at 68-69. Like Rousseau, Marx
essentially believed that ancient man was naturally solidary, but corrupted by civilization: "Thus
the ancient conception, in which man always appears ... as the aim of production, seems very
much more exalted than the modem world, in which production is the aim of man and wealth
the aim of production." Id. at 84. Marx hoped that a proletarian revolution would reestablish
this happier relationship between man and the means of production. Marx also imagined that
ancient communes periodically redistributed their lands. See id. at 139-45 (letters dated 1868-
81). The ancient Near East provides scant support for that notion.
175. Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 42-43. (Soviet school is Diakonoff's own designation. See
id. at 7.) With a Marxian stress on the joys of solidarity within a "classless" society, Diakonoff
characterizes the rise of civilization as ominous because trade increasingly sapped communal
norms of reciprocal altruism. "Of course, with the growth of class society the duties of actual
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ling all agricultural lands in Sumer prior to 2250 B.C., when he asserted
a secular state took sway.' 76 Some have recklessly interpreted the un-
disputed rise of kingly influence during the Ur III dynasty as a full-
blown system of "state socialism."'
1 77
All of these unitary conceptions of land-tenure patterns have
fallen into disrepute. Archeologists have disproportionately found the
artifacts of palaces and temples because those bureaucracies were par-
ticularly disposed toward record-keeping. Recognizing this bias in the
textual sources, scholars of the ancient Near East have begun to stress
that there also existed a relatively independent private sector. 178 In-
deed, the latest research indicates that households, temples, and pal-
aces (when they existed) all owned some land in every period of
ancient Near Eastern history for which evidence is available. 179 To
generalize, the palace was unusually prominent in Egypt; the temple,
in Sumerian cities; and the private agricultural sector, in Israel.
Within the private sector, kin-based units were central.
B. Kinship Groups
In order of increasing size, territorial social groups of the ancient
Near East are conventionally classified as extended patriarchal house-
holds, clans (or communes or villages), and tribes. 180 An extended
mutual aid within the territorial community were increasingly pushed into insignificance by la-
bour service and taxation [imposed by the emerging ruling class]." Id. at 32; see also id. at 17.
This view has little evidence to support it and oddly presupposes, for example, that a patriarch
invariably ruled benevolently and that a society could be "classless" even though slavery existed
within it. Members of the Soviet School have tended to claim that communal ownership was
characteristic of the most recent period of prehistory, an era that can provide no evidence to
refute the claim.
176. See Foster, New Look, supra note 91, at 225 (devastating critique of Deimel's view, and
also the variation on it in FALKENSTEIN, supra note 80, at 18-19).
177. See Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 13-32 (rebutting notion that an ancient Near Eastern
king owned all land in a proprietary capacity); Benjamin R. Foster, Commercial Activity in
Sargonic Mesopotamia, 39 IRAo 31 (1977) [hereinafter Foster, Commercial Activity] (critique of
"state socialism" thesis).
178. See sources cited in supra notes 91 & 94.
179. On Mesopotamia, see, e.g., BENJAMIN R. FOSTER, ADMINISTRATION AND USE OF INSTI-
TUTIONAL LAND IN SARGONIC MESOPOTAMIA 225-41 (1982) [hereinafter FOSTER, INSTIru-
TIONAL LAND] (criticizing more monolithic visions of land tenure in Sargonic Mesopotamia
(c.2350-2150 B.C.), such as Deimel's temple-state hypothesis, Diakonoff's communal-ownership
theory, and Gelb's private-enterprise model); POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 109,
183, 186 (attacking various unitary views). On diversity of owners within Egypt, where palace
and temple control was more extensive but hardly total, see KATARY, supra note 103, at xxi;
Manning, supra note 80, at 21-28; Ward, supra note 77, at 64. On temple and palace landowner-
ship in Israel, see infra notes 214 & 225 and accompanying text.
180. The Hebrew Bible employs this sort of tripartite taxonomy of kinship groups. The three
levels are the byt 'b (father's house, with one or two dozen members, including adult sons' fami-
lies); the msphh (clan); and the sbt or mth (tribe). See WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note
85, at 12-13, 20-22.
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household contained more adults and more generations than did a nu-
clear-family household; in the prototypical case, not only were the pa-
triarch and his wife present, but so were their adult sons and those
sons' wives and children. 181 The ancient clan was a kinship-based ag-
gregation of several extended households. A tribe, in turn, was an
agglomeration of several clans, perhaps as much on the basis of terri-
torial propinquity as on kinship.
1. Patriarchal Extended Households
As Part II stressed, in all three civilizations the family household
was the basic provider of food and shelter, and also the key produc-
tion unit in agriculture. 82 Within a household, whether nuclear or
extended, intimate kinship ties could be expected to foster a strong
ethic of sharing of internal resources, a primordial method of risk
spreading. In general, theory suggests that the ratio of extended-fam-
ily households to nuclear households would be higher in earlier histor-
ical periods than later ones, and in rural areas than in cities.183
Technological progress and urbanization give rise to both easier con-
tracting and alternative techniques for risk-spreading, which in turn
tend to reduce household size. In Mesopotamia, which has provided
an unequaled quantity of evidence on the issue, there was indeed
some evolution from extended-family to nuclear-family (and individ-
ual) ownership between the third millennium and the middle of the
second.' 84 The Mesopotamian pattern was hardly tidy, of course; even
181. Compare the discussion of ancient communes in Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 30-59.
Diakonoff envisions the members of a "family commune" as a father (the ruling patriarch) and
mother; their unmarried children; their married sons and those sons' wives and children; other
patriarchal relatives; debt slaves; and chattel slaves. Id. at 37-39. Diakonoff defines a "territorial
community" as an aggregation of several family communes. Id. at 47.
182. See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text. On multigenerational extended house-
holds in rural Israel in c.1250-1050 B.C., see HoPKNs, supra note 61, at 252-54 (citing an estimate
that size usually ranged from 10 to 30 persons). The extended patriarchal household (oikos) was
also the basic social unit of Ancient Greece. A community (polis) allotted a household inherita-
ble rights in a land lot (kleros). See ALISON BuRFoRD, LAND AND LABOR IN THE GREEK
WORLD 15-17, 33 (1993).
183. See BECKER, supra note 159, at 237-44; POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 91
(observing, however, that extended families may have occupied some city houses in c.2500 B.c. in
Sumer).
1 184. See Benjamin R. Foster, The Late Bronze Age Palace Economy: A View From the East,
in THE FUNCTION OF MINOAN PALACES 11, 12, 12 n.8 (Robin Hagg & Nanno Marinatos eds.,
1987) [hereinafter Foster, Palace Economy]; Foster, Land Sales, supra note 129, at 70 (supporting
Diakonoff's notion that the size of land-owning entities in Akkad probably trended from ex-
tended-family to immediate-family); Carlo Zaccagnini, The Price of Fields at Nuzi, 22 J. ECON.
& Soc. HIST. ORIENT 1, 27 (1979) [hereinafter Zaccagnini, Price of Fields] (asserting trend in
Nuzi from extended-family communes to individually owned estates).
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in the early second millennium, members of extended families were
still routinely leasing fields in Ur.185
There is little direct historical evidence about household govern-
ance. Members of a group who share occupancy of a parcel of land
generate internal rules to govern their substantive rights and decision-
making procedures. Especially when co-occupants are few and kin-
related, these rules are highly likely to be informal (not expressed in
written contracts) and based on custom, not law. 186
An overarching issue was the right, if any, of a patriarch to gov-
ern without the consent of others in the household. In general, a pa-
triarch is thought to have possessed vast powers even when his adult
sons resided with him.' 87 Despite the obvious demerits of autocracy,
the custom of dictatorial patriarchy reduced the transaction costs of
both internal decision-making and bargaining with outside entities.
Scholars of Mesopotamia have attempted to infer patterns of
household ownership and governance from names listed on land sale
documents. 188 After a mid-third-millennium Sumerian land sale, pay-
ments and gifts commonly were distributed to one or more "primary
sellers," and also (in smaller amounts) to various "secondary sellers"
who were kinsmen of the primary sellers; single sellers became more
typical in later periods. 189 It is unclear whether these additional signa-
tories had full ownership interests, had only vestigial powers (say to
veto a transfer outside the family or clan), or were merely functioning
as witnesses. 190 Conversely, when an ancient tablet identifies a single
185. See POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 94-96, 184 (relying primarily on
Diakonoff).
186. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 273-75 (1991) [hereinafter ORDER
WITHOUT LAW]. Mesopotamian codes say rather little about rights among co-owners of land.
But cf. Middle Assyrian Laws, supra note 117, Tablet B, $ 4 (on a cultivator's remedy when a co-
owning brother has reaped what the cultivator had sown). To some interpreters, 38 of the
Laws of Eshnunna grants a brother the preemptive right to purchase the share of another
brother who is selling. See YARON, ESHNUNNA, supra note 47, at 227-32. Martha Roth's recent
translation, however, renders this provision as governing a partner's right of first refusal when his
partner intends to sell a partnership share. Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 1 38.
187. See Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 37-40 (Mesopotamian patriarch's powers included the
power to marry off his children for bride-money and to sell them into slavery); WESTBROOK,
BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 14 (on Israel).
188. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 94-96; SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURES, supra note 3, at 96-102.
189. See GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 16-17. The authors neverthe-
less envision these early sellers as "at best, nuclear families. This, in our view, precludes any
possibility of the existence of a truly familiallcommunal ownership of land during [3100-2008 B.c.
in Mesopotamia]." Id. at 17; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra text accompa-
nying notes 367-69.
190. Although SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 96-97, stresses the last of
these possibilities, it is likely that the secondary sellers had at least veto power. See infra text
accompanying notes 390-93.
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individual as the seller or buyer, that person might be acting not on his
own but rather as the agent of a number of household members. 191
Foster concludes that during the Sargonic period (c.2350-2150 B.c.)
members of some extended households had rights of apportionment;
some of these households diversified their risks by assembling a varied
collection of holdings and then entering into leases with professional
farmers. 192
2. Clans
Clan ownership of land and labor gives rise to greater internal
monitoring costs than does household ownership. But communal
ownership also affords various benefits, among them, risk-spreading,
efficiencies of scale, elimination of the costs of policing the boundaries
of household claims, and solidary relations. 193 Villagers in the ancient
Near East appear to have turned to clan ownership in instances where
it promised net advantages. 194 For instance, low-quality pasturelands,
which would not have been worth fencing, may have been used as
commonses for grazing. 19
5
Diakonoff has adduced evidence that a Mesopotamian clan (or
village) was likely to be governed by a council of elders, one of whose
functions was to deal with legal problems.196 Especially on the allu-
vium of southern Babylonia, villages were key social units, much in-
volved in irrigation operations and perhaps in decisions on the
fallowing and grazing of irrigated fields.197 A Mesopotamian text sug-
gests that a village might sometimes itself be a land claimant:
An official and the judges of Larsa write to "the mayor and elders
of Bulum: Watar-Shamash has informed me that he bought an
orchard five years ago and that the village is claiming it from him.
191. A bureaucratic authority such as the palace might prefer to deal with only one person as
a matter of administrative convenience. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 96. On the
predominance of single buyers, see GELB ET AL, ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 15-16.
192. Foster, Land Sales, supra note 129, at 71.
193. See generally Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319 (1989);
Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1332-62.
194. Unfortunately, especially in comparison to palaces and temples, ancient villages have
left meager historical traces.
195. Mesopotamian villagers may have used unirrigated lands for communal grazing. Cf.
POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 159-63 (on Mesopotamian shepherds). In Ugarit,
however, the king appears to have controlled all pastureland and granted villages and groups of
royal dependents access to it only on a conditional basis. Heltzer, Royal Economy, supra note
71, at 476-78 (contrasting this practice with the widespread supposition that ancient pasturelands
were communally owned).
196. Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 47-48.
197. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 82-83, 189-90. Some family groups
even had their own gods. Id. at 101.
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Examine his case and pass judgment according to the edict. If it is
too difficult (?) for you, send him and his adversaries to us."
198
In the same vein, the Hittite Laws that governed northern Mesopota-
mia provided that a land parcel exempt from royal duties reverted to
the "village" in the event that the landholder disappeared or defaulted
from his local obligations.' 99
Ancient Egypt's society may have been even more village-based
than Mesopotamia's. 200 In Israel, villagers pooled labor at harvest
time, shared work on terracing projects, and rendered emergency aid
to a household that had fallen on hard times. 201 The Israelites also




Tribes, the largest of the informal social groups, appear to have
been the least consequential in land management. 20 3 Although the
Hebrew Bible reports that each of the twelve tribes of Israel had been
allotted a broad territory, 204 in practice the Israelite clan was the far
more significant institution.20 5 Indeed, a tribe was not necessarily
even the product of decentralized social forces. A palace or temple
might designate a particular territory as a tribe (or equivalent admin-
istrative unit) to make the group's members jointly responsible for
contributing revenues needed to support the army and court.
20 6
198. Id. at 276-77 (quoting a translation by Frankena); see also id. at 83 (other examples of
land ownership by clans and villages).
199. See O.R. GURNEY, TBE HrrrrrEs 103 (1952); Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 40; see also
id. IT 46 & 47b, (contemplating the idea that the "men of the village" may own and transfer
land).
200. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 113. But cf. supra note 98.
201. See HOPKINS, supra note 61, at 225,254-59; see also WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra
note 85, at 20-22.
202. HOPKINs, supra note 61, at 225-26 (threshing floors), 247 (children and old people might
have shepherded villagers' livestock on fallowed fields and marginal lands).
203. For a possible exception, see KNAPP, supra note 24, at 157 (on Kassite period in
Babylonia (c.1600-1150 B.C.)).
204. Josh. 13-21.
205. HOPKINS, supra note 61, at 258-60 (hypothesizing that tribe played a role in risk-spread-
ing); WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 22-23.
206. WEBER, supra note 9, at 139; see also Foster, Palace Economy, supra note 184, at 12;
SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 98 (communes may arise in response to state
imposition of joint responsibility for taxation).
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C. Organizations as Landowners
The advance of civilization gave rise to new hierarchical institu-
tions whose activities came to partially eclipse the extended house-
hold, clan, and tribe.
1. Types of Hierarchical Landowners
The organizational owners can be loosely classified as temples
(usually the first to appear 207), palaces, and private owners of large
estates (latifundia). Before describing their land management strate-
gies, we introduce these institutions.
a. Temples
A temple typically was staffed by members of a hereditary
priestly class and support workers. The temple's basic comparative
institutional advantage lay in the relative literacy of its leaders and its
credibility in divine affairs. Morris Silver surmises that the devout
would have been relatively trustful of temple-affiliated enterprises.
20 8
Temples unquestionably played central roles in ancient Near Eastern
economies, accumulating assets through gifts, offerings, and other
methods. 2°9 In Mesopotamia, especially in the earliest historical peri-
ods, temples were significant landholders. 210 During Egypt's Old
Kingdom period (2695-2160 B.C.), a professional priestly class took
root and pharaohs made large grants of arable land in perpetuity to
temples. Both priests and others holding these temple estates were
exempt from the fiscal obligations the crown imposed on other land-
owners. 211 By the late New Kingdom (late second millennium), tem-
ples had increased their landholdings; the Harris Papyrus shows them
possessing fully one-third of Egypt's arable land at the time of the
207. See KNAPP, supra note 24, at 70-71; POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 137
(Mesopotamian temple predates palace). But cf. Foster, New Look, supra note 91, at 240-41
(pre-2350 B.c. evidence of Sumerian land designated "for the maintenance of the city ruler").
208. SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURS, supra note 3, at 19. See generally id. at 7-31 (on
"Gods as Inputs and Outputs of the Ancient Economy").
209. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 109-36.
210. See KNAPP, supra note 24, at 44-46, 70-72 (fourth- and early third-millennium Mesopo-
tamia). Some works on Mesopotamia echo the Deimel thesis that until the late third millen-
nium, the temple owned most or all arable land, and rented it to farmers on a share-cropping
basis. See, e.g., LLOYD, supra note 27, at 122; SAGas, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 46, 162-66.
This overly simple thesis has given way to a conception of mixed forms of landownership in
third-millennium Mesopotamia. See supra text accompanying notes 173-79. Much later in the
second millennium, Hittite temples held land of the king and they, in turn, let out their estates to
farmers in exchange for in-kind ground-rents. GURNEY, supra note 199, at 102-03.
211. Hans Goedicke, Cult-Temple and "State" During the Old Kingdom in Egypt, 1 STATE
AND TEMPLE ECONOMY IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 113, 127-31 (Edward Lipinski ed., 1979).
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reign of Rameses IV.212 By then, some wealthy ancient Egyptian do-
nors were making gifts of land to priests in a mortuary cult to endow
the costs of the cult's providing the donor, after his death, with an
eternal stream of offerings, prayers, and ceremonies. 213 Israelite tem-
ples also relied on land donations; the Holiness Code addresses re-
demptive rights of a family member whose ancestral lands had been
given to priests. 21
4
b. Palaces
A palace can be envisioned as a ruler (king, pharaoh), perhaps
supported by regional rulers (governor, nomarch, vizier), and sus-
tained by a network of royal agents. The palace had a military arm
and hence a comparative advantage in force. Kings tended to foster
the belief that gods had legitimated their rule.215 The manifest advan-
tages in Mesopotamia and Egypt of having a strong state to assist hy-
draulic and surveying activities also no doubt allayed potential
opposition to the rise of these authorities. Nevertheless, contrary to
extreme extensions of Wittfogel's "hydraulic society" thesis, even in
these settings the palace did not emerge solely to manage water
projects, and kings of the ancient Near East rarely sought, much less
achieved, total control over economic affairs. 216 Instead, a royal bu-
reaucracy typically had unencumbered ownership of only selected ter-
ritories. On some additional lands, it could require feudatories to
perform special services to the crown. Beyond that, the palace had to
content itself with imposing various forms of taxes.21 7
The amount of crown-owned land appears to have fluctuated
widely over time. In Mesopotamia, the Sargonic kings were particu-
larly aggressive in pursuing land acquisitions.218 This burst of state
212. O'Connor, supra note 99, at 226-27. Text A of the Wilbour Papyrus enumerates obliga-
tions owing in 1142 B.C. from 2800 holders of plots of agricultural land sparsely scattered within a
140 kilometer stretch of the Nile. Some 91.8% of the smallholders' payees were specific temples,
most of them funerary cults and ordinary cults affiliated with temple groups. See KATARY, supra
note 103, at 297, 302. Many of the secular institutions listed among the payees-e.g., "Landing-
Places oi Pharaoh" and "Royal Harems"-were crown-related. Id. at 17-18, 298-99.
213. This priestly obligation ran with the land and burdened subsequent transferees of the
parcel. Ward, supra note 77, at 65-67 (three examples from period c.2500 to 1950 B.C.).
214. Lev. 27:14-25. On priestly land in Israel, see BOROWSKI, supra note 60, at 29-30.
215. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 71, 88-90, 102. In the extreme case, Egypt, the pharaoh was
seen as descended from gods.
216. See supra note 28.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 302-19.
218. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 26. Floods that caused radical
changes in the courses of strands of the Euphrates would have tended to centralize land tenure.
Even when the fields near a braid's former course had been privately owned, the palace (or
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enterprise and regulation is conventionally seen as peaking in the Ur
III period.2 19 Many centuries later, the Hittite royal domains are
thought to have been unusually vast because feudatories of that em-
pire had large holdings.220 Even as early as the Early Dynastic period
of Egypt (3050-2695 B.C.), royal officials were holding landed estates,
perhaps as a result of kingly grant, but also perhaps as a result of
inheritance.221 The pharaonic palace owned considerable agricultural
land during the Old and Middle Kingdoms,2 22 but apparently some-
what less by the New Kingdom.2 23 There was much crown land in
Ugarit224 and some in Israel.
225
c. Private latifundia
A rise in foreign trade for agricultural products may have stimu-
lated land consolidations in Sumer and Akkad, Egypt, and Israel.226
Egyptian records indicate that during the Fourth Dynasty (c. twenty-
sixth century B.C.) one Metjen assembled 6000 arouras (about 4000
acres) through purchases from what appear to be freeholders.
227
temple) would likely have the power to allocate lands riparian to the new channel. POSTGATE,
MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 299-300.
219. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 26 (during Ur III dynasty, kings
became "de facto owners of southern temple estates"). The numerous administrative and court
documents of the Ur III period make no reference to the sale of agricultural lands between
private parties. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 96, improbably takes this as evidence that the state
(and temple?) must have controlled agriculture then, cultivating land through tenants. Gelb,
Household and Family, supra note 94, at 69-70, offers the more straightforward interpretation
that the Ur III dynasty only suspended the rights of private owners to sell fields. See also supra
note 94; infra note 323.
220. GURNEY, supra note 199, at 103.
221. Whatever the pharaoh's upstart claim to absolute dominion, older patterns of private
landholding seem to have persisted in Egypt, at least at the village level, and possibly also among
the upper classes. Trigger, supra note 101, at 57-58.
222. Kemp, Old Kingdom, supra note 102, at 81.
223. O'Connor, supra note 99, at 226-27.
224. An Ugarit archive has revealed the king's holdings of real property, and also his condi-
tional land grants to dependents. Heltzer, Royal Economy, supra note 71, at 469-78.
225. Israel's kings emerged as significant landowners after establishment of the monarchy.
BoRowsI, supra note 60, at 26-29; Davies, supra note 67, at 358-59; see, e.g, 1 Chr. 27:25-31
(David), 2 Chr. 26:10 (Uzziah), 2 Chr. 32:27-29 (Hezekiah). The notion that Yahweh had given
the land to the tribes and family groups may have somewhat deterred, however, the emergence
in Israel of land regimes involving duties to the crown. See Johnstone, supra note 71, at 317.
226. For analysis of the economic stimulus provided by the opening of the Indo-Pakistan
subcontinental market during the Old Sumerian period, see Elisabeth C.L. During Caspers, Su-
mer, Coastal Arabia and the Indus Valley in Protoliterate and Early Dynastic Eras, 22 J. ECON. &
Soc. HisT. ORIENT 121, 122-23 (1979). For subsequent periods, see SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURES, supra note 3, at 147-57 (reviewing supportive evidence from Sumer, Old Kingdom Egypt,
and Babylonia); SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 259-63 (Israel). Silver attributes land con-
solidation to scale economies, including in the storage of foodstuffs. A shortcoming in Silver's
theory is that wholesalers could have emerged to exploit efficiencies in storage operations.
227. Baer, Eleventh Dynasty, supra note 137, at 13.
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There is evidence from eighteenth century B.C. Mesopotamia that a
few unrelated investors sometimes did pool capital in a partnership
dedicated to the acquisition of large acreages.228 Nonetheless, large
private landowning bureaucracies are relatively inconspicuous even
well into the second millennium.229 The surviving portions of the
Code of Hammurabi include only two provisions relating to
partnerships. 23
0
The first half of the first millennium appears to have been a time
of private land-consolidation. Large manorial estates emerged in the
Neo-Assyrian empire,23' and Israelite priests denounced land assem-
blages that threatened ancestral land holdings in the Canaan
highlands.232
2. Management of Agricultural Operations on Large Tracts
An entity that owns large arable acreages can manage agricul-
tural activities hierarchically through a supervised workforce, or de-
centralize operations by granting or leasing portions of its holdings to
others.233 Because efficient industrial organization is highly depen-
dent on context, it is not surprising that institutional owners in the
ancient Near East employed variations on all these approaches. 234
a. Hierarchical administration
Top-down management might involve the hiring of wardens to
supervise teams of slaves, corvee laborers, or hired hands. Mesopota-
228. See RIVKAH HARRIS, ANCIENT SIPPAR 235-37 (1975). In Old Babylonian Sippar, profits
from trade were sometimes invested in real estate worked by slaves imported expressly for this
purpose. Parallels may be drawn to the rise of latifondisti in ancient Rome. See Charles DiA.
Thorland, Rascals and Runaways: Old Babylonian Law and the Insubordinate Slave 13 (1992)
(unpublished M. Phil. dissertation, Oxford University, on file in the Bodleian Library).
229. An early example is reported in Mario Fales, A Survey of Neo-Assyrian Land Sales, in
Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East 1, 7 (Tarif Khalidi ed., 1984) (in-
stance in which a governor and three of his subordinate officials co-owned land).
230. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, gap I cc ("If a man gives silver to another man for
investment in a partnership venture, before the god they shall equally divide the profit or loss.");
id. 38 (providing partner preemptive option when other partner intends to sell share).
231. Fales, supra note 229, at 7-9 (on expanding latifundia, often on noncontiguous lands, in
900-700 B.C.); Renger, Arable Land, supra note 36. at 307-08.
232. See infra notes 400 & 466 and accompanying text. Morris Silver has chastised these
priests for failing to realize that a land consolidation that exploited new trade opportunities
might benefit all affected. SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 74-78.
233. On the general problem, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 159. Leasing arrangements are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 283-301.
234. See, e.g., POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 186-87 (on how a Mesopotamian
temple might mix farming its own fields, granting land to staff ("prebend" land), and renting
fields to tenants); Renger, Arable Land, supra note 36, at 284-86, 298-302.
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mian examples of hierarchical administration are best attested.235
Shulgi (c. 2095 B.c.) and other kings of the Ur III Dynasty undertook
"a massive programme of bureaucratic control," 236 which undoubtedly
increased the centralization of field management. During the same
era, the Namhani temple referred to its centrally managed acreages as
"ox fields"; 237 the label hints that scale efficiencies arising from techni-
cal innovations in plows and plowing may have been prompting exper-
iments in large-scale grain cultivation. The overly centralized Ur III
system collapsed, however, by 2020 B.C. 2 38 Hierarchical administra-
tion of crown lands again became pronounced after 1600 B.c., when
various parts of Mesopotamia came under the sway of the Kassites,
Hittites, and Hurrians; their systems also failed to endure, breaking
down entirely by the end of the second millennium.239
Harris has provided a rich description of agricultural organization
in Old Babylonian Sippar during the first portions of the second mil-
lennium.240 Sippar investors tended to hire a steward to manage their
lands. This steward in turn would hire laborers, for example, "5 men
on 8 days for the third ploughing. '' 241 Free men were paid in silver
(plus a barley ration); slaves, in barley only.242 As rational-actor mod-
els anticipate, the problem of agent opportunism appears to be time-
less. Belijatim, the steward about whom Harris gathered the most
evidence, was accused by an employer, in a letter, of being "not trust-
worthy (since) every year at harvest time concealed barley and stolen
amounts intended for payment for my oxen are discovered in his
possession. " 2 4 3
b. Subdivision by tenurial grant
The owner of an extensive tract of land can use various methods
to subdivide it. One is to sell (or give away) subparcels uncondition-
235. In Egypt, the Wilbour Papyrus of 1142 n.c. identifies not only many (lease-like?) ar-
rangements with smallholders, but also a number of hierarchically managed farms. KATARY,
supra note 103, at 11; see also SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucTURES, supra note 3, at 158 (Egyptian
temples practiced both direct management and leasing of agricultural land holdings). Israelite
kings are asserted to have used slaves and forced laborers to farm their royal estates. BOROW-
sKi, supra note 60, at 28; see also 1 Chr. 27:25-31 (David's use of stewards to administer crown
land).
236. POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 42.
237. Id. at 186.
238. Id. at 42.
239. See Foster, Palace Economy, supra note 184, at 12-14.
240. HARRIS, supra note 228, at 209-57.
241. Id. at 236.
242. Id. at 246.
243. Id. at 237.
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ally. Although institutional owners in the ancient Near East some-
times did this, they were more likely to attach strings to lands grants.
When transferring pieces of its holdings to members of its own circle,
a palace or temple commonly required the grantee and his successors
to meet special tenurial obligations. This sort of "feudal" 244 system
served to perpetuate, and hence cement, interpersonal relationships
within the institution's clique. 245
Many ancient Near Eastern institutions engaged in the practice of
granting land to compensate staff. Conditional grants to loyalists are
in evidence in the Sargonic period,246 in and after the Ur III Dy-
nasty,247 in Old Babylonia, 248 among the Hittites,249 and in Egypt,250
Ugarit,251 and Israel.252
The Mesag estate reveals the potential complexities of condi-
tional land transfers.253 Sargon I of Akkad, who ruled c.2350 B.C., be-
came a great landowner, buying up much arable land from extended
244. Feudal can be a highly misleading label in this context, however, because it not only
evokes inapt medieval images but also obscures the important fact that in most ancient contexts
much land was not held in service to the king. Evidence of "freehold" land is adduced in POST-
GATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 242 (landowners in Old Babylonia with traditional ten-
ures did not have duties to serve the king); Manning, supra note 80, at 26-28 (freest Egyptian
farmers merely owed pharaoh taxes payable in grain); supra text accompanying note 84 (refer-
ence to Ugarit house which is to have "no corvee from it"); supra note 86 (on general Israelite
aversion to tenurial arrangements).
245. Ben-Barak, supra note 128, at 74-75. For other possible advantages of conditional sales,
compare infra text accompanying note 296 (on coordination by lease).
246. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 26.
247. Ur III kings granted land in return for continuing military service. POSTGATE, MESOPO-
TAMIA, supra note 26, at 242. Later, Amorite princes seized temple lands in the remnants of the
Ur III empire and the Isin and Larsa kingdoms and allotted portions to grantees who accepted
ongoing tenurial obligations. SAGOS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 236-38.
248. Paragraphs 27-41 of the Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44. address the rights and
obligations of those who held land from the king. This detailed coverage suggests that these
arrangements were widespread.
249. A complex, if partial, feudal system existed in the Hittite domains of northern Mesopo-
tamia and Asia Minor. The Hittite laws touch on the complex subject of whether the burden of
rendering royal services runs to a successor who has inherited only a portion of the burdened
land. See, e.g., Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 1 46: "If in a village someone holds fields as an
inheritance share, if the [larger part of] the fields has been given to him, he shall render the
luzzi-services. But if the sm[aller part] (of) the fields [has been given] to him, he shall not render
the luzzi-services: they shall render them from the house of his father."
250. There is ample evidence, for instance, that New Kingdom pharaohs granted land to both
native veterans and foreign mercenaries. See KEMP, ANCIENT EGYPT, supra note 53, at 228.
The conditions attached to these grants, however, are less clear.
251. Ugarit's kings granted fields to craftsmen, skilled agricultural workers, and local royal
bureaucrats, typically on condition of future services and in-kind payments. Heltzer, Royal
Economy, supra note 71, at 463 n.83, 469-76. For the text of an apparently unconditional royal
grant to a foreigner, see H.W.F. SAGGs, CIVILIZATION BEFORE GREECE AND ROME 192 (1989)
[hereinafter SAGGS, CIVILIZATION].
252. Ben-Barak, supra note 128, at 89-90 (conditional royal grants).
253. See FOSTER, INSTITUTIONAL LAND, supra note 179, at 61-65.
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households and then parcelling it out to his followers. 254 Mesag, a
provincial bureaucrat in Sargonic Sumer, came to control over 2500
acres, probably only a portion of a yet larger royal plantation. The
royal administration appears to have granted Mesag 33% of his acre-
age as "domain land," part of whose yield he was to keep for his suste-
nance, and part to deliver to the palace.255 Mesag is thought to have
paid in some fashion for the remaining 67%.256 Mesag in turn subdi-
vided his large holdings, allocating parcels both to subordinates as
compensation for their services and to teams of field workers (who




A complex society inevitably has a network of roadways and
other public lands to enable citizens to travel and socialize with one
another. 258 During the Ur III period, serviceable highways were al-
ready sources of pride, as well as great aids to monarchs undertaking
demanding cultic pilgrimages.259 Archeologists not surprisingly find
that ancient cities had streets.260 The Akkadian language included a
word for square, which was used roughly in the manner of the Sume-
rian term for "wide street." The area just within the city gate appears
often to have been a key public space.2 61 In sum, ancient Near East-
ern civilizations, which on the one hand consistently recognized pri-
vate property in houses and gardens, on the other opened selected
lands to the general public.
254. POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 39, 41.
255. FOSTER, INSTITUTIONAL LAND, supra note 179, at 69.
256. See id.
257. On Mesag, see Bridges, supra note 135, at 133-34, 148-50; FOSTER, INSTITUTIONAL
LAND, supra note 179, at 52-69.
258. See Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1381-87. These open-access lands should be dis-
tinguished from the limited-access communal lands discussed supra text accompanying notes
193-202.
259. The hymn Shulgi A commemorates King Shulgi's (c.2094-2047 B.C.) fast march from
Nippur to Ur and back again in a single day to celebrate new-year's festivals in both cities. The
hymn glowingly describes the king's construction of caravan-serai at measured intervals along
the roads of Sumer. These rest-houses were said to be manned and provided with shady gardens
so that "[t]he wayfarer, who passes the night upon the road/May seek safe haven there, like in a
well-built city." JACOB Kt.EN, THREE SHULGI HYMNS: SUMERIAN ROYAL HYMNS GLORIFYING
KING SHULOI OF UR 179, 191-93 (1981); see also SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3,
at 63 (on ancient roads); SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 41-43 (on highways in Israel).
260. See, e.g., LLOYD, supra note 27, at 163 (map of residential quarter of Ur); POSTOATE,
MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 77 (map of Eshnunna).
261. POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 79; see also SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURES, supra note 3, at 119-21 (on public spaces used for open-air markets).
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IV. TIME SPANS OF STANDARD LAND INTERESTS
A society tends to recognize private land rights of infinite dura-
tion when: its land is scarce; it has developed a system of writing; and
its members have technologies that enable them to permanently alter
land conditions. 262 The last of these factors is particularly important.
When land is modifiable, nonperpetual land tenures such as usufructs
and life interests tend to lead to both underinvestment in land im-
provements and wasteful overexploitation of natural resources.263 By
the earliest historical periods, ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel
all were conferring perpetual private land rights.
264
A. Heritable Rights in Land
Inheritance, which allows the lands of decedents to pass to heirs
(instead of, say, escheating to the state), creates family entitlements of
infinite duration.265 Several Mesopotamian codes include detailed
provisions regarding the inheritance of "fields," "orchards," and
"houses"-solid evidence of perpetual ownership interests in these
sorts of properties.266 Numerous surviving records of estate divisions
corroborate that real property was a major component of paternal es-
tates during the Old Babylonian period.267 A father's estate was usu-
ally divided among his sons, either in equal shares or with an extra
share for the eldest, depending upon the region.268 Sons sometimes
took as undivided co-owners, and sometimes as sole owners of specific
262. See Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1364-71. The Anglo-American legal term for a
temporally infinite property interest is fee simple.
263. Id. at 1367.
264. In ancient Greece, similarly, a family estate descended to members of the household
that possessed it. See BURFORD, supra note 182, at 33.
265. On inheritance in the ancient Near East, see WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note
85, at 17-23, 118-41.
266. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 150, 165, 178-79; Middle Assyrian Laws, supra
note 117, Tablet B 1, Tablet 0 3; Sumerian Laws Exercise Tablet, supra note 45, 4'; see also
POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 96-99 (inheritance of city houses) and at 187 (some
lands conferred by palace or temple came to be inheritable); Foster, Land Sales, supra note 129,
at 71 (in Sumer, use rights in land were heritable).
267. See Charles DiA. Thorland, "One Heir, One Share," Favored Sons, Black Sheep, and
Widows' Livings: Intestate and Quasi-Testamentary Mechanisms in the Old Babylonian Period
15-16 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Thorland, One Heir].
268. A father may also have had limited powers, before death, to control succession among
his sons. See Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 150 (father may grant wife power to appoint
which son is to succeed to land); 165 (father may give field, orchard, or house to his first-born
son); 169 (father may disinherit son who has committed two grave wrongs). Conversely, a
father might be entitled to increase the number of his heirs. See id. 170 (father may acknowl-
edge sons by one of his slaves); 1 185-93 (father may adopt sons).
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portions of the father's holdings.269 Despite the Mesopotamian legal
bias against inheritance by daughters, 270 there are many instances of
Mesopotamian women-even married women-owning land in their
own right.
271
In ancient Egypt, it is undisputed that as early as the Old King-
dom private possessors of lands could pass their holdings to descend-
ants.272 Of the three civilizations, Egypt appears to have granted
private land owners the greatest freedom of testation, and is said to
have been the only one of the three not to have disfavored inheritance
by daughters or other female kin.273 The Egyptian "lawsuit of Mose"
in the mid-thirteenth century B.C. illustrates how agricultural land
might descend for generations within a family line. In that instance,
Mose claimed to own land that the pharaoh had given three centuries
previously to Mose's ancestor as a reward for war services as a ship
269. Practical incentives not to fragment agricultural land, however, particularly where irri-
gation and fallowing practices militated against subdivision, tended to perpetuate joint owner-
ship by brothers and other family members. POSToATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 95.
Compare Middle Assyrian Laws, supra note 117, Tablet B 1 1 (contemplating in-kind division of
land among brothers), with id. Tablet B 1 4 (rights among brothers who are undivided co-owners
of a field). For practice during the Old Babylonian period, see Thorland, One Heir, supra note
267, at 41, 75-79.
270. Texts from the Old Babylonian period reveal a few circumstances in which a daughter
might share in the estate of her deceased father and then dispose of that inheritance as she
pleased. See Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 182 (on priestess of Marduk of Babylon
whose father had not provided her with a "dowry"); Laws of Lipit-Ishtar, supra note 42, 1 b ("If
a man dies without male offspring, an unmarried daughter shall be his heir.").
271. See GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 17 ("Women participate very
frequently in sale transactions, both as buyers and sellers (primary and secondary)."); POST-
GATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 279 (text of Nippur document describing long-running
litigation between two women, at least one of whom was married, over a house-purchase trans-
action); see also SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 41-48, 95 (on the significant
role of women in ancient economies). For general analysis of the Code of Hammurabi's rules of
inheritance, and a synthesis of what may be gleaned from them in conjunction with other legal,
administrative, and literary texts of the period, including some discussion of the possibilities of
inheritance by women, see Thorland, One Heir, supra note 267; see also 1 Driver & Miles, supra
note 113, at 324-58.
272. For a general analysis of Egyptian rules of inheritance, see Pestman, supra note 56. In
an arbitration text from the New Kingdom, a son's claim to the hut of his father prevails over
that of the current occupant, despite the improvements made to the hut by the latter. See An-
drea G. McDowell, An Incised Hieratic Ostracon (Ashmolean HO 655), 81 J. EGYPTIAN AR-
CHAEOLOGY 220 (1995) (officials deciding case appear to have compromised to the extent of
ordering the rightful owner to pay the present occupant compensation for these improvements).
Interestingly, this text appears in the guise of an elaborately prepared limestone ostracon, which
the translator suggests may have been installed in the wall of the owner's hut to assert his right
to the building. Id.
273. Ward, supra note 77, at 67-69; see also KNAPP, supra note 24, at 173. From the begin-
ning of the second millennium, children and heirs had a qualified right to inherit their father's
property (an interest somewhere between a forced share and a remainder interest), but sales,
inter vivos gifts, and quasi-testamentary bequests by "fictitious sale" were common and disinher-
itance not unknown. Pestman, supra note 56, at 61-63, 66-68.
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captain.274 Mose's forebears had occupied this land until a greedy of-
ficial had tricked Mose's mother out of it. The lawsuit of Mose also
illustrates that, as in Mesopotamia, land was sometimes taken undi-
vided by co-heirs.275
The Israelites also recognized the heritability of a decedent's es-
tate. Paralleling the pro-male practices found in Mesopotamia, the
Deuteronomic Code provided that a deceased father's estate was to
descend to his sons, with the eldest taking a double share.276 This tra-
dition is an essential backdrop to the well-known story of Jacob dup-
ing his brother Esau into selling the birthright to their father Isaac's
estate.277 Unlike the Mesopotamians and Egyptians, the Israelites
may have barred women from owning property in any capacity. 278
B. Subdivision of Land Ownership in Time
An owner commonly finds it desirable to divide up a perpetual
land interest into time blocks and to transfer those blocks separately.
Like a subdivision in space, a subdivision in time can augment aggre-
gate value.279 Among the many possible methods of dividing owner-
ship in time, two of the most obvious are to create: an interest that
terminates on the death of the transferee (e.g., the English "life es-
tate"); and a lease for a specific term. Both forms were used in the
ancient Near East, most notably in Mesopotamia, the civilization that
has left the most traces.
1. Life Estates
Various provisions of the Code of Hammurabi recognize life in-
terests. Several paragraphs indicate that a widow was entitled to re-
274. Ward, supra note 77, at 64-65, 71.
275. The estate of Neshi described in the case was managed intact by successive trustees for
the benefit of members of the family for over two hundred years. See JAMES, supra note 57, at
95. A juridical instruction from the so-called Code of Hermopolis (third century B.C.) ordains
that "If a man dies leaving lands [or] gardens.., it is the eldest son who takes possession of the
property of his father." The eldest son, unless the testator had stipulated otherwise, was to
manage the undivided property on behalf of the joint heirs. Pestman, supra note 56, at 64-65.
276. Deut. 21:15-17; HANS J. BOECKER, LAW AND TI-rE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE
OLD TESTAMENT AND ANCIENT EAST 118-20 (Jeremy Moiser trans., Augsburg Publishing House
1980) (1976). See generally Richard W. Hiers, Transfers of Property by Inheritance and Bequest
in Biblical Law and Tradition, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 121 (1993/94). Texts from nearby Ugarit
reveal royal grants made to a transferee and his male issue forever. Heltzer, Mortgage, supra
note 88, at 93.
277. Gen. 25:29-34. The birthright included the eldest son's power to lead the family and
right to take a double share of the inheritance. OxFoRD BIBLE, supra note 59, at 32 n.25.31-34.
278. See WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 64-65.
279. Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1372-73.
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side in the home of her deceased husband, enjoying until her own
death the usufruct of either any "marriage-gift" that her spouse had
formally given her while both were alive, or a sort of forced share in
his estate.280 The Code also includes elaborate provisions governing
trust-like arrangements through which a father could confer upon a
priestess daughter (barred from marrying) a lifelong interest in the
income from particular assets, such as fields or orchards;281 the sons
owned a remainder that became possessory after both the father and
daughter had died. The existence of analogous time-limited interests
in real property in Egypt is less clear.28
2
2. Leaseholds
Anthropological evidence indicates that members of preindustrial
societies tend to engage in land-leasing at an earlier stage than land-
selling.283 Rental arrangements respond to land-occupancy demands
of relatively transitory or capital-poor persons. In addition, leases can
serve to spread risks and to structure future interactions in a manner
that enhances cooperation. 284
In Mesopotamia, the leasing of both houses and fields was com-
monplace beginning no later than the middle of the third millen-
nium.2 85 Evidence of leasing practices elsewhere is scantier. In Egypt,
land rentals may have been prevalent no later than 2000 B.c. 286
Egypt's institutional landowners appear to have rented fields to smal-
lholder-tenants, who either performed the fieldwork, hired others to
perform it, or subleased their holdings to cultivators.287 Some Egyp-
280. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 171-72.
281. Id. 178-181.
282. See Thdoridorid~s, supra note 56, at 295-300.
283. PRYOR, supra note 12, at 143.
284. See J.V. Henderson & Y.M. Ioannides, A Model of Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 98 (1983); infra text accompanying notes 292-98. In some ancient legal systems, a
landlord may have been able to evict a tenant at the end of the term more expeditiously than a
creditor would have been able to oust a landowner who had failed to pay user fees. Cf. infra text
accompanying note 437. All else equal, a legal asymmetry of this sort would make contractual
arrangements between landlords and tenants more efficient than arrangements between institu-
tional service-providers and landowning service-users. If so, an institutional owner that provided
irrigation or other special benefits might prefer to lease portions of its land than to sell portions
unconditionally.
285. See Steinkeller, Renting of Fields, supra note 94, at 129-39 (on share-tenancy arrange-
ments on fields during pre-Sargonic and Sargonic times); Stone, supra note 167, at 268 (leasing
of fields, orchards, and houses during Ur III period).
286. There are indications of the leasing of grain fields in 2002 B.c. See Baer, Eleventh Dy-
nasty, supra note 137, at 3-4, 6, 9 (farmer's letters). The earliest extant Egyptian lease documents
date from the sixth century B.c. See HuGHms, supra note 102, at 2, 6.
287. Only 20% of the smallholders listed in P. Wilbour are identified as cultivators,
herdsmen, or beekeepers-the persons most obviously qualified for fieldwork. Baer, Eleventh
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tian temples leased out their arable lands for less than the usual frac-
tion of the harvest to temple dependents and military personnel. 288
In part because it was costly to hire a scribe, written leases (if
necessary at all) tended to be short and to the point. A rental agree-
ment for an Old Babylonian house is typically pithy:
Mashqum, the son of Rim-Adad, has rented for one year from
Ribatum, a hierodule of Shamash. As the rent per year he shall pay
1-1/2 shekels of silver, with 2/3 shekel of silver received as the initial
payment on his rent.289
This spareness suggests that many of the rights and remedies of land-
lords and tenants during the term of a lease were determined by cus-
tom. The Code of Hammurabi contains a number of what appear to
be gap-filling provisions for leases. For example, where a lessee had
prepaid in full a year's rental for a house and the lessor had evicted
him before the full year had expired, the Code states that the lessor
must "forfeit" (i.e., return) the entire year's prepaid rent.290 Hammu-
rabi, like other rulers, also seems to have periodically attempted to
control rents and crop shares.291
The leasing of fields and orchards creates distinct problems and is
suited to governance by tailored norms. Economists have generated a
rich literature on land and labor contracting in agricultural settings.
Someone who owns a field, and wants to keep it but not cultivate it
himself, can:
(1) hire wage labor (which would keep the risk of crop failure with
the owner); or
(2) lease for a fixed rent (which would shift this risk to the ten-
ant);292 or
Dynasty, supra note 137, at 15-16; see also KATARY, supra note 103, at 16, 223-25, 299-301. This
papyrus hints that nuclear households dominated actual cultivation activities in New Kingdom
Egypt. Id. at 225.
288. O'Connor, supra note 99, at 227-28.
289. ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TExTs RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 218 (James B.
Pritchard ed. & Theophile J. Meek trans., 1955) [hereinafter Pritchard, ANET]. A lease of
course might include additional terms. See 1 Driver & Miles, supra note 113, at 138 (lease provi-
sions in Sippar that specify a tenant's duty to cultivate); SILvER, ECONOMIC STRucruRas, supra
note 3, at 93-94 (examples of Mesopotamian lease clauses on tenant duties).
290. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, gap I g. It is unclear whether this implies that a
tenant was obliged to vacate at the landlord's request. See also id. 47 (appearing to empower
tenant to renew his field lease for an additional year, on the same terms, where tenant "did not
recover his expenses" in the previous year); for competing interpretations, see 1 Driver & Miles,
supra note 113, at 142-44.
291. See, e.g., Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 1 60, 64 (specifying, perhaps as default
rules only, fractional divisions of croplands and crops in certain transactions between plantation
owners and gardeners); see also HARRIS, supra note 228, at 226 (example where an agricultural
lessee was to pay "according to the rate established by the city").
292. This suggests that field rentals would have been relatively more common in relatively
low-risk circumstances. Seemingly supportive is W.F. Leemans, The Role of the Landlease in
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(3) enter into a sharecropping arrangement, which would split the
risk between landlord and tenant.
Although far from universal, sharecropping arrangements were preva-
lent in the irrigated regions of both Mesopotamia and Egypt.2 93 Typi-
cally, the landlord's share was set at either one-third or one-half of the
yield.29
4
There are two principal theories for the widespread use of share-
cropping throughout human history. The first is that its risk-splitting
feature appeals to cultivators, who are assumed to be more risk-averse
than landlords.295 The second theory stresses that the success of a
farming venture commonly depends on both the landowner and ten-
ant providing streams of inputs into the production process. Accord-
ing to this latter theory, crop-sharing is a workable mechanism for
deterring both sides to the bargain from shirking on their responsibili-
ties.2 96 On the one hand, the prospect of sharing in a harvest promises
to make a cultivator more conscientious than a wage-earner would be.
On the other, compared to a flat rent, a crop-share helps ensure that a
landlord will faithfully provide inputs that he can supply more effi-
ciently than the tenant could-services such as irrigation, diking, fal-
lowing, and post-flood surveying.
Evidence from the ancient Near East provides some support for
both the risk and joint-production theories of sharecropping. For ex-
ample, of the many provisions of the Code of Hammurabi that touch
on sharecropping, a startling number directly address the concerns
that the two theories highlight. Several Code paragraphs deal with
how damage from storms is to be allocated among landlords, tenants,
Mesopotamia in the Early Second Millennium B.c., 18 J. ECON. & Soc. HIST. ORiENr 134, 138-45
(1975) (during Old Babylonian period, privately owned land was more commonly leased in the
north of the region than in the higher-risk South).
293. On Mesopotamian sharecropping, see generally 1 Driver & Miles, supra note 113, at
131-38. HARRIS, supra note 228, at 220-35, describes leases that priestesses and other landown-
ers in Sippar negotiated with well-to-do investors who presumably intended to sublease. Rental
arrangements in these Sippar leases varied; the tenant owed either a fraction of the crop (most
commonly one-third) or a flat rent (usually measured in barley).
294. See Steinkeller, Renting of Fields, supra note 94, at 114 (Ur III field rents were set at 1/3
or 1/2 of barley yield); Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 46 (1/3 or 1/2). In Egypt, simple
fractions also seem to have been popular. See HUGHES, supra note 102, at 4-5 (six Egyptian farm
leases from 555-533 B.c. at rents of 1/4, 1/3 or 1/2 of crop).
295. See STEVEN N.S. CEuNG, THE THEORY OF SHARE TENANCY (1969); Keijiro Otsuka et
al., Land and Labor Contracts in Agrarian Economies: Theories and Facts, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 1965
(1992).
296. See Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 447 (1995); Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, A Theory of Contractual
Structure in Agriculture, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 352 (1985).
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and lenders. 297 Notably, paragraph 46 requires parties to a share-
cropping agreement to split any pre-harvest storm losses as they had
agreed to split the harvest itself. Other provisions address the danger
of shirking on the part of a tenant who has leased a field on a crop-
share basis. For instance, Code of Hammurabi paragraph 42 states:
If a man rents a field in tenancy but does not plant any grain, they
shall charge and convict him of not performing the required work in
the field, and he shall give to the owner of the field grain in accord-
ance with his neighbor's yield.
298
The Hebrew Bible makes little or no mention of leaseholds. This
pattern has prompted some scholars to infer the existence of an Israe-
lite norm against the renting of land.299 Various pieces of circumstan-
tial evidence cast doubt on this thesis.300 On the other hand, it does
seem that the institution of sharecropping-so prominent in southern
Mesopotamia and Egypt-was not transplanted to ancient Israel. The
two theories of sharecropping suggest answers to this puzzle. Partly
because the Israelites had developed other mechanisms for loss-
spreading, 301 they had less use for this method of splitting risks.
Moreover, since their agriculture did not depend on irrigation canals
and other outside services, they had less reason to employ a mecha-
nism suited for coordinating the joint inputs of a landlord and a ten-
ant-cultivator.
297. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 11 45-46, 48. For commentary, see 1 Driver &
Miles, supra note 113, at 139-45. 1 45 states that, if the lessor were already to have received his
rent, the tenant is to bear any losses incurred when a storm or flood ravages the leased field.
This provision has been called "eminently unjust" and proof that "the rich man had advantage
over the poor," despite the fact that the same allocation prevails in contemporary Anglo-Ameri-
can law. See ALBERT KOCOUREK & JoHN H. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE
LAW 400 (W.W. Davies trans., 1915). This criticism is unsound. Under the usual sharecrop ar-
rangement, a tenant does not pay rent until after the harvest. See 1 Driver & Miles, supra note
113, at 140. In the usual instance, the tenant would be far better able than the landlord to
prevent storm damage to crops already harvested. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Ex ante, it would be in the interest of both parties to terminate, at har-
vest time, the "insurance" aspect of their relationship.
298. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44; see also id. 43-44, 61-63, 65; Laws of Ur-Narmma,
supra note 41, 1 32 (specifying, in units of grain, tenant's penalty for failing to cultivate field).
299. See BOECKER, supra note 276, at 89-90.
300. Leases seem to have been used in nearby Ugarit. See Baruch Halpern, A Landlord-
Tenant Dispute at Ugarit?, 2 MAARAV 121 (1979-1980). The Jubilee provisions of the Book of
Leviticus explicitly contemplate a field owner's "sale" of "crop years" to a neighbor. Lev. 25:14-
16. The Talmud (written many centuries after the Torah), containg provisions on farm leases and
sharecropping, an indication that these sorts of transactions were not then seen as a violation of
a fundamental principle of Jewish law. WEBER, supra note 9, at 255-56; see also MENACHEM
ELON, 1 JEWISH LAW 428 (1994) (on treatment of sharecropping in later Jewish Law).
301. See supra text accompanying note 172.
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V. THE ROLE OF LAND IN THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FINANCE
The ancient Near East provides the earliest empirical window on
institutions of public finance. In all three civilizations, land was a pri-
mary form of wealth, typically overshadowing even slaves and live-
stock. Landowners both benefitted from the services rendered by the
various public providers-palace, village, and others-and in return
were commonly called upon to help finance the operations of those
institutions.
In ancient times, as in other times, the state was a mixed bless-
ing.302 A rational-actor optimist might interpret the rise of the ancient
palace as an adaptive social innovation that helped solve the problem
of providing "public goods." The theory of public finance holds that
only an entity with coercive powers of taxation can provide services
such as a legal system, national defense, flood control, and open-ac-
cess transportation arteries such as canals. 30 3 Private entrepreneurs, it
is thought, will provide insufficient quantities of these services because
they cannot exclude freeriders who reap the benefits of the service
without paying for it.304 A rational-actor pessimist, on the other hand,
might envision the "king's people" primarily as a clique of self-inter-
ested rentseekers who deployed crown power to enrich themselves at
the expense of all they could coerce.
In most ancient contexts, both unalloyed pessimism and unbri-
dled optimism about the role of the state would be simplistic. The
king's people typically did deliver some highly valued public goods, a
strategy that helped them enlarge their tax base and enhance the legit-
imacy of their regime. (Indeed, royal quests for tax revenues appear
to have stimulated early advances in writing and records systems.305)
Still, because few competing institutions had the power (or, in the case
of temples, perhaps the inclination) to curb palace excesses, the king
302. For a "neoclassical theory of the state," see NORTH, supra note 8, at 20-32.
303. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 54-58 (3rd ed. 1980).
304. Either the service is consumed in a nonrival fashion, or the service provider has no
feasible way of excluding freeriders from using the service. Id. The Middle Assyrian Laws,
supra note 117, indicate an awareness of problems of freeriding. See id., Tablet B, 17 (land-
owners who contribute to work of bringing in well water for irrigation are only persons entitled
to use the water); Tablet B, 9 18 (fieldowner may petition mayor and noblemen of the city to
flog neighbor who had failed to cooperate in effort to harness surface waters for irrigation).
305. Egyptian records of the annual level of the Nile flood, censuses of populations, and
biennial censuses of "gold and fields," dating from c.2900 B.C., were all presumably tax-driven.
See Thdodorid~s, supra note 56, at 292. The administrative reforms of Shulgi in late third-millen-
nium Mesopotamia led to improvements in both writing methods and recording practices.




and his allies commonly were able to extract large amounts of surplus
from their subjects.306 This led to widespread grumbling about
taxes307 and invited an incoming monarch to start his reign with a pop-
ulist gesture.
30 8
Two types of governmental fiscal charges on landowners should
be distinguished. 30 9 General taxes are obligations that a state imposes
on all (or almost all) landowners without attempting to rationalize the
charge as a fee for the conferral of particular benefits. User charges,
by contrast, are special fiscal obligations a state imposes because it
provides special services to discrete lands.310 In the ancient Near
East, fiscal obligations of either sort could take the form of: periodic
payments of fixed quantities of grain or metal; delivery of a specified
fraction of the crop harvested on the land; or performance of periodic
stints of military or corvee labor.
A. General Public Services and General Taxes
Public goods that radiate pervasive benefits are typically financed
out of general taxes. A central function of the ancient palace was to
recruit, manage, and equip a military force and, by inference, to han-
dle relations with alien regimes.31' There is evidence of a Mesopota-
mian royal justice system, at times memorialized in decrees and codes,
and partially integrated with local councils operating at the village
level. 312 The maintenance of land records sometimes involved inter-
play among crown, temple, and village participants. 31 3 Some of the
ancients' most ambitious public works, such as long levees in Mesopo-
tamia and landings for boats on the Nile, conferred broad benefits and
were candidates for being financed through widely imposed corvee-
306. See 1 Driver & Miles, supra note 113, at 112-13 (on balance, holding a king's fief was
advantageous); Foster, Palace Economy, supra note 184, at 12 (in many Bronze Age societies,
king's people held land in return for services owed king, and shared in surplus produced by serfs
and slaves).
307. For example, Solomon's tax and forced-labor programs created widespread resentment.
KNAPP, supra note 24, at 14; see also Neh. 5:4, quoted infra at text accompanying note 432 (refer-
ring to burdens of "the king's tax").
308. See infra text accompanying notes 453-57. In the first known legal code (c.2100 B.C.),
Ur-Namma boasts of ending onerous exactions that various powerful cliques had been imposing
upon boatmen and stockmen. Laws of Ur-Namma, supra note 41, Tablet A, lines 87-124.
309. For a brief introduction to principles of taxation, see MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra
note 303, at 229-324.
310. The tenurial obligations that a state might levy on selected land grantees are concep-
tually different. The state imposes these obligations in its capacity as a transferor of assets, not
in its capacity as a provider of public services. See supra text accompanying notes 244-57.
311. See Foster, Palace Economy, supra note 184, at 12-13.
312. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 275-78.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 367-80.
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labor duties. An Old Babylonian king boasted that, after gathering
the people of his many villages, "I made them work by my great
power. I fashioned the (canal's) two banks like awe-inspiring moun-
tains.... I called the canal Tuqmat-Erra, and thus restored the eternal
waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. ' 314 Much evidence from Mesopo-
tamia, Egypt, and Ugarit supports the notion that ancient kings com-
monly did impose general taxes to help finance the provision of royal
services. 315
B. User Charges Imposed on Recipients of Special Services
User fees were employed in the financing of village irrigation sys-
tems in southern Mesopotamia, a civilization dependent on the provi-
sion of these services. 316 An official called a gugallum appears to have
been in charge of maintaining a village's canals and regulators and
rotating the flow of irrigation waters among field ditches. Before the
start of the Mesopotamian growing season, a field tenant-even one
leasing from a palace or temple-might have to make an advance pay-
ment to the central "irrigation office" for water services. 317 In some
situations the king appears to have borne some responsibility for en-
suring the success of village arrangements; in a letter, Hammurabi
commanded a subordinate to investigate an irrigation controversy that
had arisen and make certain that the elders of the city and tenants of
the irrigated district convened a court to gather evidence on the mat-
ter.318 Because palace administrative texts seldom mention the gugal-
314. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 179 (quoting inscription of Rim-Sin I of
Larsa (c.1800 B.C.)).
315. See Foster, Palace Economy, supra note 184, at 13, 15 (Late Bronze Age palace imposed
taxes and exactions on members of "free community" in Nuzi, Ugarit, Alalakh, and Matti);
GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75. at 19 (one c.2500 B.C. sale tablet for a house
identifies the buyer as a "field assessor"); Ward, supra note 77, at 64-65 (evidence of Egyptian
tax-assessment records); Heltzer, Royal Economy, supra note 71, at 475-76 (Ugaritic villagers
owed taxes and corvee).
316. Owners and lessees of temple estates often were exempt from general taxes. SILVER,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 19-20 (on tax exemptions that favored temples);
Goedicke, supra note 211, at 127-31; Janssen, supra note 129, at 509-10 (Egyptian exemptions for
temples). In some situations, however, Egyptian temples did make payments to the crown. See
Baer, Low Price, supra note 100, at 33 (temples owed land taxes to Pharaoh, at rate of approxi-
mately one-tenth of crop); HUGHES, supra note 102, at 5 (Ptolemaic leases of temple lands allo-
cated duty to pay Pharaoh's tax). The pharaonic levies mentioned in the last two sources
conceivably may have been user charges, perhaps for surveying and irrigation services.
317. See Steinkeller, Renting of Fields, supra note 94, at 120-21, 125-26 (describing "irrigation
tax" of the late-third and early-second millennia).
318. Cited in 1 Driver & Miles, supra note 113, at 152.
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lum, however, a village appears to have had considerable autonomy in
managing its local irrigation operations.
319
VI. LAND TRANSFER
The Marxian conception of a progression of historical stages has
fostered the erroneous notion that land was not "commodified" until
a postulated transition from feudalism to capitalism, a transformation
that Karl Polanyi asserted did not occur in Europe until after the Mid-
dle Ages.320 In fact, ancient documentary sources are full of refer-
ences to negotiated land sales. All three civilizations developed
routine procedures for land transfers and established systems for
maintenance of land records. On the other hand, ancient regimes
commonly did restrain alienation, especially of ancestral or feudatory
lands.
A. Evidence of Land Sales
The oldest legal documents ever unearthed involve land sales in
Mesopotamia. These are pictographic and date from the beginning of
the third millennium.321 For the Fara Period (c.2600-2450 B.C.), Gelb
and his co-authors assembled twenty-five documents showing field
sales, and another seventeen showing house sales.322 Thereafter, with
certain exceptions during the Ur III (c.2150-2000 B.C.) 32 3 and Middle
Babylonian (c.1600-1150 B.C.) periods, there is abundant evidence of
the sale and leasing of privately owned land in Mesopotamia.3 24 By
319. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 178-80; see also McC. ADAMS, supra note
26, at 245-46.
320. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 179 (1944) (dating "commercializa-
tion of the soil" with the demise of feudalism in Europe). For criticism of this assertion, see
SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 92-96; Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1377-
78. A softer and far more tenable version of this thesis is that, in the ancient Near East, most
access to land was not through arms-length market transactions. See Renger, Economic Struc-
tures, supra note 21, at 188-89.
321. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 66-67, 285. The first known human texts
are administrative and accounting documents, and date from c.3200 B.C. Id. at 66.
322. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 14.
323. Even during the Ur III dynasty, when a royal proclamation may have restricted the
alienation of fields, there is evidence of the sale of houses and orchards and the leasing of fields.
See sources cited in supra note 94. For evidence that some prebend (temple-allotted) land was
alienable during this period, see PioTR STEINKELLER, THIRD-MILLENNIUM LEGAL AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE TEXTS IN THE IRAO MUSEUM, BAGHDAD 98-100 (1992) [hereinafter STEINKELLER,
THIRD-MILLENNIUM TEXTS].
324. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75; SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES,
supra note 3, at 92-93. One trove of documents, from Sippar with dates ranging from 1894 to
1595 B.C., reveals 97 field sales and 12 orchard sales. HARRIS, supra note 228, at 240. Renger,
Arable Land, supra note 36, conveniently summarizes how the amount of evidence varies by
category of property, time period, and place.
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the latter portion of the third millennium, silver (or some other pre-
cious metal) had become the default medium of exchange there. 325
As always, documentary data from beyond Mesopotamia are
more fragmentary. There are a few fragments of evidence of land
sales during Egypt's Old Kingdom, 326 and more for the New King-
dom. 327 Ugarit records reveal sales of privately owned agricultural
lands in the late second millennium.328 Although the Hebrew Bible
includes broad injunctions against the sale of ancestral lands, in prac-
tice the ancient Israelites had a number of devices for transferring
land among themselves.
329
B. Land Sale Procedures
In all eras, two risks make a land purchaser potentially anxious
about handing over a large sum to a land seller:
(1) the risk of seller breach (e.g., that the seller will fail to cede pos-
session of the land, or later reclaim it, or falsely assert that
purchase payments are still owing); and
(2) the risk of superior third-party claims (because the seller does
not have a clear title (or even any title) to the land).
The civilizations of the ancient Near East slowly developed proce-
dures to protect land buyers from these two risks. Postgate has imagi-
natively portrayed how forms of land transactions may have evolved
in Mesopotamia between 5000 and 1600 B.C. as literacy developed
and spread, and courts, temples, and other relevant institutions
matured. 330
325. Foster, Commercial Activity, supra note 177, at 35-36 (Sargonic era transactions); Su.-
VER, ECONOMIC STRucTUREs, supra note 3, at 123-26. In the New Kingdom in Egypt, land
purchasers typically paid either silver or gold. Id. at 124.
326. See Baer, Eleventh Dynasty, supra note 137, at 13 (Metjen's vast purchases c.2600 B.C.);
see also supra note 80 (house sale).
327. See, e.g., supra note 83 (sale of house plot). Under the Stile Juridique from Karnak
(c.1600-1570 B.C.), the state gave parties to a land sale a year to fulfill their conveyancing obliga-
tions, with a possibility of further extensions. Thdoridorid~s, supra note 56, at 293. The Wilbour
Papyrus's smallholders, some of whom appear to have been freeholders (see supra note 105),
apparently could alienate their interests. KATARY, supra note 103, at 206 (reporting Bernadette
Menu's interpretation). Gen. 47:18-26 states that Joseph "bought" lands for Pharaoh from desti-
tute Egyptians, and then rented it back to them for a 20% crop-share.
328. SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 73.
329. FAGER, supra note 151, at 120 (Jubilee was planned as an institution that would counter
Canaanite tradition of treating land as a commodity.); MAIIHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note 88,
at 202 (Israelite households seem to have rather easily lost both land and freedom.); SILVER,
PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 73-77 (adducing evidence of a market in land in ancient Israel); see
also sources cited later in this Part.
330. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 282-87 (especially chart at 283). As in
most other contexts, the best evidence on the topic at hand is from Mesopotamia.
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1. Preliterate Procedure: A Mass Gathering
Face-to-face rituals appear to have been the norm before the era
of written sales documents. For instance, a land seller might have to
utter appropriate words and carry out symbolic acts in the presence of
a large number of relatives and other witnesses, some of whom might
receive baksheesh as part of the transaction.
331
The first real estate transaction in the Book of Genesis hints at
preliterate procedures of land transfer. Abraham, who had come to
Canaan as an alien, sought to purchase land in Hebron from Ephron,
a Hittite.332 Abraham needed a burial place for Sarah, his recently
deceased wife. Ephron "owned" a field whose boundaries encom-
passed the Cave of Machpelah, a suitable site that, after Abraham had
purchased it, eventually became the tomb of Abraham and Sarah,
Isaac and Rebekah, and Jacob and Leah.333 Abraham opened the ne-
gotiations by offering Ephron the "full price" of the field. Ephron
responded, however, by offering the land as a gift:
Ephron the Hittite answered Abraham in the hearing of the Hit-
tites, of all who went in at the gate of his city, "No, my lord, hear
me; I give you the field, and I give you the cave that is in it; in the
presence of my people I give it to you; bury your dead." Then
Abraham bowed down before the people of the land. He said to
Ephron in the hearing of the people of the land, "If you only will
listen to me! I will give the price of the field; accept it from me, so
that I may bury my dead there." Ephron answered Abraham, "My
lord, listen to me; a piece of land worth four hundred shekels of
silver-what is that between you and me? Bury your dead." Abra-
ham agreed with Ephron; and Abraham weighed out for Ephron
the silver that he had named in the hearing of the Hittites, four hun-
dred shekels of silver, according to the weights current among the
merchants.
... The field and the cave that is in it passed from the Hittites
into Abraham's possession as a burying place.
334
Because Abraham sought a burial site, he wished a title that
would be secure for eternity. That all the Hittites in Ephron's city
were reported to have observed the transaction helped provide Abra-
ham the two assurances that any land buyer seeks. First, the large
number of witnesses lessened the risk that Ephron would later disa-
vow the sale by claiming, for example, that he had never received the
331. Id. at 283.
332. For a masterful essay on this transaction, see WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note
85, at 24-35. Although some scholars attribute this text to the P-source, Westbrook regards its
roots as ancient. Id. at 34-35.
333. Gen. 49:29-33, 50:13.
334. Gen. 23:11-20.
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purchase money. Second, the ceremony had provided each witness a
chance to speak up if he believed that he held a title to the Cave of
Machpelah that was concurrent with, or superior to, Ephron's; that
none in the throng had spoken helped assure Abraham that the risk of
third-party claims was low. 335 In the absence of such a throng, per-
haps Abraham would have been willing to pay only 300 shekels, not
400.336
Abraham's insistence on paying for the land is also notable. Be-
cause accepting a gift typically obligates a donee to later repay the
donor's generosity in some fashion, a donee bears a greater risk than a
purchaser does that the transferor will seek the return of property.337
The passage in Genesis teaches that an Israelite should be wary of
accepting land as a gift, particularly from an alien.338 Having learned
this lesson, when King David acquired the site of what later became
Solomon's Temple from Araunah the Jebusite, he declined the alien's
offer to give the land along with oxen and wood, saying, "No, but I
will buy them from you for a price, '339 fifty shekels of silver in that
instance. 34
0
2. Written Sales Documents and Land Descriptions
The refinement of writing and the spread of scribal skills gave rise
to ever simpler procedures for protecting land buyers. Mesopotamian
scribes eventually came to be schooled in preparing clay tablets to
memorialize these transactions.34'
335. A Sargonic obelisk refers to a land sale attended by 30 witnesses, and concluded by a
ceremonial feast at which 94 local men "ate bread." GEL.a ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra
note 75, at 129. On these rites, see id. at 243-44.
336. Ephron may have been obligated to distribute portions of the silver to his heirs and
clansmen, because they may have had inheritance rights or authority to veto the transfer. See
infra text accompanying notes 382-93. Compare Gen. 23:20; 25:9-10; 49:32 (all of which refer to
"the Hittites" as the sellers), with Gen. 23:9, 17 (referring to Ephron as the seller).
337. DAVID DAUBE, COLLECTED STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW 1342-44 (Zweiter Halbband ed.,
1991) (analyzing the Cave of Machpelah transaction); WEsTBRooK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note
85, at 26-30. See generally ORDER WITOUT LAw, supra note 186, at 228 n.45 (sources on gift
exchange).
338. See Gen. 23:11-20.
339. 2 Sam. 24:24.
340. See 2 Sam. 24:16-24; 2 Chr. 3:1; 1 Kings 9:20 (identifying Jebusites as aliens); see also
Gen. 33:18-20 (Jacob's payment of one hundred pieces of money to aliens for site for an altar); 1
Kings 16:24 (King Omri's purchase of site of city of Samaria for two talents of silver).
341. Oaths and other ritual observances typically complemented the procedure. See Foster,
Land Sales, supra note 129, at 442. The clay tablet itself came to symbolize the transaction; the
Code of Hammurabi, when it called for invalidation of a transfer, stated that the buyer's "tablet
shall be broken." Code of Hammurabi 37, as translated in 2 Driver & Miles, supra note 113.
But cf. Martha Roth's version in Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44 (offering "deed shall be
invalidated," a less archaic translation).
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A cuneiform land-sale text typically covered only the basics:
identity of the parties; barebones land description; price paid; revendi-
cation clause; and witnesses. 342 For example:
1-1/2 sar (of land) with a house built on it, next to the house of
Kununu and next to the house of Irraya, Arad-Zugal has bought
from Arad-Nanna. He has paid him 8-1/2 shekels of silver as its full
price.
Arad-Nanna has taken an oath by the king that he will not in
the future say "it is my house."
[The names of witnesses, and the date, follow.] 34 3
This document, like many others, includes an estimate of land
area. Specialists in land surveying show up in the most ancient histori-
cal records. During the Fara Period (c.2600-2450 B.c.), a "master
house surveyor" and "(field) scribe" were responsible for surveying
(and perhaps also registering) house and field properties, respec-
tively.344 A Sumerian tablet (c.2350 B.c.) documenting a land sale
identifies one witness as a surveyor and another as the son of a sur-
veyor.345 Beginning in the late-third millennium, survey maps of fields
were being incised on clay tablets. 346 During the Middle Babylonian
period, explicit land measurements appear in recorded documents.347
Paintings in five Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian tombs portray land
measurers at work.348 Over 90% of the grain fields listed in Text A of
the Wilbour Papyrus contain either 3, 5, 10, or 20 arouras349-a regu-
larity of sizing that suggests coordinated surveying and land subdivi-
sion during the New Kingdom.
Procedures for written land transactions in ancient Israel are sug-
gested by Jeremiah's 587 B.C. purchase of his cousin Hanamel's rights
to a field at Anathoth. In what the Oxford Bible calls "the most de-
tailed account of a business transaction in the Bible, ' 350 Jeremiah re-
ports that he:
weighed out the money to him [Hanamel], seventeen shekels of sil-
ver. I signed the deed, sealed it, got witnesses, and weighed the
money on scales. Then I took the sealed deed of purchase, contain-
342. See GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 20-21.
343. SAGOS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 293-94.
344. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 237; see also the reference to a
"purchase rope" in the text quoted at infra note 360.
345. Foster, Land Sales, supra note 129, at 452.
346. SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucruREs, supra note 3, at 93.
347. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 159.
348. HuGouis, supra note 102, at 41-42 (scenes show ripe grain, implying that measurers were
working for landlords or tax collectors).
349. KATARY, supra note 103, at 309. An aroura equals approximately two-thirds of an acre.
350. OXFORD BIBLE, supra note 59, at 1011-12 n.32.1-44.
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ing the terms and conditions, and the open copy; and I gave the
deed of purchase to Baruch [Jeremiah's own personal secretary351]
.... in the presence of my cousin Hanamel, in the presence of the
witnesses who signed the deed of purchase, and in the presence of
all the Judeans who were sitting in the court of the guard. In their
presence I charged Baruch, saying, Thus says the Lord of hosts, the
God of Israel: Take these deeds, both this sealed deed of purchase
and this open deed, and put them in an earthenware jar, in order
that they may last for a long time. For thus says the Lord of hosts,
the God of Israel: Houses and fields and vineyards shall again be
bought in this land.
352
This passage implies (despite its final sentence 353) the existence of a
routinized system of land transfer that involved an official deed that
was written on papyrus, rolled up, and sealed; an open copy kept for
more ready reference; witnesses; and household archives for the keep-
ing of permanent records. It is notable that, even though Jeremiah's
transaction was between relatives, procedural formalities were strictly
observed. The centrality of written documents in this transaction con-
trasts strikingly with their absence in Abraham's transaction.
3. Protecting Buyers from Breaching Sellers
A clay sales tablet included the names of witnesses and the im-
press of the seller's seal.354 If safely deposited, perhaps in a temple or
the buyer's family archive, copies of this tablet would be available to
help prove that the seller had indeed consented to the transfer. The
sales document might also include a revendication clause (a boiler-
plate cuneiform entry) in which the seller took an oath against re-
opening the transaction in the future.3 55 Officials might also be
present to witness and affirm the seller's consent;356 for example, in
c.2350 B.C. the city herald of Girsu apparently consummated a house
351. Jer. 36:4-8.
352. Jer. 32:9-15.
353. Raymond Westbrook has suggested that the final sentence probably refers to a hiatus in
land sales on account of a seige by the Babylonian army. Letter from Raymond Westbrook to
Robert Ellickson (Nov. 15, 1995) (on file with recipient) [hereinafter Westbrook Letter].
354. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 61, 285-86.
355. See GELB ET AL, ANCIENT KUDURaRUS, supra note 75, at 244-47 (calling this a "no-
contest clause"). Some revendication clauses covered both parties. SAGGS, BABYLON, supra
note 80, provides an example at 294: "They have taken an oath by Ishtar and by Ibal-pi-El the
king that neither will in future return against the other. He who makes a claim (at law) shall pay
two minas of silver and his tongue shall be torn out." In some contexts a revendication clause
might have been intended as a waiver of the seller's right to redeem.
356. See GELB ET AU, ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 237 (in mid-third millennium
Mesopotamia, official surveyors and heralds were typically involved in the sale of a house or
field, and received small gifts from the buyer).
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sale by driving a peg into the house's wall and then surrounding the
peg with a clay collar into which he impressed his seal.
357
An Old Babylonian lawsuit nicely illustrates the value of these
procedures in the event of a seller's breach. Ilusha-hegal, a priestess
who had sold her house at Nippur to Addi-liblut's wife, complained in
a lawsuit that she had not received the full purchase price.
[A]ddi-liblut did produce the sealed deed for 1 sar of house, and the
judges read it, and questioned the witnesses who were written in the
deed and they gave evidence before the judges in front of Ilusha-
hegal that she had received 15 shekels of silver as the price of 1 sar
of built house, and Ilusha-hegal conceded it. The judges examined
their case, and because Ilusha-hegal had disowned her seal they im-
posed a penalty on her and made out this tablet renouncing her
claim.358
C. Protecting Buyers from Third-Party Claimants
Methods of protecting buyers from encumbrances were varied
and increasingly sophisticated.
1. Early Procedure: Buyer Side-Payments to Seller's Kin
During the mid-third millennium, a buyer commonly made minor
"gifts" to the primary seller's heirs or other possible claimants, pay-
ments that would help estop them from later challenging the validity
of the transfer.359 A stone tablet from c.2400 B.C. illustrates this
system:
Lummatur, son of Enanatum, the governor of Lagash, bought 9
1/4 iku of land, (measured?) by the "purchase rope," from B and C,
sons of A, the "lords of the field" (= primary sellers). The rate is 1
iku of land at 2 gursaggal of barley. B ... received 18 1/2 gursaggal
of barley as the price of the field and x commodities as the gift. C,
the "lord of the field,". .. and bl, b2, b3, b4, [four] sons of B, and cl,
c2, c3, c4, cS, c6, c7, [seven] children of C .... the "sons of the field,"
357. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 61. (photograph of seal), 286.
358. Id. at 279; see also Thorland, One Heir, supra note 267, at 69-73 (describing Old Babylo-
nian probate litigation in which the size of the inheritance was to be decided by evidentiary
production of deeds to real property).
Nevertheless, the role of documentary evidence in litigation over land ownership is uncer-
tain, even in the Old Babylonian period. Some lawsuits appear to have been resolved by the
taking of oaths. See, e.g., Pritchard, ANET, supra note 289, at 218 (example where oaths to god
are reported to have been used to decide competing claims to house). Court records are terse,
however, and may underreport decisionmakers' consideration of underlying documents. POST-
GATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 281.
359. See also supra text accompanying notes 182-92 (families as owners).
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received x commodities per person as the gift. B ... drove this nail
into the wall and spread the oil on the side.
360
In this transaction, B's and C's children were surely more than mere
witnesses, but also less than full co-owners. By paying off these secon-
dary sellers, a buyer was probably seeking to extinguish their rights (if
any) to inherit or redeem patrimonial land, or veto its alienation. 361
2. Seller Warranties of Title
Some sale documents came to include an express warranty
against title defects. A "defension clause" memorialized a seller's
promise to appear in court to defend the buyer's title against third-
party claimants and possibly to clear the title of these claims. 362 In
some Pre-Sargonic versions, should a third-party prevail over the
buyer, the warranty called for the clay purchase nail to be driven
through the seller's mouth; in later versions, a seller in breach was to
provide compensation to the buyer. 36
3
3. Quieting Title Through Publicity of an Impending Sale
In some eras it appears to have been conventional for a buyer
contemplating a land purchase to arrange for a public herald to publi-
cize the impending transaction.364 The Middle Assyrian Laws (c.1076
B.c.) describe a highly sophisticated variation of this method of title
protection:
[B]efore he purchases the field or house, he shall have the herald
make a proclamation three times during the course of one full
month within the City of Ashur [the Assyrian capital], and... [also]
within the city of the field or house which he intends to purchase, as
follows: "I intend to purchase the field or house, within the com-
mon irrigated area of this city, belonging to so-and-so, son of so-
and-so. Let all who have a right to acquire (the property) or a con-
test (against this transfer) bring forth their tablets and present them
360. GEL ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 75 (notations simplified). The
"commodities" sometimes included wine and beer. Id. at 293. On the rituals of driving a nail
into the wall and spreading oil on the side, see id. at 23, 240-42.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 265-78; infra text accompanying notes 390-93 & 441-
52.
362. See Reuven Yaron, On Defension Clauses of Some Oriental Deeds of Sale and Lease,
from Mesopotamia and Egypt, 15 BIBLIOTHECA ORIENTALIS 15 (1958) (focusing on practices in
the later first millennium).
363. GELB ET AL, ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 247-48 (referring to defension
clauses as "eviction clauses").
364. This practice is attested as early as the mid-third millennium. See id. at 237 (sale docu-
ments refer to heralds). Gelb implausibly assumes that heralds engaged only in publicizing "con-
cluded transactions." As the ensuing text indicates, the ordinary buyer may be even more
interested in publicity before a sale than after it, because after the sale the buyer can himself
publicize the transaction by conspicuously taking possession of the property.
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before the officials, let them thus contest (the purchase), let them
clear (the property of other claims), and let them take it.... " When
the herald makes his proclamation ... [certain specified royal and
city officials are to be present, who, at the end of the process are] to
write their tablets and give (them to the purchaser, saying) as fol-
lows: "The herald has made proclamations three times during the
course of this full month. He who ... has not presented [his tablet]
before the officials forfeits (any claims to) the field or house; it is
cleared for the benefit of the person who had the herald make the
proclamation." 365
The ensuing portion of the excerpt directs the "judges" to prepare
three tablets attesting to the herald's proclamations; the source then
breaks off, just as it seems to be about to identify to whom the tablets
are to be delivered. Note that a buyer could invoke this Middle As-
syrian procedure-strikingly analogous to the modem quiet title ac-
tion-in order to be able to buy with confidence from an adverse
possessor.
366
4. Official Land Records and Possession as Methods of Providing
Notice to Bar Third-Party Claims
There is ample evidence of land-records depositories in ancient
Mesopotamia and Egypt.367 Archeological evidence from Shuruppak
suggests that clay tablets memorializing land sales were stored to-
gether in records offices as early as 2500 B.C. 368 During the Middle
365. Middle Assyrian Laws, supra note 117, Tablet B, 1 6 (parenthetical material appears in
original translation; bracketed material and ellipses have been added by authors).
366. On American law, see Comment, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to
Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1245 (1959); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 121-68 (adverse
possession).
None of the known codes sets out generally applicable requirements for obtaining title by
adverse possession. A number of provisions do touch on the problem, however. For instance:
If either a soldier or a fisherman abandons his field, orchard, or house because of the
service obligation and then absents himself, another person takes possession of his
field, orchard, or house to succeed to his holdings and performs the service obligation
for three years-if he then returns and claims his field, orchard, or house, it will not be
given to him; he who has taken possession of it and has performed his service obliga-
tion shall be the one to continue to perform the obligation.
Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 30. But cf. id. 1 31 (a feudatory's absence for one year is
not sufficient to deprive him of possessory rights). For analysis, see 1 Driver & Miles, supra note
113, at 119 (resisting analogy to adverse possession because the second occupier's possession
appears to have been based from the outset on a royal grant). See also Laws of Lipit-Ishtar,
supra note 42, 18 (When the owner of an estate has failed to honor tax obligations, a person
who has assumed that tax burden for at least a three-year period acquires an entitlement to
possess the estate.); supra text accompanying note 119 (on rights of good-faith improvers under
Middle Assyrian Laws).
367. On the prevalence and nature of land-records systems in Mesopotamia, see STEINKEL-
LER, THIRD-MILLENNIUM TEXTS, supra note 323, at 89; Foster, Land Sales, supra note 129, at
441-42.
368. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 285-86; see also GELB ET AL., ANCIENT
KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 19 (various sale documents identify land sellers as holding the
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Babylonian period, a system for registering royal land is well at-
tested. 369 There is suggestive, if not conclusive, evidence that the
Neo-Assyrian palace (c. ninth to seventh centuries B.C.) maintained
registries of land purchase documents, perhaps in part to aid the pal-
ace's administration of its taxation system.370
According to one source, during all historical periods the Egyp-
tian state was registering land sales, acting through local councils and
witnesses. 371 By the Middle and New Kingdoms, a form of fictitious
lawsuit may have been used to effect a sale, a method that would have
assured official recordation. 372 The lawsuit of Mose, referred to
above, provides an illuminating glimpse at the extent of records sys-
tems in the New Kingdom. 373 Khay, an unscrupulous government of-
ficial, had bribed colleagues working in the archives of three
pharaonic organizations-the Royal Treasury, Bureau of the Grana-
ries, and Royal Judgment Hall-to alter in his favor records pertain-
ing to Mose's ancestral land. Mose nevertheless managed to prevail in
court by presenting, along with various depositions, "family records
going back 300 years; a copy of the official land-register which named
his parents as the owners; [and] a copy of the official tax-assessment
records showing his family had paid the taxes on the land .. .
Why would ancient Near Eastern regimes establish public
archives of land-sale documents? While these documents would be
relevant to disputes over alleged breaches by sellers, a household ar-
chival system such as Jeremiah's might well be adequate for that
purpose.
official position of "field recorder"), and at 237 (reporting suggestion of registration system dur-
ing the Fara Period (mid-third millennium)).
369. Small stelae, called kudurrus in Akkadian, were prepared to memorialize royal land
grants. The original stone was deposited in a temple, where it would be accessible for public
viewing, and a clay copy was delivered to the grantee. A kudurru described the land being
granted and listed tenurial obligations due. The text also included a list of witnesses and elabo-
rate curses to deter tampering with both the stela and the grantee's interest. See GELB ET AL,
ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 21-24; KNAPP, supra note 24, at 157.
370. Fales, supra note 229, at 2-3.
371. See Th6oridorids, supra note 56, at 292-93; see also Baer, Low Price, supra note 100, at
45 (in the later New Kingdom, land transfers were recorded in local courts). Cf., McDowell,
supra note 272, at 222 (at Deir el-Medina "property disputes were taken particularly seriously,
and were decided by the oracle or the representatives of the vizier" rather than the local court).
372. See Pestman, supra note 56, at 62-63. During the Predynastic period and the Old King-
dom, there is some suggestion that an oral agreement sufficed to effect a land sale, with a written
record produced only in the event of a legal dispute. Thdoridorid~s, supra note 56, at 292-93.
This may have evolved into the fictitious-lawsuit procedure.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 274-75.
374. Ward, supra note 77, at 65.
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In some contexts, a buyer might regard a temple as a safer depos-
itory than a house, particularly if the deity could be expected to safe-
guard the temple compound.375 It is also conceivable, but unlikely,
that public-records systems functioned in part to protect land purchas-
ers from hidden title encumbrances. 376 This a private archive could
not do. For example, by producing Hanamel's deed, Jeremiah could
protect himself against Hanamel, but not necessarily against a third-
party, for example, yet another cousin to whom Hanamel had previ-
ously sold the identical property at full price.
An appropriately designed public land-records system can enable
a buyer to allay risks of almost all third-party claims. This is one of
the primary functions of American recording statutes, for example. In
general, these contemporary laws deem a land purchaser to have con-
structive notice of information that could be obtained either by inspec-
tion of the premises being sold, or by examination of public land
records.377 A buyer who purchases with notice-actual or construc-
tive-of a pre-existing claim, takes subject to that claim. On the other
hand, a purchaser or mortgagee without actual or constructive notice
(in legal parlance, a "bona fide purchaser") generally prevails over
hidden claims, even ones that were prior in time.378 This set of rules
greatly reduces a purchaser's risks of being victimized by a double-
dealer. Prior to closing, when it would still be possible to back out of
the deal, a Jeremiah can search for third-party claims by inspecting
both public land records and the land itself; after closing, a Jeremiah
can immediately take possession and/or record the deed of purchase,
thereby freezing out anyone to whom a Hanamel might subsequently
sell the land.
There appears to be no textual evidence bearing on the existence
of such a system in the ancient Near East. The cuneiform codes and
Hebrew Bible say nothing about the relevance of constructive notice
arising out of either possession or recordation in a public archive. The
procedures in use, however, indicate that possession did have legal
relevance-perhaps, that a land purchaser would be charged with no-
tice of what an on-site inspection would have revealed. This doctrine
would provide a rationale, for example, for the Mesopotamian ritual
375. Westbrook Letter, supra note 353.
376. Landbuyers' anxieties about title quality would be capitalized (negatively) into land val-
ues. As a result, all landowners and tax collecting institutions would have an interest in devising
institutions to allay these risks.
377. See generally DUKMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 687-754.
378. This outcome is efficient because a party who first acquires an interest has far better
information and ability to prevent double-dealing than does a subsequent purchaser for value.
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of driving a "clay nail" into the wall of a purchased house. Moreover,
as explained below, the widespread use of antichretic pledges (as op-
posed to mortgages) suggests that lenders regarded taking possession
to be the one and only legally reliable method of barring subsequent
third-parties claims.3
79
Palace and temple staffs had reason enough to create central
records depositories to facilitate their collection of taxes, tenurial obli-
gations, and rents.380 To make a public-records system also serve to
protect good-faith purchasers from third-party claimants, public au-
thorities would have had to: devise systems to deter tampering, forg-
ing, and fraudulent dating of documents; provide adequate storage
facilities and usable indexes for documents; and have a legal system
capable of resolving disputes involving complex documentary records.
None of the three ancient Near Eastern civilizations appears to have
been capable of this combination of institutional achievements.
D. Restraints on the Alienation of Land
Throughout history, preliterate societies have tended to limit the
power of private owners to transfer land holdings. This policy serves
to cement a society's members more closely together, but at the cost
of creating economic and social rigidities. 381 Although evidence of
functioning land markets is available for almost every period of an-
cient Near Eastern history, informal and legal norms tended to con-
strain land transfers, particularly of ancestral estates.
1. Varieties of Restraints on Alienation
a. Village power to veto a land sale
Territorially-based clans and villages were important intermedi-
ate groups in the ancient Near East.382 Cooperation at the village
level would benefit residents in many endeavors, such as: defending
against marauders; maintaining irrigation facilities and communal pas-
tures; pooling labor for harvests; and spreading the costs of disease
and household-specific crop failures. 383 Cooperation within a social
group is more likely when its members are close-knit-that is, well
informed about one another and enmeshed in long-term relationships
379. See infra text accompanying notes 427-40.
380. For a historical survey of a closely related institution, see ROGER J.P. KAIN & ELIZA-
BETH BAIGENT, Ti CADASTRAL MAP IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE (1992).
381. See Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1375-80.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 193-202.
383. See HoPKINs, supra note 61, at 225, 256-60 (on the Israelite clan/village).
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that enable each member to readily administer informal rewards and
punishments. 384 If a village landowner were to sell out to an alien
household, that event might create external costs that the seller would
not directly bear. Compared to most long-time residents, most aliens
would have less village-specific social capital and fewer local kinfolk.
With fewer "hostages" at stake, an alien would be less apprehensive
about the prospect of village retaliation against opportunism on his
part.385 In general, then, an alien would be less likely than a longtime
resident to act cooperatively.
During preliterate and protoliterate eras of the ancient Near
East, a land sale might not be effective unless witnessed and explicitly
(or tacitly) approved by members of a tribe386 or village, a power that
enabled these social units to screen against transfers to untrustworthy
persons. 387 Abraham's purchase of the Cave of Machpelah, one will
recall, is reported to have been negotiated in the presence of all the
Hittites living in the seller's city.388 These onlookers appear to have
been entitled to prevent the sale.389
b. Family power to veto a land sale
A smaller entity, the extended family household, was the basic
social unit in the ancient Near East.390 Customary and legal norms
favored the perpetuation of a patrimonial home base. For example,
the Mesopotamian custom of burying a dead person beneath the
ground floor of his ancestral house391 served to deter alienation be-
yond the family, certainly by enhancing a would-be seller's contrition,
and perhaps also by dampening interest on the part of potential pur-
chasers. During the Early Dynastic period (c.2900-2400 B.C.) in Meso-
potamia, each member of an extended family is thought to have had
the power to veto the transfer of family land. Nevertheless, in a time
of severe economic distress, senior family representatives might nego-
384. See ORDER WITHoUT LAW, supra note 186, at 177-82.
385. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 Am. ECON. REv. 519 (1983).
386. After the Kassite invasion (c. sixteenth century B.C.) had reinvigorated communal own-
ership in Babylonia, it is thought that a tribal consensus was a prerequisite for the alienation of
communal land. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 157.
387. A contemporary analogy is the screening of prospective buyers by members of a coop-
erative housing association, who would bear the consequences if a newcomer defaulted on finan-
cial or other obligations. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 934-35.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 332-36.
389. See WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 32-34 (casting Hittite community in
role of consenting sovereign).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 182-92.
391. LLOYD, supra note 27, at 72, 96, 163.
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tiate to sell patrimonial land, and the other adult family males would
indicate their assent by serving as witnesses.392 As previously noted,
by the middle of the third millennium, Mesopotamian land buyers
were commonly paying small sums not only to the primary seller(s)
but also to the seller's relatives. 39
3
c. Unwaivable prohibitions on transfers outside the family
Members of a single family-line often owned a specific parcel of
land for many generations. Even in Old Babylonian times, when land
markets appear to have been liveliest, 31% of house sales and 48% of
field sales at Nippur were made to a close relative of the seller's. 394 In
Egypt, the aforementioned lawsuit of Mose involved land that had
passed down within a single kinship line for three centuries. 395 Ac-
cording to the Torah, every household in Israel was entitled to a plot
of land as a tangible fulfillment of Yahweh's promise to Abraham.
396
In theory, this land was to be held by an Israelite family-line in
perpetuity, a conception that called for immutable restraints on both
sales and pledges to creditors. 397 Many verses of the Hebrew Bible
excoriate sellers of ancestral lands, consolidators of agricultural acre-
age, and creditors who acquire the farmsteads of defaulting debtors.
398
Some Torah provisions purport to confer unwaivable powers on fam-
ily members to redeem ancestral lands previously sold to non-kin.399
While villagers would understandably be apprehensive about
alienation to an outsider, why would they also seek to prohibit a pros-
perous insider from consensually buying out the ancestral home of an
impecunious extended family? Land consolidation, which emerged as
a central political issue in Israel, was associated with perceptions of an
increasingly unequal social structure. Some Israelite priests sought to
prevent land alienation to slow the trend toward larger agricultural
estates.400 Sympathizers might chalk this up to the priests' view that
392. SAGGS, CIVILIZATION, supra note 251, at 38-39; see also GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDUR-
RUS, supra note 75, at 17 (During the 2600-2340 B.C. period, an individual or nuclear household
could not alienate land in the absence of familial, and perhaps communal, consent.).
393. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92, 359-61.
394. Stone, supra note 167, at 276, 279.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 274-75, 373-74.
396. Gen. 12:7 ("To your offspring I will give this land.").
397. MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 202. Recall that Naboth told King Ahab,
"The Lord forbid that I should give you my ancestral inheritance." 1 Kings 21:3.
398. See infra note 466 and accompanying text.
399. See infra text accompanying notes 441-52.
400. On anti-latifundist sentiment in Israel, see FAGER, supra note 151, at 85-88, 112-13; infra
note 466. On trends in the distribution of wealth in Israel in 800-600 B.C., compare SILVER,
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egalitarian land distribution was desirable in and of itself. Cynics
might suspect that priests opposed the emergence of plutocratic land-
lords to prevent any diminution in the relative social status of the
priestly class.
Apart from addressing concerns about distributive justice, the
compelled maintenance of a broad distribution of family farmsteads
could be expected to have a number of benefits. The wide diffusion of
economic power would likely enhance village solidarity.401 More spe-
cifically, because owner-occupants would have more at stake, they
could be expected to defend their lands more ferociously than tenants,
debt slaves, or hired workers would; as a result, restraints on the con-
solidation of ancestral farmsteads might constitute a sound defense
policy.40 2 The perpetuation of ancestral farmsteads also ensured an
economic base for the decentralized provision of social insurance to
the infirm and elderly. It is harder for a household to dissipate the
value of a land parcel than to squander the purchase money it has
received as a result of a land sale. Paternalist policies that made fam-
ily farmsteads inalienable and exempt from attachment by creditors
might be thought appropriate to prevent a household from destroying
its financial base and thereby shifting the cost of caring for its needy to
the larger community.
d. Special restraints on the transfer of lands burdened
with tenurial duties
Palaces and temples tended to impose particularized restraints on
the alienation of lands carrying service obligations.403 These restric-
tions helped an institution ensure both the quality of feudatory serv-
ices and the promptness of rent payments. In addition, attentive
regulation of the transfer of tenurial duties could help an institution
enhance the solidarity of its members. Predictably, the Code of Ham-
murabi imposes elaborate restrictions on the alienation of royal lands
PRoP-ITs, supra note 58, at 111-18, 248 (doubting that income inequality was increasing), with
FAGER, supra note 151, at 86-88 (criticizing Silver's position).
401. See Hoprmis, supra note 61, at 241; ORDER WrrHouT LAW, supra note 186, at 179 n.42
(on how the broad distribution of power fosters cooperation).
402. Israel, where restraints on alienation seem to have been strictest, was the most militarily
vulnerable of the three civilizations. Cf. Hopzirs, supra note 61, at 140-41 (some observers
interpret the layouts of Israelite villages as defense-oriented).
403. During the Ur III Dynasty, the state may have supervised all land sales in some fashion.
See GELB ET AL, ANCIENT KUDURRtUS, supra note 75, at 17.
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that had been allotted in return for services to the king.404 The Code
strictly forbids an ordinary vassal ("a soldier, fisherman, or a state ten-
ant") from selling his royal lands, assigning them to a creditor, or giv-
ing them to his wife or daughter;405 these provisions seem to have
been addressed to situations where military service was due.4°6 By
contrast, "a naditu [priestess], a merchant, or holder of a field with a
special service obligation" (higher-status and perhaps more trustwor-
thy persons) could sell their royal lands, with the purchaser assuming
the "service obligation on the field, orchard, or house which he
purchases. '407
2. Devices for Evading Restraints on Alienation
With a bit of imagination an owner might be able to skirt legal
rules that prohibited the sale of an ancestral farmstead to a would-be
buyer (presumably, someone better able than the owner to put the
land to remunerative use). Most obviously, the owner could lease the
farmstead to this transferee. Old Babylonian rules against the aliena-
tion of lands impressed with military obligations were sidestepped in
this fashion, perhaps because the lessor could still perform the military
obligation.408
A sale of land could also be disguised as a loan. As explained
more fully below,40 9 under an antichretic lease (pledge) arrangement,
a lender took over possession of the borrower's land in order to se-
cure a loan that the lender had made. Unless legal authorities were
adroit at closing loopholes, the parties could privately agree that the
loan would never be repaid and that the lender would remain perma-
nently in possession. In effect, the delivery of the principal of the
404. See generally Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 26-32, 3441, gap I c (on transfer
of service obligations and tenurial lands); see also Hittite Laws, supra note 46, 11 39-41, 46-56
(specifying land transferees who owe services to the king).
405. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 91 36-38. However, feudal duties of a father
"taken captive while serving in a royal fortress" automatically passed to a son "able to perform"
those obligations. Id. 1 28.
406. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 187 (on Akkadian institution of ilkum
and Hammurabi's supervision of military tenures). The provisions themselves mention service in
royal campaigns and garrisons. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 26-28, 32.
407. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 91 40. This is an ancient example of the burden of
an affirmative covenant running with the land.
408. See Renger, Arable Land, supra note 36, at 300; POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note
28, at 187. Beginning with the Ur III period, temple staff members who had been compensated
with prebend land similarly began to lease out their holdings. Id.
409. See infra text accompanying notes 426-40.
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"loan" would have functioned as payment of the full purchase
price.41
0
In Mesopotamia, conveyancers were particularly ingenious at
overcoming legal restraints on land alienation. At Mai during the
Old Babylonian period, sellers dodged rules against the sale of tribal
property by falsely claiming that the buyer was receiving a share of a
division of common property.41' After the economic crisis of 1739
B.C. at Nippur, some buyers may have evaded restraints on alienation
by deceitfully asserting that they were kinfolk of former owners and
were taking the land as redeemers.4 12 The most notorious evasionary
tactic was the fictitious adoption, widely employed in the Nuzi area of
the upper Tigris Valley during the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries
B.C.4 13 Perhaps as a result of the influence of less civilized Hurrian
invaders, Nuzi lawmakers had made arable land nominally inalienable
outside the ancestral family. As so often happens, markets triumphed
over law. Because transfers within a family were permitted, the trans-
action simply included a document by which the seller adopted the
prospective buyer as his child.414 The tablet recorded the buyer's
"gift" (purchase payment) to the adoptive father, and noted the
buyer's receipt of the parcel in question as an "inheritance.
'41 -5
3. The Trend Toward Greater Alienability
The widespread use of these sorts of evasions in second-millen-
nium Mesopotamia indicates that traditional norms of inalienability
were losing their grip. Restraints on alienation are perverse when
they prevent, without sufficient justification, exchanges mutually ad-
vantageous to buyer and seller. As a labor force becomes capable of
being more specialized, the cost of binding rural folk to ancestral
farmsteads increases. In addition, the main benefit of the traditional
restraints-enhancement of village close-knittedness-becomes less
410. Davies, supra note 67, at 360-61 (noting that a borrower's unwaivable right to redeem
might help close this loophole by creating uncertainty about whether the transfer would stick).
411. SAGGS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 294-95.
412. Stone, supra note 167, at 281.
413. Carlo Zaccagnini, Land Tenure and Transfer of Land at Nuzi (XV-XIV Century B.C.), in
LAND TENURE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 79, 81 (Tarif Khalidi ed.,
1984).
414. Id.
415. SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucrUREs, supra note 3, at 140-41, 159-60; Zaccagnini, supra note
413, at 81-83. Many of these adoptee-buyers were creditors of the sellers. Renger, Arable Land,
supra note 36, at 305. Adoptions were also used to evade Hittite Law restraints on the transfer
of feudatory lands. See GURNEY, supra note 199, at 102-03 (referring to such adoptions as a
"legal fiction").
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consequential after the emergence of a state capable of providing mili-
tary and criminal-justice services over a broad territory.
A general, if hardly unidirectional, 416 trend toward greater legal
alienability of land is evident in Mesopotamia and Israel as literacy,
technology, and scarcity developed.417 In Mesopotamia, the rights of
remote members of extended families to control ownership of ances-
tral lands generally ebbed after the middle of the third millennium.418
By the latter part of the first millennium, privately owned fields in
Mesopotamia were "freely sold or bought."
419
As mentioned, the Hebrew Bible reports numerous instances in
which Israelites bought lands from aliens for currency.420 Although
the biblical text is full of injunctions against Israelites' selling patrimo-
nial lands, Jeremiah's purchase of a field from his cousin Hanamel in
587 B.C. symbolized that the devastation of the recent Chaldean inva-
sion was to be remedied by freeing up land markets generally:
421
Fields shall be bought in this land of which you are saying, it is a
desolation, without human beings or animals; it has been given into
the hands of the Chaldeans. Fields shall be bought for money, and
deeds shall be signed and sealed and witnessed, in the land of Ben-
jamin, in the places around Jerusalem, and in the cities of Judah, of
the hill country, of the Shephelah, and of the Negeb; for I will re-
store their fortunes, says the Lord.422
In the end, Jewish law came to authorize land sales between persons
unrelated by kinship.423
VII. LAND FINANCE
Loans, especially of silver and barley, were commonplace in the
ancient Near East.424 Particularly during early historical periods,
416. For example, communal land ownership and family-veto powers blossomed again after
the Kassite invasion of Mesopotamia. See KNAPP, supra note 24, at 157.
417. Egyptian sources are too thin to reveal trends.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85. By the early second millennium even close
family members seem to have had little practical influence over a landowner's ability to sell or
let his property. See W.F. Leemans, The Family in the Economic Life of the Old Babylonian
Period, 5 OIKUMENE 15 (1986).
419. Renger, Arable Land, supra note 36, at 309.
420. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
421. Jer. 32:6-44.
422. Jer. 32:43-44; see also Jer. 32:15 ("Houses and fields and vineyards shall again be bought
in this land.").
423. Talmudic texts do not restrain the transferability of land. WEBER, supra note 9, at 256;
see also 1 ELON, supra note 300, at 196 (on use of Cave of Machpelah transaction as precedent in
later Jewish Law).
424. POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 193-94 (Mesopotamia); Renger, Economic
Structures, supra note 21, at 191-203 (Mesopotamia); FAGER, supra note 151, at 102-04 (Israel).
See generally SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucrUREs, supra note 3, at 84-92.
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however, institutional barriers and norms against the alienation of
patrimonial holdings appear to have limited the use of a parcel of land
as security for a loan. Instead, an ancient lender tended to obtain se-
curity by exacting an executory promise of "debt slavery"; 425 the bor-
rower would promise that if he were to fail to repay the loan, either
he, his wife, his children, or other members of his family would "enter
the house" of the lender (or the lender's assignee) to work for subsis-
tence rations. A debt slave might serve either for a fixed term, or
until the debt had been paid or canceled by royal edict. Although far
inferior to a free worker, the status of a debt slave nevertheless was
distinctly superior to that of a chattel slave, who had no crystallized
prospect of freedom.
A. Land as Security for Loans
If legal rules were to allow, the owner of an unencumbered parcel
could generate funds by entering into any one of a number of basic
types of transactions:
(1) a sale of the land for a lump sum;
(2) a lease (converting the asset into a stream of incoming rents);
(3) a mortgage loan (an arrangement that would enable the owner
to remain in possession, with the lender entitled to take over
possession in the event the borrower defaulted on loan repay-
ment); and
(4) an antichretic pledge (essentially, a rent-free lease for a fixed
(or possibly indefinite) term to a lender in consideration for a
loan).
In the ancient Near East, antichretic arrangements-unfamiliar in
present-day real-estate circles-appear to have been used far more
commonly than mortgages.4 26
1. The Antichretic Pledge
As just noted, under an antichretic arrangement, a lender imme-
diately occupied a parcel of the borrower's land on a rent-free basis.
427
Therefore, at minimum, the borrower would be making, as long as the
425. See, eg., Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 11 114-119 (regulating these arrange-
ments); SILVER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, supra note 3, at 89-92; SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note
58, at 68-72.
426. Some cuneiform texts from Ugarit appear to reflect modem mortgage arrangements; in
several of these, the buyer of mortgaged property seems to be clearing its title by using part of
the purchase funds to release the debt the seller owed to a prior mortgage lender. Heltzer,
Mortgage, supra note 88, at 92-95.
427. See generally BOAZ COHEN, 2 JEWISH AND ROMAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 433
(1966); Zaccagnini, Price of Fields, supra note 184, at 7-8. 39 of the Code of Hammurabi, supra
note 44, appears to refer to antichretic arrangements.
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lender remained in possession, implicit payments in amounts equal to
the rental value of the land.
428
For example, suppose a borrower were to desire a loan of thirty
silver shekels for a term of one year and were willing to pay annual
interest of 33-1/3%.429 In one possible antichretic arrangement, the
borrower would give the lender possession, for exactly one year, of
land whose annual rental value was forty shekels. Observe that the
lender, who would recoup not only interest but also the entire loan
principal during the first year, would profit handsomely by holding
over for an additional growing season. An antichretic borrower there-
fore had a strong incentive to deal with a lender who could credibly
commit to relinquishing possession on time.
As another example, suppose a borrower were to seek a loan of
thirty shekels at an annual interest rate of 33-1/3%, but could only
pledge land with an annual rental value of ten shekels. Under these
circumstances, an antichretic lease might entitle the lender to possess
the land rent-free until the borrower had repaid the principal.
2. Why Antichretic Pledges and Not Mortgages?
An antichretic transaction is a form of pledge, in the sense that
the lender actually takes possession of the security. A pledge arrange-
Many civil-law systems recognize the arrangement, and refer to it as antichresis, a word less
accessible than the phrase antichretic pledge. For remnants in Louisiana law and practice, see
LA. CiV. CODE ANN. §§ 3134-35, 3176-81 (West 1994); Ralph Slovenko, Of Pledge, 33 TuL L.
REV. 59, 128-32 (1958); Leonard Oppenheim, Comment, Antichresis: An Ancient Security De-
vice Revived, 13 TuL L. REV. 131 (1938).
428. An archival study of transactions in Nuzi in the mid-second millennium revealed that
antichretic loans there tended to involve specific commodities (such as metals, domestic animals,
farm produce, and manufactured goods) that the debtor was obligated to return in kind after
some minimum term (typically 3 to 10 years) had elapsed. Zaccagnini, Price of Fields, supra
note 184, at 8-11. Jordan, who also studied Nuzi transactions, reports that typical contract
clauses required the debtor to clear the title of the field of fiscal encumbrances and liens, and
prevented the debtor from reclaiming a field after plowing but before the harvest (presumably to
protect the creditor's investment in field preparation). Gregory D. Jordan, Usury, Slavery, and
Land-Tenure: The Nuzi tidennutu Transaction, 80 ZErrsc-u'r FOR ASSYRIOLOGIE UND
VORDERASIAnSCHE ARCHAOLOGIE 76, 79-83 (1990).
Antichretic arrangements are also in evidence in Assyria during both the Middle Assyrian
and Neo-Assyrian periods (c. fourteenth to seventh centuries, B.c.). See Zaccagnini, Price of
Fields, supra note 184, at 21-22, 24-26. Some Middle Assyrian loan contracts entitled the debtor
to remain in possession of his real estate, at least prior to the expiration of the fixed term. On
the issue of whether these arrangements can be characterized as mortgages, see id. at 21 & n.36.
During the Neo-Assyrian period a creditor typically was entitled to possess pledged land for a
fixed number of years. It is uncertain whether the term was calculated to provide the lender the
return of his capital as well as the interest and, if it was not, what occurred at the end of the term
if the debtor could not repay the principal. J.N. PoSTGATE, Fu'ry NEo-AssvRIAN LEGAL Doc-
UMENTs 51 (1976).




ment is inherently costly because it places the security in the hands of
someone who is likely to be less capable than the borrower/pledgor of
putting the asset to productive use. For example, a farmer typically
could cultivate a patrimonial field more skillfully than an average
lender could. A pledgee of course might lease the pledged property to
a third party, or, if the original owner were to be the optimal land
manager, even lease it back to the debtor. These additional arrange-
ments would entail transactions costs, however. Indeed, the basic
problem with the pledge is that putting a lender in possession tends to
be an awkward (high transaction cost) method of providing notice
that a secured claim exists.
Why then were antichretic arrangements so pervasive? Scraps of
textual evidence support the view, embraced by many historians, that
lenders simply had the market power to force harsh terms on borrow-
ers.430 The Code of Hammurabi placed a number of restrictions on
the profits of antichretic lenders;431 these provisions hint that these
capitalists were popularly viewed as greedy and abusive. This also
seems to have been the opinion of the reformist priests in Israel:
There were also those who said, "We are having to pledge our
fields, our vineyards, and our houses in order to get grain during the
famine." And there were those who said, "We are having to borrow
money on our fields and vineyards to pay the king's tax .... [W]e
are powerless, and our fields and vineyards now belong to
others." 43
2
Historians should be wary of this simple exploitation hypothesis, how-
ever. The antichretic transaction evolved over many centuries, and it
is implausible that borrowers were blind to its shortcomings.
A somewhat more promising hypothesis is that, given the legal
procedures of the era, allowing the lender to take immediate posses-
sion tended to be an efficient (mutually advantageous) term in a loan
430. Many scholars regard antichretic arrangements as highly unfavorable to debtors. See,
e.g., Jordan, supra note 428, at 82 (creditor is "true beneficiary" of these transactions); Zac-
cagnini, Price of Fields, supra note 184, at 11-12, 26. The fact that interest rates were high does
not in itself prove lender overreaching. See infra text accompanying notes 475-80. Nevertheless,
although there is no direct evidence on the point, some lenders no doubt possessed monopoly
power or committed frauds on unsophisticated borrowers. These practices would have given
fuel to the anti-lender sentiment that pervaded the ancient Near East.
431. See Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 49-50, gap I a. These paragraphs address
situations in which the crop grown on the secured land is bountiful enough to more than repay
the lender in possession both principal and interest. These provisions state that the debtor/
owner is entitled to reap the crop, repay both principal and interest, and keep any overage.
Although this treatment suggests some movement in the direction of a mortgage arrangement, a
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contract. This might have been so for two reasons. First, awkward as
it was, taking possession may have been the only feasible way for a
lender to protect himself from claims by subsequent third-party pur-
chasers.433 By turning over the security to a particular lender, the an-
tichretic lease largely eliminated the risk that the borrower would be
able to defraud creditors by repeatedly marketing the same property
as unencumbered security. For example, if there were no effective re-
cording system and lenders were incautious, a venal Naboth might be
able to mortgage his vineyard ten times over and abscond with the
proceeds of the multiple loans, leaving his lenders squabbling over a
vineyard far insufficient to satisfy all their claims. If an antichretic
pledge were the customary arrangement, by contrast, Naboth's initial
lender could take immediate possession of the vineyard, presumably
in conspicuous fashion, thereby giving subsequent lenders legally deci-
sive notice that Naboth had already promised that security.
The chief advantage of a mortgage system is that it leaves the
borrower in possession. To establish a viable mortgage system, how-
ever, legal authorities must: (1) provide a simple way, short of taking
possession, for a mortgage lender to provide notice of his security in-
terest in a manner readily discernable to subsequent buyers and lien-
ors; and (2) declare that the claim of a lender who has complied with
this notice requirement is to prevail over the claims of all subsequent
claimants (on the ground that they should have known what they were
getting into). Later civilizations were able to make use of on-site
monuments or central land-records systems to accomplish this notice
function. In ancient Athens, for example, a lender came to be able to
give authoritative notice of a land security interest by driving an en-
graved stone (horos) into the ground at the site in question. 34 After a
civilization achieves that sort of institutional milestone, the mortgage
is likely to begin to supplant the pledge. And, when that has come to
pass, land-a conducively valuable and immobile asset-becomes ca-
pable of outrivaling debt slavery as a means of loan security.
As mentioned, none of the three ancient civilizations seems to
have succeeded in developing a simple procedure by which a lender
could provide authoritative notice of a land-security claim short of
taking actual possession. Even in an instance in which a lender was to
look only to a crop for security, provisions of the Code of Hammurabi
433. See supra text accompanying notes 377-79.
434. On secured land transactions in ancient Greece, see generally MosEs I. FINLEY, STUD-
iEs IN LAND AND CREDIT IN ANCIENT ATHENs, 500-200 B.c.: THE HOROS-INSCRIvlONS (1951).
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suggest that the lender conventionally would take possession of the
land (perhaps to rent it to a third-party tenant).4 35 Ancient land-rec-
ord archives reveal little or no hint of mortgage-like documents.
4 36
There seems to be no evidence of litigation between lenders over loan
priorities. It appears, then, that taking possession was an ancient
lender's only surefire way of barring the claims of subsequent third-
party purchasers. Under those circumstances, an antichretic pledge
awkward as it was, could have been a more efficient transaction than a
mortgage.
Second, if lenders on the whole could commit to keeping
promises more credibly than borrowers could, an antichretic pledge
would reduce the expected costs of breach by the party in posses-
sion-the one who could do the most damage. Both mortgage and
antichretic-pledge arrangements require the party in possession of the
land security to depart from it under specified circumstances. A mort-
gage transaction calls for a debtor who has defaulted to relinquish the
property. In the case of an antichretic arrangement, by contrast, the
lender is to turn over possession once the debtor has satisfied the
terms of loan repayment. In the ancient Near East, lenders may have
been more likely than borrowers to voluntarily leave land on the occa-
sions they had promised they would. Merchants, members of temple
cliques, and others who specialized in lending would have been repeat
players, concerned about maintaining reputations for promise-keep-
ing. In addition, because of the populist political culture and the tra-
dition against alienation of patrimonial lands, lenders may have
doubted that state force would have been reliably available to assist
them in ousting a mortgagor in default. The forcible eviction of an
extended household from an ancestral farmstead would have been a
potentially explosive event. The prevalence of antichretic arrange-
ments (not to mention redemptive rights)437 suggests that ancient
norms may have been more tolerant of evictions of "land con-
solidators" than of longtime family possessors. Recognizing this, the
parties to a loan may have seen mutual advantage in an antichretic
arrangement that gave possession of the security to the party who, if
in breach, would be easier to oust.
435. Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, 1 49-50, gap I a (all dealing with situations in
which a lender had taken possession of agricultural land). For more on these provisions, see
supra note 431.
436. On records systems, see supra text accompanying notes 367-80.
437. Redemptive rights (see infra text accompanying notes 441-52) would be toothless unless
someone in authority would be prepared to evict a creditor or purchaser who refused to relin-
quish a redeemer's ancestral holding.
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The hypothesis that antichretic pledges were inherently more effi-
cient than mortgages is difficult to reconcile, however, with the perva-
sive institution of executory debt slavery, a transaction with the same
basic disadvantages of a mortgage. Because there seem not to have
been systems for recording security interests in persons,438 an unscru-
pulous borrower might promise a number of unwary lenders that his
children would exclusively secure each of their loans. A forcible evic-
tion from an ancestral farmstead might be a traumatic event, but so
surely might be a creditor's seizure of a wife or child after a father's
default. If executory debt-slavery arrangements could persist in the
teeth of these drawbacks, why couldn't mortgage arrangements as
well?
Perhaps the most plausible hypothesis for the widespread use of
the antichretic pledge is that, like many other facially awkward trans-
actions, it was used primarily to evade legal rules that prohibited spe-
cific types of contractual arrangements. As previously noted, an
antichretic pledge was a simple means to disguise a sale that would
otherwise violate restraints on land alienation.4 39 An antichretic
pledge also could readily be structured to provide returns in excess of
the usury limits that were routinely in force in the ancient Near
East.4 0 In the sample transactions presented above, the implicit an-
nual interest rate is 33-1/3%, but that figure is nowhere stated as such.
This hypothesis generates a positive prediction: the erosion of re-
straints on alienation and usury laws should be associated with a de-
cline in antichretic arrangements.
B. Relief for the Financially Distressed
For reasons to be explored in the next Part, members of palace
and temple elites often exercised legal influence on behalf of debtors.
438. But cf. SAGGS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 170-71 (discussing markings on persons al-
ready in slavery).
439. See supra text accompanying notes 408-10.
440. See, e.g., Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 1 18A9 20-21 (specifying rates of interest on
loans of silver and grain); Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, gap I$ t-v (similar); SILVER,
PRoPHETs, supra note 58, at 230 (720 B.C. Egyptian example of limits on interest rates). On
Hebrew Bible norms and laws against charging interest, see Exod. 22:25 (ban on exacting inter-
est from Israelites); Lev. 25:36-37 (prohibition on taking interest in advance from kinfolk); Deut.
23:19-20 (interest can only be charged of foreigners); Neh. 5:10-12 ("Let us stop this taking of




Ancient legal norms commonly entitled a person (or his rela-
tive' 1) to redeem formerly owned land. These (nominally unwaiv-
able442) redemptive rights were premised on the notion that
patrimonial land lost on account of temporary financial distress should
be reclaimable. Typically, these rights could be exercised against pur-
chasers, purchasers' transferees, and lenders who had taken posses-
sion under antichretic leases. Redemptive rights appear to have
existed in third-millennium Mesopotamia, and were perhaps tempo-
rarily revived in an ordinance of Rim-Sin (c.1800 B.C.)."43 The Israe-
lites' Holiness Code treated redemptive rights as fundamental and
sought to regulate them in great detail.4" In territories where main-
taining close-knittedness was especially essential for defense (i.e.,
outside walled cities), the Holiness Code proclaimed perpetual re-
demptive rights." 5
Redemptive rights foul land markets by dampening land sales
and discouraging buyers from improving redeemable lands. The au-
thors of the Holiness Code were sensitive to these negative economic
consequences. They set a time limit for redemption of urban prop-
erty: "If anyone sells a dwelling house in a walled city, it may be re-
deemed until a year has elapsed." 446 Notably, the Holiness Code also
systematically protected landholding priests from the consequences of
redemption. A donor who had consecrated a house or field to the
Lord but then elected to redeem it was required to pay a 20% pre-
mium over the value that the receiving priest had originally placed on
the gift.44 7 In addition, if the priest were to have sold the consecrated
441. See Lev. 25:25; WESTROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 21, 61-62, 102.
442. Some commentators intimate that redemptive rights could be waived or destroyed.
Fager implies that patrimonial agricultural land could be permanently alienated if all members of
the relevant extended family promised to respect the transfer. FAGER, supra note 151, at 28; see
also WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 15-16, 100-02 (arguing that a buyer who paid
full price to a father would defeat sons' patrimonial interests). If redemptive rights were indeed
waivable, one might expect a buyer to insist on an express clause to that effect in the deed.
443. See SAGGS, BABYLON, supra note 80, at 220-21 (citing a legal dispute in which a son
appealed to a royal edict to reclaim real property that his father had sold).
444. Lev. 25:24: "Throughout the land that you hold, you shall provide for the redemption of
the land." See generally Lev. 25; WESTEROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 58-68.
445. Compare the time-limited statutory rights of redemption that about half the American
states make available to persons who have lost real estate as a result of foreclosure. See gener-
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field to a third party, the donor lost his redemptive rights. 4 8 These
rules could be expected to increase the value of priestly assets.
Ancient legal codes seldom pinpoint the price that a reclaimer
had to pay to redeem." 9 Allowing the original land-seller to redeem
by tendering the original sale price would be unjust in inflationary
times, and would discourage a purchaser from later improving the
land. This may explain why some redemptive rights apparently were
formulated as preemptive options.450 Consider, for example, Laws of
Eshnunna, paragraph 39: "If a man becomes impoverished and then
sells his house, whenever the buyer offers it for sale, the owner of the
house shall have the right to redeem it.''451 One reason for waiting for
the sales offer is that that offer could be used to dictate the redemp-
tion price, an approach that would enable the outgoing owner to
recoup investments in improvements.4 52
2. Debt Cancellation by Edict
Perhaps as early as the mid-third millennium, Mesopotamian
kings episodically tended to proclaim a misharum-an act of "justice"
or "equity." A typical edict of this sort canceled specified debts and
tax claims, and ordered the release of debt slaves.4 53 Some of these
edicts apparently also decreed that specified landholdings (typically
those lost on account of financial distress) were to be returned to their
prior owners at no charge-in effect, enabling land redemption at a
price of zero. (The nature of the tradition is only dimly understood
because there is but one fully preserved example of a Mesopotamian
448. Lev. 27:20.
449. See, e.g., the ambiguous formula in Lev. 25:27. For detailed discussion, see WEST-
BROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 90-117 (concluding that the redemption price was most
likely set to equal the original sale price).
450. On these devices, see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 1, at 933-34. For an apparent
case in point, see Ruth 4:3-10 (Boaz's exercise of a preemptive option to purchase the land of
Elimelech, his deceased kinsman), discussed in WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at
63-68.
451. Laws of Eshnunna, supra note 43, 1 39. For discussion of the ambiguities of this provi-
sion, see YARON, ESHNUNNA, supra note 47, at 232-35.
452. It is perhaps significant that 38, the immediately prior provision in the Laws of
Eshnunna, supra note 43, authorizes a remaining partner "to match any outside offer" that a
departing partner had received for his share.
453. See POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 196-98; WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW,
supra note 85, at 45-49; THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST. SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS AND PICTURES RE-
LATING TO THE HEBREW BIBLE 526 (James B. Pritchard ed., 2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter Pritchard,
SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS]. Many of these edicts are known only because royal year-names and
private legal documents refer to them. Id.
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misharum: the Edict of Ammisaduqa, the ruler of Babylon in 1646-
1626 B.C. 4 5 4 )
The practice diffused to other lands. In 720 B.c., Bakenranef can-
celed various debts outstanding in the Egyptian delta.455 The Deuter-
onomic Code called for the nullification, "every seventh year," of any
debts that Israelites owed to one other.4 56 In early sixth-century Ath-
ens, Solon canceled the debts of agriculturists.4 57
The frequency of ancient debt-relief edicts is uncertain. It is
thought that a Mesopotamian king typically would declare a
misharum at the outset of his reign, and thereafter perhaps at intervals
of seven or more years.458 The more frequent these land-return
edicts, the less important redemptive rights would be. Why pay to
redeem one's ancestral lands if a misharum would soon deliver those
lands back for free?
3. The Jubilee Legislation in Leviticus 25
The Jubilee provisions of Leviticus 25:8-55 show the strong influ-
ence of the priests who are thought to have authored the late strata of
the Torah.459 On paper, Jubilee was the most radical land legislation
of ancient times-so radical that most scholars have concluded that it
was never implemented.460 In essence the authors of these laws at-
tempted to regularize the misharum tradition, which, to the great dis-
may of egalitarian prophets such as Jeremiah, Israelite kings had been
neglecting.461 According to the key verse, every fiftieth year (i.e., af-
ter seven-times-seven years):
454. Reproduced in Pritchard, SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS, supra note 453, at 526-28.
455. SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 230.
456. Deut. 15:1-2. The Torah also called for the freeing of Hebrew debt slaves after six years
of service. See Exod. 21:2 (male slaves); Deut. 15:12 (male and female slaves).
457. BURFORD, supra note 182, at 50-51.
458. For sources on frequencies, see WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 45.
Hammurabi is thought to have issued debt-relief edicts in the 1st, 12th, 20th, and some time after
the 30th year of his reign. Id.
459. On the literary strata of the Leviticus 25 text, see FAGER, supra note 151, at 123-25.
Westbrook believes that the Jubilee laws may have been drafted as late as the sixth-century
Babylonian exile. See WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 55-57.
460. FAGER, supra note 151, at 13 n.3, 34-36 (1993) (citing sources); WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL
LAW, supra note 85, at 38-52; Davies, supra note 67, at 361, 365 n.13 (Because the mass reshuf-
fling of lands would have been highly disruptive, Jubilee was abandoned at an "early stage" and
many owners in fact lost their ancestral lands.); OxFoRD BIBLE, supra note 59, at 158 n.25:23
("[T]here is no evidence that the jubilee program was ever carried out.").
461. See WESTBROOK, BIBLICAL LAW, supra note 85, at 16, 50-51.
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you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants.
It shall be a jubilee for you: you shall return, every one of you, to
your [patrimonial] property and every one of you to your family. 462
By entitling a prior owner to repossess his ancestral lands without
charge,463 Jubilee would have made ancestral land alienable not in fee
simple but only for the time period up to the next Jubilee year.46t The
priestly critics of Israelite society were explicit about this aim; in a key
verse in Leviticus 25, the Lord declares that "[tihe land shall not be
sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine." 465
The priests who radicalized the Holiness Code sought to prevent
the assemblage of large landholdings and stem the alienation of ances-
tral property.466 Their program also would have provided the Israe-
lites exiled in Babylon a stronger legal basis for reclaiming ancestral
lands upon their eventual return to Canaan.467
Jubilee, by impairing land alienation and pledge, would have ossi-
fied Israelite society and periodically triggered cataclysmic reshuf-
flings. 468 None of the historical narratives in the Hebrew Bible refer
to either the shadow of an impending Jubilee or the event itself.469
The Israelites seem to have had the good sense not to follow the
priests' utopian program.
462. Lev. 25:10.
463. Lev. 25:28; FAGER, supra note 151, at 104.
464. A dwelling house in a walled city (other than a Levite city) was exempt from Jubilee.
Lev. 25:29-33. See FAGER, supra note 151, at 88-89 (interpreting this exception as an effort by
the reformist priests to make the Jubilee program politically acceptable to city residents). Be-
cause an occupant could be expected to shirk on maintenance as a Jubilee year approached,
Jubilee would have had especially dire consequences for complex structures such as city houses.
In addition, the advantages of maintaining close-knit neighborhoods was more important in the
relatively defenseless open country beyond city walls. Indeed, some commentators interpret the
Jubilee legislation as applying only to cultivated lands. See id. at 89.
465. Lev. 25:23.
466. BOECKER, supra note 276, at 90-91 (purpose was to impede creation of a proletariat);
FAGER, supra note 151, at 87-88, 93-95, 98-111 (Jubilee provisions were aimed to preserve a
kinship group's command of ancestral lands, and prevent abuses of rich against poor.). For
prophets' sentiments in this vein, see, e.g., Isaiah 5:8 (condemning those who "add field to
field"); Micah 2:1-2 (assailing the wicked who "covet fields, and seize them; houses, and take
them away; they oppress householder and house, people and their inheritance").
467. FAGER, supra note 151, at 61, 110-11; see also id. at 61-63 (describing, but regarding as
too cynical, Sharon Ringe's theory that the Jubilee text was an attempted power play by exiled
priests who sought to control the land-distribution process after their return to Canaan).
468. See id. at 97 (Jubilee "might have been economically disastrous").




VIII. THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON
LAND TRANSACTIONS
The scapegoating of real-estate investors and moneylenders gen-
erally played well in the politics of the ancient Near East.470 Although
the Jubilee legislation itself had no bite, many populist policies may
have temporarily aided persons in financial straits. Some may even
have contributed to long-run economic and social well-being.471 On
the other hand, usury laws, perpetual redemptive rights, and debt can-
cellation edicts probably were perverse in most contexts, provoking
time-consuming evasionary tactics, discouraging capital formation,
and otherwise misallocating resources. 472 Just as the prevalence of
rent controls and usury laws in the mid-twentieth century cries out for
social-scientific explanation, so do the enduring presences of compara-
bly misguided ancient policies.
473
A. Causes of Populist Politics
Public-choice theorists would suppose that members of ancient
elites adopted populist policies to preserve their power and social sta-
tus. By issuing an edict that canceled debts, for example, a newly
crowned king could anticipate that he would immediately earn the
favor of current debtors. An insecure king might give great weight to
these short-term political benefits, and heavily discount any long-term
economic mischief that a debt-cancellation edict would cause. Simi-
larly, members of a priestly class, desirous of maintaining their rela-
tive status and power, might oppose private land consolidations to
forestall the emergence of powerful rivals in the private sector.
Path-dependence 474 may also have been at work. An incoming
monarch might be chary of dashing debtors' expectations if the prior
several kings had remitted debts immediately after assuming the
throne.
470. Cf. KNAPP, supra note 24, at 72-73 (on how the Pre-Sargonic king Uru-inim-gina shored
up his power by championing ordinary citizens against "petty officials and noble landowners").
471. See infra text accompanying note 481 (on inalienability of patrimonial land).
472. See SILVER, PRoPHETs, supra note 58, at 213-28, 249 (on "disastrous" progressive social
reforms under Jeroboam II, Hezekiah, and other Israelite kings of the eighth century B.c.). See
generally NORTH, supra note 8. "The security of property rights has been a critical determinant
of the rate of saving and capital formation." Id. at 6.
473. But cf. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995)
(arguing that, contrary to conventional economics texts, a usury law may be a desirable mecha-
nism for restricting the extension of credit to high-risk borrowers).
474. Path dependency is present when choices made in the past constrain present choices.
See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-52
(1996).
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The political influence of ideology, which in the ancient era was
thoroughly permeated with religious belief, also cannot be ruled out.
Some Israelite prophets no doubt favored populist measures not only
on account of their wariness of emerging plutocrats, but also on ac-
count of theistic beliefs and genuine compassion for the poor.
B. Economic Effects of Populist Politics
1. Interest Rates
Ancient lenders could hardly be expected to ignore the risk that
the palace (or temple) would annul outstanding debts. The Deutero-
nomic Code, after proclaiming that debts between Israelites were to
be forgiven every seventh year, went on to send a warning to would-
be lenders:
Be careful that you do not entertain a mean thought, thinking, "The
seventh year, the year of remission, is near," and therefore view
your needy neighbor with hostility and give [i.e., lend] nothing: your
neighbor might cry to the Lord against you, and you would incur
guilt.475
Not surprisingly, lenders responded to debtor-relief measures by
charging high interest rates, their most straightforward method of ob-
taining financial compensation for the risks they had to run.476 Post-
gate reports that in Old Babylonian times annual interest rates were
roughly 20% on loans of silver and 33 1/3% on loans of barley.477 A
few hundred years later, in Nuzi in northern Babylonia, rates appear
to have been even higher, perhaps exceeding 50%.478 Egyptian lend-
ers, from the New Kingdom onwards, normally required rates of re-
turn in the range of 100% per annum.479 In 720 B.C., rates were so
475. Deut. 15:9.
476. If faced with a usury ceiling, a lender might be able to evade it with a device such as an
antichretic lease.
477. POSTOATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 193. Postgate offers no comment on the
disparity between the two figures. Perhaps, on average, borrowers of barley tended to be worse
credit risks. Perhaps silver was usually lent to merchants, whose loans might be exempted from
effects of debt-cancellation edicts. See Pritchard, SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS, supra note 453, at
526-28 (Edict of Ammisaduqa did not cancel loans-whether of barley, silver, or other goods-
to certain commercial enterprisers.). During the Old Babylonian period, the basic relationship
of a merchant-venturer to his subordinate traders appears to have been that of creditor to debt-
ors. See Code of Hammurabi, supra note 44, gap I cc, 11 100-07.
478. See Jordan, supra note 428, at 83; Zaccagnini, Price of Fields, supra note 184, at 11
(antichretic lenders realized roughly 100% annual return (before expenses)).
479. Baer, Low Price, supra note 100, at 45.
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high that Bakenranef, a ruler in the Nile Delta, decreed a prospective
usury ceiling of 33 1/3% per annum.480
2. Land Prices
The market value of a parcel of land is determined by the present
value of the expected flows of benefits and burdens that attach to it.
Legal norms and institutions affect these flows and, in turn, land val-
ues. For example, improvements in institutions for maintaining land
records, resolving title disputes, financing land transactions, and deter-
ring trespassers and encroachers would all tend to boost the value of
real estate. Conversely, a palace could depress land values by engag-
ing in uncompensated expropriations, conferring overly generous re-
demptive rights upon kin of ancestral occupants, and issuing edicts
that authorized the uncompensated ouster of persons who had bought
from, or lent to, the financially distressed. By increasing title risks,
these sorts of measures would also deter land improvements. A land-
owner might decline to erect cattle booths or cultivate a vineyard if
a redeemer could retake the land without paying for these
improvements.
The net influence of a legal policy depends heavily on context.
For instance, a traditional restraint that prohibited alienation of patri-
monial land outside the family might raise the value of a parcel sited
in a village where the maintenance of close-knittedness was essen-
tial.481 However, this same sort of restraint would lower market value
wherever the negative effects of limiting the pool of eligible buyers
outweighed the benefits of the restraint.
Although price controls were familiar in ancient Near Eastern
economies, Morris Silver has adduced evidence of floating land prices
in many contexts. 82 Wide variations in real estate prices per unit of
area are well-documented for third-millennium Mesopotamia483 and
early second-millennium Sippar,484 Nippur,485 and Nuzi.486 When
480. SILVER, PROPHETS, supra note 58, at 230. For sources on interest in the ancient Near
East, see id. at 77 n.3. The Hebrew Bible, which sought to suppress the charging of interest,
reveals nothing about market interest rates.
481. See supra text accompanying notes 400-02.
482. SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucrusES, supra note 3, at 92-96. A restored letter fragment
from the Canaanite city of Tel Aphek suggests an understanding that scarce items sell at higher
prices. Id. at 95-96 (citing William H. Hallo, A Letter Fragment from Tel Aphek, 8 TEL Aviv 18
(1981)).
483. GELB ET AL., ANCIENT KUDURRUS, supra note 75, at 251-74.
484. HARRIS, supra note 228, at 26-27 (house sale contracts), 217-20 (field sale contracts), &
242 (orchard sale contracts).
485. Stone, supra note 167, at 267, 272-76 (prices of fields, houses, and temple offices).
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King Ahab sought to acquire Naboth's vineyard, he did not refer to
any administered price, but instead stated, "I will give you a better
vineyard for it; or, if it seems good to you, I will give you its value in
money."c4
7
Many scholars have asserted that ancient Near Eastern fields sold
for "low" prices, given their crop yields.48 At Old Babylonian Nuzi,
for example, fields sold for approximately the value of one year's
grain harvest.4 9 Evidence from the New Kingdom (1540-1070 B.c.)
suggests that Egyptian fields sold for 1 to 1-2/3 times the value of the
annual crop.
490
These figures in themselves do not prove that land prices were
low. The market value of a field is set not by its gross yield but by the
capitalized value of the net rental income it generates. 491 Average an-
nual net rental income was likely to be far smaller than the value of
one year's crop. A landlord typically was entitled to only 1/3 or 1/2 of
the crop as rent, might have had to incur a variety of maintenance
expenses, and was likely to owe land taxes to the crown. In addition,
to remain fertile, fields periodically had to be left fallow; indeed, irri-
gated fields in ancient Mesopotamia tended to be fallowed as often as
every other year.492 Lastly, in calculating the present value of the net
rental income a field would generate, an investor would take into ac-
count the risks of losing the land on account of a misharum, a redemp-
tive claim, or an expropriation. 493 If those risks would be roughly
comparable to the risks faced by ancient lenders, the proper capitali-
zation rate would equal the annual market rate of interest: on the or-
der of 30%-to-50%.
With these considerations taken into account, the ratio of field
sales prices to gross rents in the ancient Near East does not seem out
of line.494 Suppose, for example, that a landlord's average annual net
rental income from a particular field were to be 1/6 of the average
486. Zaccagnini, Price of Fields, supra note 184, at 4-7 (Per unit of area, prices of fields
varied widely, with irrigated fields at the high end.).
487. 1 Kings 21:2.
488. See, e.g., Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 44-45 (asserting that the price of land was ex-
tremely low at all times in Mesopotamia).
489. Zaccagnini, Price of Fields, supra note 184, at 7 (regarding this "a very low valuation").
490. Baer, Low Price, supra note 100, at 29-30.
491. By analogy, a supermarket's gross receipts are a poor indicator of the market value of
the enterprise.
492. POSTGATE, MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 26, at 159, 175, 294.
493. See Zaccagnini, Price of Fields, supra note 184, at 16-19 (discussing possible risks at
Nuzi).
494. See also the discussion in Baer, Low Price, supra note 100, at 30-45.
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annual crop (counting fallows), and the applicable discount rate were
to be 33-1/3%. In that case, simple mathematics indicates that the
field's expected sales value would be equal to one-half the value of the
field's average annual crop. If the field were fallowed in alternate
years, its sales value would be equal to the value of the crop harvested
in a nonfallow year. In essence, the "low" sale price of land in the
ancient Near East (like the high rate of interest) was largely a function
of a legal environment deeply hostile to investors.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Introduction identified four general schools of theory on the
process of historical change: rational-actor optimists, rational-actor
pessimists, stage theorists, and cultural pluralists. On the whole, how
does the assembled evidence on land regimes in the ancient Near East
harmonize with these alternative conceptions?
Rational-actor optimists generally anticipate that individuals will
be successful-within the constraints of their limited resources and
knowledge-in creating institutions that will assist them in achieving
cooperative outcomes. Rational-actor pessimists stress how path-de-
pendencies or the machinations of powerfully placed interest groups
may prevent members of a society from coordinating to mutual ad-
vantage. 495 We ourselves conclude that, in general, the evidence from
ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel supports a hybrid of the opti-
mistic and pessimistic views of institutional development.
Much of the evidence adduced seems consistent with our initial
hypothesis that a small, close-knit social group will typically succeed in
devising land-tenure institutions that maximize the welfare of the
group's members.496 When free from outside coercion, ancient villag-
ers appear to have adopted the marble-cakes of land-tenure arrange-
ments that law-and-economics theory predicts: private ownership of
houses, gardens, and small arable lands plots; communal or institu-
tional ownership of arable and grazing lands where that arrangement
was necessary to exploit efficiencies of scale or spread risks; and a
495. Most scholars who use the rational-actor approach decline to be pure optimists or pessi-
mists, of course, and instead adopt a hybrid approach such as the one we discuss below.
496. At least one major caveat is in order. Villagers in ancient civilizations had scant success
in controlling activities that caused diffuse environmental damage. Excessive irrigation caused
severe salinization of lands in southern Babylonia and eventually helped make the area uninhab-
itable. Like others in the ancient Near East, the Israelites destroyed most native forests. But
even societies that have possessed scientific knowledge far superior to the ancients have had
difficulty developing institutional responses to activities with pervasive spatial consequences.
See Property in Land, supra note 3, at 1334-35.
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network of open-access land.4 97 The record suggests that the social
impetus toward these arrangements was universal-i.e., present re-
gardless of a society's religion, ethnic make-up, and other cultural
features.
The optimistic branch of our hybrid assessment also has a dy-
namic dimension. As land became scarcer, technology advanced, and
literacy spread, these ancient civilizations tended to develop more effi-
cient land-sale procedures and tended to relax traditional restraints on
alienation that were ill-adapted to an urbanizing economy. These in-
novations, however, hardly occurred smoothly or in predictable
stages.
The pessimistic element of our assessment is consonant with pub-
lic-choice theory. In the ancient Near East, a powerful hierarchy
(state, temple, or conquering invader) commonly imposed plainly
inefficient land institutions. While the ancient state could earn legiti-
macy by providing a variety of public goods, it also often tended to
push counterproductive measures that would enrich well-positioned
constituencies at the expense of those less powerful. Examples are
the Ur III dynasty's experiment in a centrally managed economy, the
ancient Near Eastern traditions of usury laws and debt-relief edicts,
and the Israelite priests' Jubilee program and related populist policies.
Economic theory suggests that these hierarchical interventions, when
effective, would have impaired the evolution of customary land insti-
tutions and reduced overall welfare. In sum, in the boldest of strokes,
the ancient record tends to support the relative efficacy of civil society
and both the necessity for, but utter unreliability of, the state.
These generalizations have implications for the remaining two
schools of theory of historical evolution. Stage theorists, such as Marx
and Weber, have sought to discern regular historical progressions. We
side with the critics from many camps who have assailed this once
fashionable idea.4 98 To be sure, the history of the ancient Near East
does reveal cross-cultural trends, for instance the movement toward
greater land alienability. But stage theory implies more static and dy-
namic regularities than the evidence supports. Snapshots of land insti-
tutions in the three ancient civilizations do not show the monolithic
497. For this theory, see source cited supra note 5.
498. See, e.g., McC. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 243-44 (attacking Wittfogel for exaggerating
smoothness of temporal evolutions of institutions); KARL POLANYI, THE LIVELIHOOD OF MAN
liii-lv, 42-43 (Harry W. Pearson ed., 1977) (offering criticisms of stage theory that seem in tension
with Polanyi's own notion of a "great transformation" (see supra note 320)); SILVER, ECONOMIC
STRucruRzs, supra note 3, at 158.
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land-tenure regimes that scholars such as Deimel and Diakonoff have
hypothesized existed during periods of third millennium Mesopota-
mia.4 99 Instead, these snapshots show a multiplicity of arrangements.
Most dynamic change, moreover, was erratic. For example, there was
no consistent trend from communal toward private property.500 The
histories of these civilizations-especially Mesopotamia and Israel-
are punctuated with unpredictable cataclysms such as coups and inva-
sions. The erratic political environment of the ancient world eviscer-
ates any attempt to successfully construct a stage theory.
More concretely, ancient Near Eastern history provides no sup-
port for the belief, harbored by utopians, that human societies once
enjoyed a pacific period of reliable reciprocal altruism, with little strife
and evil, only to then fall from innocence.50 ' Pace Marx, Engels,
Rousseau, and the Genesis account of Adam and Eve, institutions
such as private property in land and social classes can be found in the
most remote portions of the historical record. Those who keep push-
ing the "classless stage" of social organization back to the latest period
of pre-history reveal an impulse to insulate this dream from risks of
falsification. 50 2
These criticisms partially tar Karl Polanyi and Moses Finley, his-
torians of ancient economies whose work was highly influential at
least through the 1970s. They asserted that land markets did not exist
in the ancient world 503 and believed that ancient man, unlike modern
"economic man," was motivated primarily by considerations of status
and solidarity.5 4 This is a milder version of the same utopian senti-
ment. Four millennia ago, ancient peoples conferred land entitle-
ments in bundles much like the current fee simple, and engaged in
transactions-land sales, leases, sharecropping arrangements, and
usury-law evasions-that a modem-day real-estate lawyer can readily
recognize.
499. See supra text accompanying notes 173-77.
500. See also Field, supra note 193, at 319-20 (In Europe, the partially communal open-field
system followed a more individualistic agriculture.).
501. For expressions of this belief, see. e.g., ENGELS, supra note 11, at 162-63 (quoting Lewis
Henry Morgan) (Before the introduction of private property created distinct social classes,
ancients lived in solidary clans.); Diakonoff, supra note 74, at 17, 31-32, 43 (Emergence of social
classes during and after third millennium in ancient Near East weakened nonexploitative kin-
based communes.).
502. See also supra notes 174-75.
503. See supra notes 21, 320, and accompanying text.
504. See SILVER, ECONOMIC STRucTuREs, supra note 3, at 137-38 (characterizing Polanyi's
and Finley's views). Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal Schol-
arship, and the Law-and-Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197, 202 (1983) (The mindset
that calculates costs may be culturally contingent.).
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Cultural pluralists, the members of the fourth and final school,
stress not stages of history but the plasticity of human institutions.
Many facets of the three civilizations undeniably were distinctive
enough to sustain the current disciplinary specializations in Assyriol-
ogy, Egyptology, and Biblical Studies. But, in practice, the elaborate
religions and mythologies of these societies seem not to have had
much effect on their basic land institutions.
Much scholarship on the ancient Near East has stressed the influ-
ence of cultural differences on land regimes. Knapp and Saggs, for
example, reiterate the common view that the Sumerians had a tradi-
tion of communal (and institutional) land ownership, which was
thrown over by Akkadians who honored a Semitic tradition of private
property in land.5 0 5 We are skeptical of this stress on the influence of
ethnic traditions. People on the ground, recognizing that functional
land institutions are essential to their daily survival, are unlikely to
voluntarily decide to reshape them to comply with idiosyncratic cul-
tural precepts. We doubt that ethnic variations per se have counted
for much in the land context. For example, the "Sumerian" and "Ak-
kadian" systems of land tenure appear basically to have been func-
tional adaptations to environments dominated, respectively, by
irrigated and rain-fed agriculture.
The evidence adduced suggests that law-and-economics can be a
timelessly valuable heuristic for analyzing human affairs. Frank
Michelman has brilliantly argued for the possibility that the efficiency
of private property is socially contingent.5 06 The historical record in-
dicates, however, that this institution has existed, as far back as one
can see, for houses, gardens, and more. As a practical matter, ancient
villagers' diverse and undogmatic responses to land scarcity were
tightly constrained, not highly plastic.
505. See sources cited supra note 90; see also Renger, Arable Land, supra note 36, at 280-81,
283, 295, 305 (giving significant weight to influence of ethnicity, ideology, and religion on land
institutions).
506. Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ErIucs, ECONOM-
IcS AND THE LAw 3, 33-34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
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